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California is facing yet another year of unprecedented, record-breaking drought. 
At this time of need, US agencies have turned to Australia to identify the 
strategies that urban water utilities and water agencies adopted to survive its 
worst drought in recorded history, the Millennium Drought, which lasted from 
1997 until it officially ended in 2012. 
Overall, Australia survived the Millennium Drought, demonstrating world leading innovation and 
exceptional examples of water planning and management driven by crisis. Yet there are also 
examples of missed opportunities, as well as initiatives and decisions that did not work well. The 
research presented here reflects on some of the key lessons from the Australian Millennium 
Drought experience in order to assess the opportunities for California.  
This report serves as a powerful resource for Californian water planners and managers as it 
grapples with drought and seeks to build resilient and sustainable water systems. It provides a 
one-stop shop overview of the key events and initiatives implemented in Australia’s four largest 
cities – Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane (and the surrounding south east Queensland region), and 
Perth.  
The work represents one interpretation of the drought and responses, informed by significant 
engagement with utilities and governments throughout that period, and a close working 
knowledge of the water systems and the policy environment. 
Specific attention is given to the role of demand-side measures in reducing the impact of 
drought. In Australia, urban water efficiency was the quiet achiever – saving more water at 
lower cost and greater speed than supply options. California can benefit from long-term 
structural water savings by implementing water efficiency measures at a similar breadth and 
scale. 
On top of the success of urban water efficiency, this report highlights a number of key findings 
from Australia’s experience of the Millennium Drought. 
	  
• Responding	  to	  a	  severe	  drought	  requires	  both	  supply-­‐side	  and	  demand-­‐side	  
options.	  It	  is	  crucial	  to	  implement	  the	  cost-­‐effective	  (lowest	  cost	  per	  volume)	  
options	  first.	  Although	  an	  individual	  demand-­‐side	  program	  may	  save	  less	  water	  in	  
total	  than	  could	  be	  supplied	  by	  a	  large-­‐scale	  infrastructure	  augmentation,	  this	  does	  
not	  by	  itself	  justify	  prioritizing	  all	  supply	  options	  –	  depending	  on	  the	  context,	  some	  
large-­‐scale	  supply	  infrastructure	  can	  be	  overall	  more	  costly,	  and	  have	  longer	  lead	  
times	  for	  implementation.	  During	  the	  Australian	  Millennium	  Drought,	  a	  broad	  range	  
of	  cost-­‐effective	  water	  efficiency	  programs,	  rapidly	  rolled	  out	  at	  scale,	  saved	  
significant	  volumes	  of	  water	  and	  reduced	  the	  rate	  of	  drawdown	  of	  dams.	  	  
	  
• Powerful	  demand-­‐side	  programs	  encourage	  and	  support	  water	  savings	  from	  across	  
the	  breadth	  of	  water	  users	  and	  stakeholders	  –	  households,	  businesses,	  industries	  
and	  governments.	  This	  maximizes	  the	  potential	  for	  water	  savings	  and	  can	  achieve	  
economies	  of	  scale,	  particularly	  for	  household	  programs	  that	  target	  multiple	  uses	  
and	  residents.	  Equally	  important,	  across-­‐the-­‐board	  community	  involvement	  of	  all	  
sectors	  fosters	  a	  sense	  of	  fairness	  and	  collaboration	  in	  saving	  water,	  and	  acceptance	  
and	  support	  for	  overall	  drought	  response	  strategies	  including	  restrictions	  and	  
targets.	  	  
	  
• An	  effective	  supply-­‐side	  strategy	  considers	  modular,	  scalable,	  diverse	  and	  
innovative	  technology	  options.	  As	  the	  duration	  and	  severity	  of	  a	  drought	  at	  any	  
point	  is	  unknown,	  a	  rapid	  yet	  progressive	  approach	  to	  the	  supply	  infrastructure	  and	  
contract	  decisions	  is	  required	  to	  avoid	  technology	  and	  vendor	  lock-­‐in,	  and	  to	  
prevent	  costly	  post-­‐drought	  stranded	  assets.	  Also,	  drought	  presents	  the	  need	  and	  
opportunity	  to	  invest	  in	  innovative	  supply	  and	  reuse	  options	  at	  scale,	  to	  test	  and	  
develop	  approaches	  to	  implementation,	  policy	  and	  public	  acceptance.	  	  





• Clear,	  credible	  communication	  about	  the	  drought	  situation	  and	  response	  is	  
paramount	  to	  public	  participation	  and	  support.	  In	  the	  Australian	  Millennium	  
Drought,	  multi-­‐modal	  approaches	  to	  promotion,	  education	  and	  communication	  
spanned	  information	  about	  water	  savings,	  water	  storage	  levels,	  requirements	  and	  
expectations	  about	  drought,	  and	  planned	  supply	  options.	  Drawing	  on	  their	  
experiences	  during	  the	  drought,	  some	  cities	  have	  also	  developed	  “forward-­‐looking”	  
outlook	  scenarios	  with	  clear	  outlines	  of	  response	  plans	  in	  different	  drought	  
situations.	  
	  
• Good	  data	  and	  robust	  monitoring	  and	  evaluation	  are	  critical.	  To	  manage	  demand	  
requires	  measurement	  at	  the	  sector,	  household	  and	  end	  use	  levels	  in	  order	  to	  be	  
able	  to	  design	  and	  implement	  well	  targeted	  water	  saving	  measures.	  Similarly,	  
accurate	  measurement	  and	  analysis	  of	  the	  sustainable	  yield	  of	  supply	  systems	  is	  an	  
integral	  part	  of	  supply–demand	  planning	  and	  drought	  response.	  Measurement	  of	  
the	  savings	  from	  water	  saving	  programs	  is	  also	  critical	  to	  improving	  the	  design	  of	  
future	  programs.	  
	  
• Innovative	  water	  pricing	  mechanisms	  are	  required	  to	  balance	  water	  savings,	  
revenue	  and	  equity	  goals.	  During	  the	  Millennium	  Drought,	  pricing	  was	  not	  used	  to	  
incentivize	  water	  savings.	  However,	  following	  the	  drought	  in	  several	  jurisdictions	  
prices	  rose	  significantly,	  more	  in	  response	  to	  infrastructure	  expenditure	  than	  to	  
cover	  revenue	  shortfall	  from	  reduced	  demand.	  There	  is	  potential	  to	  explore	  more	  
innovative,	  revenue-­‐neutral	  pricing	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  “fee-­‐bate”	  schemes	  which	  
reward	  low	  water	  users	  and	  penalize	  higher	  water	  users.	  
	  
























!Lessons from Australia 
The impact of the Australian Millennium Drought on urban water supplies varied 
widely across the country due to differing climates, water supply systems and 
policy responses. Different stakeholders also experienced the drought in 
different ways. This summary, and the background material on which it is based, 
represent one interpretation of the drought and responses to it. It is an 
interpretation that is informed by significant engagement with utilities and 
governments throughout that period, and a close working knowledge of the 
relevant water systems and policy environments. 
This summary uses five key dimensions to represent five ways of thinking about the lessons 
that might prove useful in California. These dimensions were identified by considering and 
documenting the Australian and Californian droughts. We analyzed: four Australian case studies, 
a number of initiatives that were implemented during the Millennium Drought, and other 
initiatives that helped to mitigate its impacts.  
 





1. MANAGING CRISIS AND 
OPPORTUNITY 
The drought presented as both a crisis and an opportunity to 
innovate – to roll out new water savings initiatives and 
incentives at scale, and to leverage community and political 
will to make needed policy and regulatory changes. At the 
same time, politicized, crisis-driven decision-making resulted 
in costly over-investment.  
 
Australia is prone to droughts, but the Millennium Drought was different. In some cities it was 
the worst on record. The falling dam levels raised concerns within the water industry that 
Australia was facing the impact of a shift in inflows due to climate change and brought about a 
realization that water usage in Australia was too high, and that the country was too vulnerable 
due to its reliance on rain-dependent water sources. These concerns highlighted the need to 
diversify water sources by adopting measures spanning water efficiency, source substitution, 
major reuse, and non-rain-dependent supplies, such as desalination.  
The gradual realization of the severity of the drought and Australia’s vulnerability sparked a 
series of responses that included world-leading innovations, and both very good and poor 
examples of water planning and management. The heightened concern about climate change 
increased the political will for action and hence the funding available for drought response 
measures, as well as the potential for shifts in policy and water use. 
Significant investments were made right across the board in initiatives 
ranging from water efficiency and source substitution such as rainwater 
tanks through to major recycling and supply options such as desalination.  
 
Due to major investments in water efficiency programs and restrictions on outdoor water use, 
water demand dropped significantly. Further water savings were achieved through building 
regulations requiring water-using equipment in new and refurbished homes. In some cities, 
large structural and behavioral shifts in water demand were achieved through suites of water 
conservation initiatives. For example, in South East Queensland residential water demand fell 
by 60% to 33 gpcd (125 lcd) and has only increased to around 45 gpcd (170 lcd) since then. 
These savings helped to delay or eliminate the need for expensive, new water and wastewater 
infrastructure to accommodate future population and economic growth. 
New policy measures were also developed. For the first time, governments contemplated real 
options planning, based on the principle of readiness – for example, by being ‘ready to construct’ 
Sydney’s desalination plant as insurance should dam levels drop below a specified trigger level. 
This planning approach allows greater flexibility for investment in large capital items by making 
the expenditure ‘staged’ and modular. It also allows for the option to curtail completion of a plant 
if conditions change. 
Responses to the Millennium Drought also provide cautionary lessons. In particular, careful 
planning by government agencies and utilities in several instances was set aside by political 
decisions. This occurred in the Victorian Government’s decision to construct a desalination plant 
and implement inter-catchment transfers, in the NSW Government’s decision to construct the 
desalination plant regardless of dam levels, and in the Queensland Government’s decision to 
construct the Traveston Dam – a decision that was subsequently overturned. These examples 
highlight a significant risk of crisis-driven decision-making when future rainfall patterns are 
uncertain – this can result in over-investment in large-scale infrastructure that is expensive, 
energy-intensive, subject to unfavorable contractual terms, and in many cases not actually used, 
resulting in costly stranded assets that will need to be paid for by the community for decades, 
well ahead of when they may be needed. 
  





2. WORKING TOGETHER 
Strong partnerships, knowledge sharing and coordination 
between organizations – states, agencies, utilities, 
researchers and industries – supported success during the 
Millennium Drought. After the drought these collaborations 
can dissolve, and governments and utilities face the 
challenge of retaining the savings and knowledge that these 
partnerships have made possible. 
 
First, dedicated investment in partnerships between government agencies, utilities, industries, 
and communities were fundamental to designing and implementing successful water savings 
programs. These programs involved governments and utilities partnering with businesses that 
used water, with businesses that manufactured and supplied water-using devices, and with 
businesses that provided services to help customers manage their gardens.  
These partnerships stimulated a multi-million dollar water efficiency 
industry during the drought years.  
 
These partnerships also helped to signal a “we’re all in it together” approach to water efficiency, 
and they helped generate public support for overall water management initiatives. In Western 
Australia, there was a long history of the Water Corporation and the state government engaging 
businesses in programs to build capacity and provide accreditation to practitioners, especially in 
the irrigation and landscaping industries. Across Australia, ‘green plumber’ programs were 
supported to encourage tradespeople to become involved in the task of improving water 
efficiency. Water efficiency programs were funded and their implementation facilitated by 
utilities and state governments – with many industry associations and trade groups (such as 
plumbers’ associations) dedicating their in-kind time. 
Second, government agencies formed drought response teams across departments and utilities, 
often at a high level, to address the drought. In the state of New South Wales for example, the 
‘Water CEOs’ group’, comprizing the heads of all water-related agencies and water utility CEOs, 
was convened and tasked with managing the drought response, with the head of the Cabinet 
Office as chair. Whilst some coordinating groups met during the drought only, in some areas 
such as in Melbourne, the Drought Coordinating Committee members have since reconvened to 
review and revise the approach to drought planning and response.  
Third, sharing information and experiences across the industry – between utilities in each state 
and between state government agencies – also helped to drive success. For example, in Perth 
and Melbourne, detailed surveys and analyses of how people use water were shared among 
utilities, spawning a new era of detailed sector and end use-based forecasting of water demand 
and potential savings. And in South East Queensland, where the timeline for implementation of 
water efficiency programs was extremely short, advice from Sydney Water proved invaluable. 
Sydney Water had implemented similar large-scale programs prior to the drought, and had 
subsequently evaluated them to demonstrate savings. Water companies and state governments 
were instrumental in commissioning and supporting applied, water-related research across all 
domains (including climate variability, seasonal forecasts, pricing, conservation/efficiency 
programs, institutional analysis, systems modeling, and environmental water needs) and in 
documenting and sharing knowledge at industry events and conferences. 
The Millennium Drought stimulated significant applied research worth millions of dollars that 
was shared through multiple channels, including industry conferences and/or utility interest 
groups (e.g. the Water Services Association of Australia and the Australian Water Association). 
Whilst some locations have seen a shift since the drought towards discussions about the 
importance of water in urban landscapes for “liveability” and the role of water efficiency in 
integrated water management, in general after the drought investment in water efficiency and 
water efficiency teams waned. As a result, the new water efficiency industry partnerships and 
research dissipated. This has created two challenges: how to maintain water savings that were 
partially dependent on ongoing partnerships, and how to retain such knowledge for future 
droughts. 







3. SPEAKING AND LISTENING 
Communication and public engagement on water savings 
programs and the water scarcity situation were essential to 
the success of all water saving initiatives. However, in many 
places, governments and water utilities failed to grasp the 
opportunity to undertake best practice community 
engagement and water-supply decision-making. 
 
Many water efficiency marketing and media campaigns were extremely effective in fostering 
community support and action. Utilities and governments applied a variety of interlinked 
communication approaches and targeted a wide range of stakeholders. For example: 
" Linking the restrictions message with the availability of incentives, rebates, and other 
water savings initiatives was a very effective mechanism for lessening the potential for 
negative responses. 
" There were concerted efforts to implement restrictions on outdoor water use as a key 
pillar of a public promotion and education campaign across users and sectors, to help 
foster the sense that all types of water users were obliged to help save water. As a result, 
communities were generally supportive of restriction programs during the drought. 
" In some regions, the media was extensively used, for example to provide information on 
dam levels and per capita water consumption in evening news broadcasts. Engaging the 
media was a crucial element in the effectiveness of campaigns to reduce water use. 
" The ‘Target 140’ campaign in SEQ and the ‘Target 155’ campaign in Victoria applied 
clear and consistent messaging and helped to focus the campaigns to reduce water use 
and reinforce community support for a common goal. These, and similar campaigns 
across the country, exceeded their targets. 
" Some initiatives were employed for the first time in Australia, to significant effect. For 
example, in SEQ the One to One program included direct communication to high 
residential water users through direct mail with a survey, and links to water saving offers, 
along with additional follow-up if there was no response. 
 
Communication and public engagement is a one-to-many activity, with 
government agencies and utilities speaking to the community.  
 
Successful community engagement means effective listening as well as skilful speaking. 
Decision-making during drought involves trade-offs – and it is important to invite the community 
to provide their input on these trade-offs. Despite the sense of urgency to make decisions 
during a drought, effective citizen engagement does not necessarily involve lengthy processes, 
and is critical to ensuring decisions reflect community preferences and in turn engendering 
citizen support. For example, in Western Australia, a robust and comprehensive process of 
community engagement on water security issues was undertaken in 2003, including a citizens’ 
forum held at Parliament House, addressed by the State Premier. In Melbourne, retail water 
companies made extensive use of customer consultative committees, and in several locations 
retailers are required under law to consult with the community on the development of their 
strategies or operating licences. 
However, there were many missed opportunities to implement such best practice citizen 
engagement processes to maximize the transparency of decision-making and encourage 
citizens to become involved in and support drought response strategies. In most states, 
decisions regarding investment, policy choices, water use trade-offs, and levels of service were 
made centrally, occasionally in consultation with industry representative organisations but not 
necessarily directly with representative members of the broader community and water 
customers. Governments did not take advantage of the level of innovation that Australia has 
demonstrated in deploying robust forms of community engagement. Successful community 
engagement means effective listening as well as skilful speaking.  







4. GETTING THE RULES RIGHT 
Governments need to implement best practice policy settings 
and regulatory arrangements to enable investment in cost-
effective supply measures as well as water efficiency 
measures.  
 
During the Millennium Drought, and since, some Australian utilities have been torn between 
investing in customer water efficiency programs (which incur operating costs and reduce water 
demand and revenue) and investing in water supply infrastructure, which involves mainly capital 
costs. Conventional regulatory settings encourage utilities to minimize operating expenditures 
and to set prices designed to earn a rate of return on capital. This has the effect of encouraging 
investment in supply-side options rather than demand-side options, irrespective of the cost-
effectiveness of those options. 
It is crucial to have best practice regulations that encourage utilities 
to invest in customer water efficiency, or better still, regulations which 
require them to do so. 
Sydney Water’s regulated operating license required it to achieve aggressive water efficiency 
targets, and these targets subsequently became a significant component of the Metropolitan 
Water Plan in 2004, 2006 and 2010. This is an example that shows how regulatory 
arrangements can strongly encourage investment in demand-side measures. As part of this 
arrangement Sydney Water publicly reported annually on its performance against the targets for 
water efficiency, reuse and leakage. These reports are an excellent example of transparency 
and accountability to the public.  
National, regulated schemes providing information about the water efficiency of fittings and 
appliances were crucial to underpinning rebates, retrofits, audit programs, and building 
regulation programs. While mandatory labelling and the water efficiency of appliances is, of 
necessity, regulated by the national government, each state in Australia developed its own 
regulatory arrangements for water efficiency in buildings, mainly for new houses or major 
renovations. Some state governments (Queensland, Victoria) opted for more prescriptive 
regulations, specifying the technologies that were to be installed in new houses, whereas New 
South Wales developed BASIX, a performance-based instrument requiring new houses to 
reduce water demand by up to 40% compared to average household consumption in the year of 
its introduction (2004). There are pros and cons of prescriptive vs. performance-based systems. 
Poorly chosen rules (such as requiring rainwater tanks in areas with little rain) can involve 
significant expense for small water savings. On the other hand, robust performance-based 
systems such as BASIX can be effective but may take several years to develop and implement.  
Best practice regulatory arrangements allow for revenue neutrality and for the pass-through of 
the cost water efficiency measures to the customer. Australia, at the time of the Millennium 
Drought, had a mixture of regulatory arrangements for utilities, some of which resolved this 
tension by allowing price pass-through and others that had not. Most utilities continue to face 
this tension between promoting water conservation and reducing long-term costs for the 
customer on the one hand, and satisfying regulatory requirements and responding to state 
government policy drivers on the other. Due to the major expenditure on supply infrastructure 
during the drought – and the resultant need for revenue to cover the costs – there is a reduced 
emphasis on utilities and governments implementing water efficiency improvements.  
Following the drought, water prices were increased due to expenditure on large-scale 
infrastructure during the drought – a more significant factor than any revenue shortfall due to 
reduced water demand. During the drought, in some locations significant attention was paid to 
frequency of billing to provide pricing and usage information to customers. However, pricing 
mechanisms, such as fee-bates were not implemented as a water conservation incentive. There 
were missed opportunities to further investigate whether innovative pricing incentives could be 
feasibly designed and implemented to achieve water savings during drought while avoiding 
adverse equity impacts. 







5. PICKING THE LOW HANGING 
FRUIT 
During drought, it is essential to consider all supply- and 
demand-side options, and to prioritize implementing “no 
regrets” least-cost options. Real options planning, and the 
concept of “readiness to implement”, enable decision-makers 
to prioritize options and deal with uncertainty about the length 
and severity of a drought.  
 
An integrated resource planning framework is one that: ensures that all options (supply and 
demand) are assessed, and compares them on a level playing field; includes risk; and 
incorporates the full range of costs and benefits. This includes citizen preferences where trade-
offs and value judgements are involved. This approach is fundamental to long-term supply–
demand planning, which should also encompass drought response planning. 
Prior to the Millennium Drought, the principles of integrated resource planning had been 
recognized in some states, including for example, in the Western Australian Water Conservation 
Strategy and the Sydney Water Recycling and Water Conservation Strategy. This resulted in 
plans that incorporated least-cost options, that is, implementing the lowest unit cost measures 
first, to minimize the overall life cycle cost. In Sydney, for example, the 1995 corporatization of 
Sydney Water gave rise to an operating license requirement to reduce system per capita 
demand for total water abstractions from 132 gpcd (503 lcd) in 1991 by 35% to 87 gpcd (329 
lcd) by 2011. This was based on the assessment that the previously proposed supply option, a 
new dam on the Shoalhaven River, had a higher marginal cost than this reduction in demand. 
Integrated resource planning was used to determine the least-cost strategy to meet these 
targets. 
As a result of this background activity, there was a foundation to build on during the drought. In 
SEQ, utilities and the state government had been slower to act on pricing reform and direct 
investment in water efficiency, but when the drought became serious there was major 
investment in water efficiency options including retrofitting of water efficient equipment, 
business water efficiency programs, and leakage and pressure management. These had a 
significantly lower unit cost than almost all the supply options that were implemented.  
In terms of drought response options, low cost, ‘no regrets’ options were pursued, that is 
implementing measures that would continue to provide a cost-effective benefit after the drought 
was over. This ranged from accessing deep water storage in Sydney’s major dams and the 
construction of key inter-catchment transfers to increase system yield, through to maximizing 
investment in reducing system losses and introducing customer-based water efficiency 
programs.  
Cost-effective water saving measures that had never previously been 
implemented at scale were rolled out across states and cities. For 
example, the offer of rebates for water efficient washing machines in 
Western Australia was so successful that it resulted in a permanent 
transformation of the industry and the market. 
In Sydney, SEQ and Victoria, utilities and governments analyzed the potential for accelerated 
water efficiency options to ‘flatten the depletion curve’ of water storages in order to ‘buy time’ for 
large-scale supply options to come on line. 
In addition, the Millennium Drought saw, for the first time, the application of real options 
planning, which includes the ‘readiness to construct’ strategy for desalination or indirect potable 
reuse capacity or ‘readiness to use’ groundwater sources. This means staging the planning and 
implementation of high cost capital works to allow maximum flexibility, depending on water 
resource constraints and the weather. The real options approach is an example of selecting the 
lowest-cost option, as it reduces the overall life cycle cost, taking into account the statistical risk 
associated with rainfall predictions. 




Cost-effective investment in water efficiency was done well in many places in Australia prior to 
and during the drought, and indeed this was the reason that some cities did not reach or come 
closer to dead storage.  
However, the principles of integrated resource planning were not applied consistently. Some 
cities and towns in Australia had programs of investment in water efficiency that were excellent 
and very broad, but not deep in terms of the overall level of investment and the extent of the 
available conservation potential. 
 
 





!Measures in summary 
During the drought, and leading up to it, there were dozens of measures developed and 
implemented by utilities, governments and community organizations. This table presents a 
summary of these measures, with an assessment of the strengths and challenges of each one. 
 
DEMAND-SIDE MEASURES 
MEASURE STRENGTHS CHALLENGES 
Restrictions  
A core option used during 
the drought, mainly 
targeting outdoor water 
uses in the residential 
sector, and some non-
residential sectors 
" Restrictions, implemented by 
water utilities in collaboration 
with state governments, were 
highly effective at reducing 
water demand. They were a 
critical initiative that slowed dam 
depletion rates and helped to 
“buy time” for decision-makers. 
" Restrictions were applied at 
increasing levels of severity as 
the drought worsened. In some 
locations, restriction levels were 
linked to dam levels, which 
enabled clear communication to 
and acceptance by the public. 
" Restrictions were widely 
supported by the public at less 
stringent levels, and considered 
as “fair”. Key to this was open 
and effective communication 
and promotion, and integration 
within an overall water 
conservation message (which 
included other sectors). 
" Most savings gained have 
remained in place (minimal 
bounce back) due to a 
combination of behavioral and 
structural water efficiency 
changes. (However due to 
demand hardening, estimates of 
savings from restrictions need to 
be revised for future drought 
planning).  
" While regulations were in place 
and some official monitoring 
occurred, penalties were rarely 
used. Compliance with 
restrictions was achieved 
through engendering community 
support and monitoring. 
" In some locations, particularly 
those with drier climates, and 
where a complete sprinkler 
ban was implemented, 
restrictions had an impact on 
trees, gardens and lawns, 
affecting both public and 
private green spaces. In 
some locations, long-
established trees died and 
sportsgrounds remained 
without lawns. This caused a 
loss of amenity and 
recreational value in various 
public open and recreational 
spaces.  
" While the community 
generally supported 
restrictions, in some locations 
specific industry sectors (e.g. 
garden product suppliers and 
outdoor water-using 
businesses) complained that 
some industries were 
targeted but not others. 
" Restrictions became a 
politicized issue and despite 
community support, decisions 
were made on the basis of 
“never” having restrictions 
again. Decision-making would 
have benefited from more 
sophisticated consultation 
with the community on levels 
of service and trade-offs 
about restrictions. 





DIY Water saving kits 
Kits containing regulators 
and aerators for showers 
and taps provided free of 
charge in public places 
such as shopping malls.  
" This was a cost effective 
initiative which achieved high 
participation rates and 
measured savings. 
" DIY water savings kits were 
particularly effective for 
engaging individuals who did 
not want a plumber to enter 
their home, or were skilled 
enough and preferred to 
change their own fittings. 
" This program can have 
the effect of ‘cream 
skimming’ or reducing the 
savings and cost 
effectiveness of larger, 
more comprehensive 
programs. 
" Unlike the audit program, 
or a compulsory swap of 
showerheads, the “DIY” 
nature of this initiative 
meant there was a risk 




exchanged up to two 
inefficient showerheads for 
free efficient devices 
obtained from various 
outlets, such as shopping 
malls, local council offices 
and hardware stores. 
" This was a cost effective 
initiative which achieved high 
participation rates and 
measured savings. 
" Because the swap required 
disconnection of existing 
showerheads, this provided 
a very effective way to 
ensure devices were 
installed. 
" This program can also 
have the effect of ‘cream 
skimming’ or reducing the 
savings and cost 
effectiveness of larger, 
more comprehensive 
programs. 
" In some areas, the 
program required 
households to provide a 
current water bill which 
excluded some renters. 
(There are varying 
regulations and practices 
in different jurisdictions 
about whether landlords 
or renters pay for water). 
" Consumer acceptability 
depends on quality of 
shower experience; 
careful selection of 
showerheads for swap 
programs is thus 
important to success.  
Toilet replacement 
programs 
Typically, the program 
involved a qualified 
plumber replacing up to 
two single flush toilets with 
new efficient 1.2/0.8 gallon 
(4.5/3 liter) dual flush 
toilets with a rebate from a 
state government. 
" This was a relatively cost-
effective initiative, although it 
had a higher unit cost than 
several other efficiency 
options, which achieved 
higher participation rates and 
higher measured savings. 
" Most major programs 
partnered with specific 
plumbing services and major 
toilet suppliers to reduce 
costs and provide a 
consistent products and 
service. 
" In the cases where a toilet 
was replaced in a 
secondary bathroom, or 
where programs allowed 
the replacement of older 
style dual-flush toilets, 
with new dual flush toilets, 
this had the effect of 
reducing the savings per 
household relative to the 
opportunity, and therefore 
the cost-effectiveness of 
the program 





Washing machine rebate 
program 
Rebates were provided 
towards the purchase of a 
washing machine at point 
of sale for those machines 
with a specified minimum 
efficiency level. 
" This was a popular and cost-
effective rebate program that 
overall helped to transform 
the “stock” of washing 
machines from inefficient 
models (often top-loaders), 
to front-loading efficient 
machines. These typically 
use half the water per wash.  
" Washing machine suppliers 
were at the forefront of 
helping to transform the 
market by supplying new, 
more efficient models. They 
were enabled by the 
increase in demand, due to 
widespread rebate uptake 
provided across multiple 
states.  
 
" Australia-wide consistent 
appliance water efficiency 
labelling, and later minimum 
water efficiency standards, 
aided the transition. 
Providing information to 
consumers (including 
campaigns by water 
companies) to raise 
awareness was key to 
success. 
" In early stages of the 
rebate programs less 
efficient machines were 
included. 
" Even with the significant 
shifts in stock (30% of 
machines were efficient 
front loaders within a 
decade, up from 10%) 
there is further, significant 
opportunity for water 
savings.  
" As the market shifted, 
more efficient machines 
became available at lower 
cost. This likely resulted in 
a significant proportion of 
free riders that limited the 
cost-effectiveness of 
programs. 
Rainwater tank rebates 
A typical program involved 
scaled rebates for 
participants buying tanks 
ranging from 260 gal (1 kl) 
to 2,600 gal (10 kl). 
Additional rebates were 
available to incentivize 
connection to indoor end 
uses such as toilets and 
washing machines to 
optimize savings. 
" Very high rebate uptake, 
which, in combination with 
building regulations in most 
states that incentivized or 
required rainwater tanks, 
raised the prevalence in 
cities from 9% to 20% in less 
than a decade. 
" Rainwater tanks were 
effective in capturing water. 
They resulted in water 
savings in those locations 
where rainfall patterns in the 
location of use (populated 
areas) differed from the 
rainfall pattern in the location 
of rainfall (dam catchments), 
and where there was 
significant rain in said 
catchments.  
" Tanks provided other 
benefits such as capture of 
alternative water sources 
and reduction in stormwater 
runoff. 
" Restrictions and rebates 
aided voluntary uptake of 
rainwater tanks. 
" Many theoretical studies 
greatly overestimated the 
water savings that would 
be achieved. Savings 
were limited in locations 
where rainfall patterns in 
populated and catchment 
areas were similar, and/or 
where rainfall was very 
low. As a result, most 
rainwater tank rebate 
programs were not cost-
effective. 
" Subsequent research 
indicates that there are 
problems with the longer 
term maintenance and 
functionality of tank 
systems, which also 
constrains water savings.  
" Poor configurations (e.g. 
roof area, small tank 
sizes, pump 
arrangements, mains 
switching devices) can 
result in low water savings 
and high energy intensity. 






residential water users  
This program targeted the 
top 10% of residential 
water users using over 37 
gpcd (140 lcd). It involved 
a detailed water use 
survey sent to 79,000 
households and follow-up 
personalized water plans 
advizing on how to save 
water. 
" A highly effective program 
which had the effect of 
significantly reducing the 
average water use per 
capita, due to the targeting 
of the top 10% of water 
users. 
" Further savings could 
have been achieved with 
more direct approaches 
(e.g. door-knocking) to 
providing information 
about water savings (e.g. 
as in WaterSmart in 
Western Australia). Now, 
with social media 
pathways, there could be 
more opportunities for 
change.  
 
Target 140/ 155 
An innovative, multi-media, 
multi-strategy 
communication campaign 
to encourage reduction in 
household water use to 37 
or 41 gpcd (140 or 155 lcd 
in South East Queensland 
and Melbourne 
respectively) across all 
uses. 
" Successful in part due to 
the strong focus on 
research into the attitudes 
of the target audience and 
integration with other 
initiatives, including 
restrictions on outdoor 
water use, the (residential) 
high water users’ program, 
non-residential sector 
water efficiency programs 
and rebate programs. 
" The 37 gpcd (140 lcd) 
target was achieved only 
four weeks after the launch 
of the program, 13 weeks 
earlier than planned, and 
awareness and recall of 
the messaging of the 
program were similarly 
successful. 
" The program design was 
subsequently replicated 
successfully in Melbourne 
as Target 155. 
" Difficult to measure 
savings due to timing, 
seasonal effects and 
interaction with other 
programs 
" After the drought ended, in 
SEQ Target 140 was 
replaced with ‘Target 170’. 
A confusing aspect of the 
program was the 
subsequent messaging of 
‘Target 170’ and that 
encouraged people to use 
more water, although after 
the drought ended water 
demand typically ranged 
between 40 and 53 gpcd 
(150 and 200 lcd) between 




Program focused on Asian 
restaurants and provided 
subsidies to swap water 
cooled commercial kitchen 
wok stoves with waterless 
equivalents. 
" Waterless woks was a 
niche but innovative 
program demonstrating the 
effectiveness of 
collaborating with 
community groups that 
understand the water use 
patterns and 
communication needs of 
specific subsectors.  
" The water savings were 
achieved through audits 
and designing and 
manufacturing a 
technological solution.  
" Although only a small 
sector the savings potential 
for Asian restaurants 
swapping to waterless 
woks was up to 90% with a 
payback period of only one 











plans / water saving 
actions plans  
" Water utilities, in conjunction 
with state governments, 
successfully engaged 
businesses across sectors to 
assist them to develop and 
implement water 
efficiency/savings 
management plans. These 
plans were tailored to 
individual businesses and 
included an audit of water use, 
and identification of water 
saving initiatives.  
" In many locations these plans 
initially targeted the top water-
using businesses in the state, 
and case studies were shared 
online. As the drought 
progressed, and residential 
users were subject to higher 
levels of water restrictions, 
business users (above certain 
quantity levels) were required 
to prepare and submit plans to 
water utilities. 
" Water utilities provided 
information and other 
knowledge-based support to 
industry to prepare these 
plans. 
" In some areas, the 




resourced. As a 
result, although all 
businesses using 
above certain 
quantities of water 
were supposed to 
develop plans, this 
was not enforced. 
Communication and 
promotion of water 
conservation and water 
savings  
" The communication, 
promotion and outreach 
elements of water 
conservation campaigns 
were pivotal to their success 
across jurisdictions. They 
also engendered and helped 
to maintain strong 
community support for water 
restrictions and other 
conservation measures.  
" Storage levels and 
consumption information 
were highlighted on 
websites, television news 
broadcasts, billboards, 
phone apps and other 
media. Information about 
water conservation and 
recycling was similarly 
distributed in bills, on 
websites, via schools and 
through the media. 
 





Pressure and leakage 
management 
Increasing investment in 
the inspection of water 
mains for leakage, 
improving responses to 
mains breaks, and 
installing pressure 
management equipment. 
" Low cost, no-regrets option 
when operating within the 
economic value of leakage 
control. 
" Strong community relations 
benefit associated with utility 
action and responsibility. 
Public interest in water use 
resulted in increased 
community interest and 
reporting of leakages, and 
quick response times. 
" Limited experience within 
some utilities increases 





MEASURES STRENGTHS CHALLENGES 
Access to dead storage 
Construction of pumps and 
infrastructure to access 
water below gravity off-
takes within existing dams. 
" In 2006 in Sydney, dead storage 
was accessed which resulted in 
an increase in reliable system 
yield by 32,000 AF/a (40 Gl/a) 
(nearly 10%).  
" This option is only 
applicable in certain 
supply systems.  
" Marginal cost of 
supplied water is 
high because 
additional water is 
only used during 
severe drought. 
" Water at the bottom 
of the dam can be 
of poor quality and 
this can cause 






infrastructure for long-term 
and/or emergency 
replenishment of water 
supplies. 
" Applied in Sydney in 2006 to 
obtain an additional potential 
alternative water source which 
was designed to operate only 
during drought, allowing the 
aquifer to recharge at other 
times. It was an illustration of the 
“readiness approach” to 
implementing drought 
responses. 
" In Perth, extended existing 
groundwater sources in 
combination with other non-rain 
dependent options were utilized 
as a means of supplying water 
in response to long-term climate 
change. 
" Marginal cost of 
water is relatively 
high if only used 
during drought. 
" High energy 
implications 






in some areas. 







Construction of new 
pipelines and channels to 
transfer water from other 
catchments. 
" In South East Queensland the 
interconnection of water supply 
systems proved useful for 
increasing yield and reducing 
risk in some areas. 
 
" In Victoria, a 
significant 
investment of USD 
1.4 B (AUD 2 B) 












widely criticized in 
terms of the benefit-






Construction of seawater 
desalination plants for 
supply of water to 
coastal cities 
" In Perth, the desalination 
plant was used during 
drought to supply water. It 
reduced the need for further 
groundwater extraction (and 
possibly the associated 
risks). Currently, two 
desalination plants supply 
about 40% of Perth’s water. 
" Introduces a rainfall-
independent source of 
supply that can aid in 
increasing overall system 
reliability and drought 
security. 
" In many areas, large-scale 
desalination was 
implemented before more 
cost-effective water 
efficiency options were 
applied.  
" The opportunity to create 
smaller modular plants to 
help diversify supply from 
rain-dependent sources 
was missed in some 
locations. Several large-
scale plants were being 
constructed across cities at 
the same time which, due 
to competition for 
resources and expertise, 
resulted in significant cost 
increases. 
" Some very large plants 
were built which are now 
idle and unlikely to be used 
until, or even well into, the 
next drought, representing 
significant stranded assets. 
Readiness 
Preparing to build large-
scale supply-side 
initiatives such as 
desalination and major 
reuse but only 
proceeding to 
construction if deemed 
necessary due to dam 
trigger levels. 
" Readiness concepts (real 
options) were applied in, for 
example, Sydney 
(desalination), SEQ (indirect 
potable reuse) and in Perth 
(groundwater). 
" In some locations, e.g. 
Sydney, the “readiness” 
was abandoned and large-
scale infrastructure 
construction commenced 
ahead of planned water 
level triggers. 
 






Large-scale high quality 
recycled water treated 
for various sectors from 
residential estates to 
large industrial 
customers for non-
potable purposes to 
offset potable water 
demand. 
" During drought, recycled 
water assisted in offsetting 
potable water requirements 
in both the residential 
(typically outdoor water 
usage provided through a 
third pipe arrangement) and 
non-residential sectors 
helping to slow the depletion 
of the potable water supplies 
" Useful in diverting effluent 
from sewage treatment 
plants for other purposes to 
protect sensitive receiving 
waters from nutrients. 
" In SEQ, recycled water 
schemes and the choice of 
technology were designed as 
a readiness strategy for 
indirect potable reuse. 
" In Melbourne, recycled water 
production from wastewater 
treatment plans was 
increased and supplied for a 
range of uses including 
agriculture, local sports 
grounds and public open 
spaces. 
" Significant government 
funding provided during the 
drought led to many non-
financially viable schemes 
coming to fruition (Qld 
Pimpama Coomera, Qld 
Western Corridor, Sydney 
Rosehill) which are now 
closed or running sub-
optimally financially post-
drought due to reduced 
demand. 
" The stakeholder and 
regulatory arrangements 
varied across jurisdictions 
and in some instances 
caused significant barriers 
and delays to 
implementation. 
" Cost to produce recycled 
water often more than 
potable water hence post-
drought value of recycled 
water diminishes along 
with demand. 
" Pop-up demountable 
sewer mining opportunities 
that could have been used 
to irrigate recreational open 
space were missed. 
Indirect potable reuse 
(IPR) " Aquifer recharge in Western 
Australia for Perth is 
currently operating and has 
high community acceptance. 
There is also the capacity for 
the Western Corridor 
Recycled Water Scheme in 
SEQ to be converted to an 
IPR plant. 
 
" In Toowoomba in 2006, a 
community referendum 
resulted in the blocking of a 
proposed IPR scheme, due 
to poor community 
engagement. This had 
ongoing impacts for 
community and political 
acceptance of IPR across 
Australia. 
 






or precinct) wastewater 
reuse) 
" There are multiple triggers 
and drivers for decentralized 
approaches including 
drought policies that set 
recycling targets, state 
government subsidies and 
funding of recycling 
schemes, BASIX, and 
growing community and 
business expectations during 
drought for “smart” water 
savings developments.  
" Decentralized systems have 
significant potential for 
achieving avoided costs in 
new developments for 
sewage infrastructure. 
" Decentralized systems also 
provide the opportunity for 
integrating energy and 
nutrient capture. 
" Schemes which involve 
sewer mining have the 
potential to provide drought 
resilience for public open 
space and recreational 
areas, which would 
otherwize be subject to 
restrictions during drought. 
" There are complexities 
involved with designing 
and administering 
regulatory and licensing 
schemes for new private 
entities involved in the 
development of 
decentralized schemes.  
" There is a perception that 
energy usage can be high 
and this is the case in 
some schemes. However 
the actual energy 
implications of 
decentralized schemes 
depend on the basis used 
for comparison – e.g. 
whether the alternative is a 
gravity system, or requires 
pumping over a large 
distance, or desalination.  
" There were missed 
opportunities to take a 
system-wide approach to 
identifying the potential for 
decentralized systems. If 
assessed on an individual 
scheme-by-scheme basis 
and over a short timeline, it 
may seem more cost-
effective to extend the 
existing centralized system 
than to support a new 
decentralized system. 
However, system-wide, 
and taking into account 
longer life-cycle 
maintenance and renewal 
costs of existing water and 
sewer infrastructure 
networks, decentralized 
systems prove to be cost-
effective. 
 
The list of measures above indicates the breadth of the measures that were implemented. It is 
useful, however, to be aware of the relative magnitudes of these measures, in terms of their 
contribution to water saved or supplied, as well as the relative unit cost. In addition, the energy 
and greenhouse gas implications of different types of measures are an important parameter, 
given the strong nexus between the water and energy sectors. 
Table 0.1, and Figure 0.1 illustrate these parameters, for a range of measures, consolidated into 
type. These results are indicative, based on experience and the assessments done in a range 
of cities. For the demand-side measures these results and outcomes are quite consistent, 
however for supply options, such as dams, inter-catchment transfers and recycling schemes, it 
is highly dependent on the local situation. With those caveats, these results are useful to 
compare relative magnitudes of net contribution to reducing the supply-demand gap, unit net 
cost and greenhouse gas contribution, using typical Australian greenhouse gas intensity from a 
predominantly coal fired grid (1 US ton per MWh). 
 
  





Table 0.1 – Indicative savings and yield, and unit cost and greenhouse intensity of 



















Demand Appliance performance standards 13 60 -14.71 
Demand Non-residential program 31 390 -0.44 
Demand Pressure and leakage reduction 28 450 -0.18 
Demand Residential outdoor program 19 510 -0.18 
Demand Residential indoor program 10 560 -14.71 
Demand New developments (Smart Growth) 18 680 0.00 
Demand Effluent reuse 27 1,010 0.74 
Supply Emergency supply readiness 32 70 0.04 
Supply Accessing dead storage 24 210 0.00 
Supply Agriculture efficiency transfers 14 340 -0.07 
Supply Weir raising 16 790 0.00 
Supply Desalination 36 1,460 3.68 
Supply New dam 97 1,690 0.74 
 
Figure 0.1 – Indicative savings and yield, and unit cost of selected supply and demand-
side measure types (White et al. 2008). 
 
 






Australia’s Millennium Drought, which lasted for more than a decade in some 
areas, was much longer and deeper than California’s drought has been so far. 
However, California is not yet in the clear. While there is a forecast of wet 
weather ahead, precipitation may not be in the right form (i.e. snow), in the right 
locations, or in sufficient amounts to bring about a measurable improvement in 
water conditions across the state. Moreover, climate change projections 
suggest that extreme events, like droughts, will become more frequent and 
intense in California. 
In this section of the report, we reflect on lessons learned from Australia’s experiences with the 
Millennium Drought and examine what these lessons mean for California’s urban areas, which 
are the focus of this report.  
Breadth of water efficiency programs 
California is in the midst of its most severe drought on record. During the early stages of the 
drought, California Governor Jerry Brown asked Californians to avoid wasting water and 
voluntarily reduce potable urban water use by 20% from 2013 (pre-drought) levels. Initial 
actions to avoid water waste included asking utilities to set limits on watering and enacting 
modest prohibitions on, for example, washing sidewalks and driveways with potable water and 
allowing runoff when irrigating with potable water. In most areas, the voluntary reduction targets 
were not met. In response to worsening drought conditions, Governor Brown announced the 
first-ever statewide mandatory reduction in urban water use in April 2015 – calling on 
Californians to reduce potable urban water use by 25% from pre-drought levels. Water use 
varies dramatically throughout California, and the state set reduction targets for water suppliers 
serving 3,000 connections or more that ranged from 4% to 36% – with the largest reductions 
required for those areas with the highest residential per capita water use. Thus far, the majority 
of the state’s water suppliers have met their individual targets, and the state is on track to 
achieve a total reduction in potable water use of 25% from pre-drought levels, saving over one 
million acre-feet of water from June to November 2015 (SWRCB 2016). 
Water reduction targets varied considerably across the state, and local water utilities have 
implemented a range of measures to meet these targets.1 Like Australia, California has reduced 
water demand through short-term conservation measures – that is, measures that rely on 
changed behavior, such as restrictions on the number of days lawns can be watered and calls 
for shorter showers and fewer toilet flushes. These types of conservation measures represent a 
fast and relatively inexpensive way to meet state-mandated reduction targets in potable water 
use and have helped reduce drawdown from surface water dams and groundwater aquifers.  
Also like Australia, California has invested in efficiency improvements during the drought that 
will provide long-term reductions in water use, such as the state-run toilet and turf replacement 
rebate programs and many locally managed incentive programs. The most active programs 
have been those targeting outdoor water uses, which account for half of urban water use in 
California and up to 80% in some hot, dry inland areas. Lawn conversion programs have been 
especially popular, with customers paid from USD 0.50 to 5.00 per square foot of lawn replaced 
with low water-use landscapes. A recent survey found that the majority of program participants 
(90%) are residential customers (CUWCC 2015). While some water suppliers have operated 
lawn rebate programs for several years, many more are now providing these programs to their 
customers, and suppliers report that customer demand typically exceeds the budget available 
for these programs. Lawn conversion programs are providing both immediate and long-term 
water savings; they are also helping to transform the market by creating a demand for low 
                                                       
1 It is of note that there are more than 430 large water suppliers (serving 3,000 connections or more) in California and 
several hundred more small water suppliers. 




water-use plants and a workforce trained to install and maintain these landscapes and changing 
aesthetic preferences for urban landscapes.  
Yet there remains significant potential to reduce indoor water use, and in California during the 
drought there has been inadequate attention paid to opportunities to replace old, inefficient 
appliances and fixtures in homes and businesses. A recent study by Plumbing Manufacturers 
International (2015) found that only 5.5% of an estimated 33.5 million installed residential and 
commercial toilets in California are high-efficiency models using 1.3 gallons (4.8 liters) per flush. 
Additionally, only 21% of lavatory faucets and 24% of showerheads meet the WaterSense 
standard of 1.5 gallons (5.7 liters) per minute and 2.0 gallons (7.6 liters) per minute, respectively. 
Similarly, Mayer et al. (2010) found that only 20% of households had clothes washers that used 
less than 25 gallons (94 liters) per load. Because the current building stock has a mix of old 
inefficient and new efficient devices, targeted outreach to high users would maximize the cost-
effectiveness of indoor efficiency investments. California could look to Australia’s indoor rebate 
and One to One programs to boost indoor efficiency efforts. 
 
During and even before the drought, there has been far less emphasis in California on reducing 
non-residential water use, which accounts for about one-third of the state’s urban water use. 
The non-residential sector includes the commercial, industrial and institutional sectors, and 
water savings from these users are not prioritized because of the diverse ways in which water is 
used and the belief that reducing non-residential water use would hinder economic development, 
especially as the economy in many areas is beginning to recover after the recent downturn. 
Several programs implemented in Australia could be implemented in California. For example, 
Sydney’s water utility partnered with a local non-governmental organization working with ethnic 
communities to incentivize Asian restaurants to replace water-cooled woks with waterless 
models, each of which saved 1,300 gallons (5,000 liters) of water per day. In Queensland, 
businesses using between 0.8 and 8 acre-feet (987 kl and 9,870 kl) of water per year were 
required to install water efficient devices, such as low flow faucets, pre-rinse spray valves, and 
showerheads. Businesses whose annual water use exceeded 8 acre-feet (9,870 kl) were 
required to develop water efficiency management plans that accounted for water use, identified 
measures to reduce water use by 25%, and had a plan to implement those measures. Fines of 
up to USD 90,000 (AUD 125,000) were levied for non-compliance; however, to assist with 
compliance, rebates and incentives totaling USD $2.2 M (AUD 3 M) were provided to more than 
2,000 customers. 
Scale of water efficiency programs 
Investments in conservation and efficiency programs have increased in California in response to 
the drought but are much lower than the investments in Australia during its Millennium Drought. 
Between 1990 and 2014, the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD), a 
regional wholesaler that sells water to 26 member agencies serving 19 million people across 
Southern California, invested USD 352 M (AUD 490 M) in water efficiency (MWD 2015). In 
response to the drought, the MWD dramatically boosted its conservation and efficiency budget 
to USD 450 M (AUD 625 M) for the fiscal years 2014/2015 and 2015/2016. MWD estimates that 
its member agencies will invest an additional USD 50 M (AUD 70 M), bringing the regional 
investment to USD 500 M (AUD 700 M) over a two-year period, or USD 13 (AUD 18) per person 
per year. Financial incentives in fiscal year 2014/2015 paid for the removal of 50 million square 
feet (4.65 million m2) of grass, and the introduction of 215,000 high-efficiency toilets, 27,000 
high-efficiency clothes washers, and 13,000 rain barrels. The MWD’s investments are 
significant and will help to provide water savings long after the drought ends. The limited data 
available, however, suggests that similar levels of investment were not made in other parts of 
the state.  
Across Australia, investments were much higher, and water efficiency efforts reached far more 
customers. The WaterFix program, for example, reached nearly half a million homes in Sydney, 
about a third of homes in the Greater Sydney area. Under this program, licensed plumbers 
would perform a household water audit, check for and repair leaks, and install efficiency devices, 
such as dual-flush toilets, showerheads, and faucet aerators. Customers paid USD 16 (AUD 22) 
for the plumber to visit the home plus an additional amount for any services rendered, and were 
allowed to repay the water utility for these services over a four-month period. A similar program 
in South East Queensland, costing USD 30 M (AUD 43 M), reached nearly 230,000 households, 
or one in six homes in the region, over a 10-month period. The estimated minimum value of the 
water efficiency measures in South East Queensland, excluding the leakage and pressure 
reduction programs, would be equivalent to approximately USD 110 (AUD 165) per person in 
today’s values. This is approximately ten times the per capita investment in Southern California 
described above.  




Diversifying the supply portfolio 
As was seen in Australia, reliance on a single supply that is dependent on precipitation 
increases vulnerability to drought, and diversifying the water supply portfolio can help reduce 
that vulnerability. In response to the 1987-1992 drought, many Californian communities, 
especially those in Southern California, took steps to develop alternative water supplies, such 
as recycled water and brackish groundwater, and to expand their efficiency programs. The 
intensity of the current drought, however, is renewing interest in developing “drought-proof” 
supplies, including seawater desalination. Indeed, some water suppliers have sought reductions 
in their state-mandated water targets by developing new supplies, such as desalination 
(Stapleton, 2015).  
 
Here, Australia provides some important lessons for California. Due to declining dam levels, 
Australia made massive investments in major new water supplies, including USD 7.2 billion 
(AUD 10 billion) in six seawater desalination plants and several recycled water plants. Today, in 
many cities, these plants have been shut down and represent stranded assets. Water 
customers are still repaying substantial capital costs but getting a minimal benefit. While these 
shuttered plants could be activated if needed (thereby providing a reliability benefit), the 
treatment technologies could also become obsolete before they are needed and may require 
significant investment to bring them back online, as has happened in Santa Barbara. These 
examples highlight the risks associated with building large, expensive new supplies to meet 
needs during drought periods. 
A least-cost planning approach could help to avoid costly mistakes. Least-cost planning 
requires considering the full range of supply and demand measures and selecting the lowest 
unit cost measures first. Within this framework, measures that reduce demand should be 
compared on an equal basis with those that increase supply. As noted by the Western 
Australian Government (2003): “This is achieved by viewing water saved through water 
conservation as a resource, in exactly the same way water stored in a dam is regarded as a 
resource. Comparisons include the total costs and benefits to water service providers and the 
community, ensuring that the water planning options implemented are those with the lowest 
cost to the community” (emphasis added). It is of note that while traditional assessments look 
narrowly at the cost and benefits to the utility, least-cost planning takes a much broader view by 
also including costs and benefits to the community. This allows for inclusion of the co-benefits of 
projects, such as reductions in energy use and wastewater treatment costs or environmental 
benefits from efficiency programs. 
 
Another way to avoid costly mistakes during a drought is to employ a readiness-based or real-
options approach where possible. With this approach, specific water supply or demand 
measures are pursued when certain criteria are met. The appropriate approvals and permits are 
put in place beforehand so that implementation or construction of the measure can be initiated 
immediately, and there is sufficient time for the project to be implemented before it is needed. 
For example, Sydney’s readiness strategy included a trigger to construct a desalination plant 
when dam levels fell below 30%, which would have allowed sufficient time to build the plant 
before reaching dead storage (White et al. 2006). Unfortunately, the readiness strategy was not 
followed through, resulting in the construction of a USD 1.4 billion (AUD 1.9 billion) desalination 
plant that was immediately placed in stand-by mode. Adherence to the readiness option would 
have resulted in significant financial savings, well over USD 1 billion, because only the funding 
needed for planning and permitting would have been committed, or the responsible agencies 
could have exited the investment at appropriate points by contractual agreement. 
Regional integration 
Water management systems in California are highly fragmented, with more than 400 water 
suppliers, each with at least 3,000 customer connections. The sheer number of utilities makes it 
difficult to coordinate activities and reduces the economies of scale when developing demand 
management programs and initiatives and in communications. While Australia generally has 
fewer water utilities, during the drought there were more than 20 councils in the South East 
Queensland region providing separate water services. In response, the Queensland 
Government established the Queensland Water Commission, which was given overarching 
policy, planning, and regulatory functions that allowed for the coordination of water use 
information, strategy development, and project implementation across formerly fragmented 
water supply services managed by individual councils.  
In California, there are many initiatives, by government and the water industry, that are working 
in this direction. The state incentivizes utilities to participate in regional integrated water 




management programs by providing them with access to bond-funded grant programs that they 
wouldn’t otherwise be able to access. Likewise, water utilities in Sacramento, the San Francisco 
Bay Area, Santa Ana, and other areas, are trying to better coordinate their activities. The 
experience from Australia is that there is always a need for improved integration, coordination, 
and communication when drought response programs in most areas are led by individual water 
utilities. 
Pricing and short-term revenue losses 
Water utility managers are sensitive to the reductions in sales that have come as a result of 
drought response actions, and concerns about short-term revenue losses are a significant 
barrier to expanding water efficiency programs in California. Yet efficiency investments are 
typically less expensive than building new supplies. Various strategies are available to help 
utilities cope with short-term revenue losses, such as implementing drought surcharges, 
building reserves, and avoiding take-or-pay contracts.2 Water utilities can benefit by improving 
their customer engagement efforts to build trust and educate users about water systems, the 
costs to manage those systems, and the long-term savings from efficiency investments. This 
was a missed opportunity in Australia, where the public support was achieved by the sheer 
scale of the communication and the urgency of the water saving investment, rather than a 
specific targeted campaign which explained the relative costs and benefits of different strategies. 
Pricing mechanisms such as drought surcharges or fee-bates (rewarding low water users, 
increasing prices for high water users) were not implemented during the Millennium Drought. 
Community and customer representative groups raised important concerns about such 
mechanisms having the potential to disproportionately affect poorer households, or renters who 
had less capacity to install water-efficient fittings compared to home-owners. However, following 
the drought, prices were increased anyway – to pay for large-scale supply infrastructure. This 
presents a key opportunity for California to carefully investigate whether short-term drought 
surcharge incentives could be innovatively designed to address equity concerns, incentivize 
water savings during drought, and potentially avoid longer-term costs for customers.  
 
Data and information 
The Australian experience shows how important it is to have good data on water use, and on 
the impacts, costs and benefits of the available measures to increase supply and reduce 
demand. In South East Queensland, for example, aggregating the demand data for over 20 
utilities was a large task, but made a huge difference in terms of managing the crisis. As is the 
case in many places, water data in California are limited. For example, as noted above, data on 
conservation investments are not readily available, and so it is difficult to evaluate the 
effectiveness of these investments. In response to the drought, the state now requires urban 
water suppliers with 3,000 or more customer connections (or those that provide more than 
3,000 acre-feet (3.7 gigaliters) of water annually) to submit reports on water use and supplied 
population on a monthly basis. These data show large variations in per capita water use around 
the state and are being used to assess compliance with state-mandated reductions in potable 
water use. This is an important step in the right direction, but more is needed. 
 
A lack of data can hinder efforts in the effective and efficient management of water resources. 
For example, if data on the market penetration of various devices, such as efficient clothes 
washers and toilets, are not readily available, planning for the rapid deployment of water 
efficiency programs is more difficult. Likewise, if data on the proportion of wastewater that is 
reused is not available for utilities across the state, this will curtail wastewater recycling. More 
and better data are needed. Additionally, consistent methodologies are needed to evaluate and 




                                                       
2 For additional resources to address this issue, see www.financingsustainablewater.org. 
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1. Introduction  
 
California is experiencing an unprecedented statewide drought. To help 
manage this, legislation has been enacted and incentives offered to assist in 
curbing demand and increasing water system investment. 
In recent times, Californian water managers from the federal to utility levels have sought to 
understand the experience in Australia in dealing with its worst-ever drought, the Millennium 
Drought, that gripped the nation for over a decade from the early 2000s until it officially ended in 
2012. 
This document represents a collation of valuable information and lessons gathered from the 
experience of the drought and its impact on urban water supply and demand in Australia, with 
the objective of assisting California in its time of need. As is the case in Australia, the vast 
majority of water in California is used for agricultural purposes, but the management systems 
and cost structure for urban water supply and demand are qualitatively distinct and separate. 
The key focus of this work is to explore the role of urban water efficiency within the context of 
water supply-demand planning and drought planning and management. While this report covers 
water supply measures, the emphasis is on water efficiency for two reasons. Firstly, in Australia 
it was the ‘quiet achiever’, saving more water, at lower cost and greater speed, than supply 
options. Secondly, while there has been much focus on the supply measures during the drought 
and after it ended, there has been less analysis and description of the experience of 
implementing demand-side measures and their role in reducing the impact of the drought. 
The report aims, not to be exhaustive, but to be a “first port of call” for those wanting to know: 
" what happened in Australia during the drought for some of the major cities 
" how water managers responded 
" what kinds of options were considered and implemented 
" the scale of investment used and participation rates in efficiency attained 
" what happened after the drought broke 
" what are the key lessons (both what worked well and what could have been done better)  
" how California might be able to take such lessons on board. 
 
The study also aims to tell the story of the drought response, acknowledging that while much 
was done well, with hindsight, there were initiatives that might have been done differently. 
This project was funded to support the greater water industry in California through the 
generosity of the following agencies: 
" Metropolitan Water District of Southern California 
" San Francisco Public Utilities Commission  
" Water Research Foundation.  
 
This report has been produced by the Institute for Sustainable Futures (part of the University of 
Technology Sydney, Australia) in collaboration with the US-based Alliance for Water Efficiency 
and the Pacific Institute. Input was provided by numerous Australian water industry 
stakeholders who worked through the Millennium Drought and have invaluable experience and 
insights into how to deal with drought, including project staff from the Institute for Sustainable 
Futures who were involved in supply–demand planning and drought response for utilities and 
government agencies in every mainland state and territory over the period of the Millennium 
Drought.  
Note that units in the text are primarily US-based, except for graphs and tables, where 
conversions are provided in the captions. Costs are shown as US dollars, which have been 
converted from nominal Australian dollars using current exchange rates. 
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2. The Australian context 
 
Australia is one of the driest continents on earth, and in recent history it has been affected by 
drought on many occasions. These droughts have been predominantly limited to specific areas. 
However, from around 1997 to 2012, Australia went through one of the worst droughts in its 
recorded history, the ‘Millennium Drought’. This drought was different to past droughts because 
it covered much of Australia and lasted for a longer period.  
 
 
In many parts of Australia, rainfall was 
far lower than average, as shown in 
Figure 2.1, based on data for the 
period 2001 to 2007.3 The reduced 
rainfall significantly affected inflows to 
dams, which before the Millennium 
Drought provided the vast majority of 
water supplies for urban settlements 
in Australia. In Perth, for example, 
inflows fell significantly during the 
1990s and were consistently below 
the long-term average. In the early 
2000s, they fell even further, raising 
concerns that the region was 
experiencing long-term climate 
change (refer to Figure 2.2). Inflow 
patterns in other parts of Australia 
were similar, and dam water levels fell 




Figure 2.2 – Annual inflows to Perth dams (ATSE 2012) 
Note: volumes in gigaliters: 300 gigaliters = 250,000 acre-feet 
 
The severity of the situation varied in each city depending on the degree to which it relied on 
dams as a water source, and on storage capacity of the dam compared to annual water usage, 
as shown in Figure 2.3. For example, Perth and Adelaide have less dam storage than other 
major cities and are less dependent on those dams because these cities extract large volumes 
of water from other available sources – groundwater and the Murray River respectively.  
 
                                                       
3 https://www.longpaddock.qld.gov.au/about/publications/pdf/seq_drought_2007.pdf. 
Figure 2.1 – Rainfall from 2001 to 2007 relative to 
historical records 
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Figure 2.3 – Dam storage capacity relative to usage (ATSE 2012). Note: volumes in 





















Perth was one of the first cities to experience falling dam levels during the drought. In other 
areas such as Sydney and SEQ, dams hit their lowest points in 2007 (33% and 16%4 of their full 
capacity respectively), while Melbourne hit its lowest point two years later in 2009 (26%). 
Falling dam levels raised concerns within the water industry that climate change was reducing 
inflows, water usage in Australia was too high, and the country was highly vulnerable due to its 
reliance on rain-dependent water sources. These concerns highlighted the need to reduce 
water demand through conservation and efficiency and diversify water sources through source 
substitution, major reuse, and non rain-dependent supplies, such as desalination. The gradual 
realization of the seriousness of the drought and Australia’s vulnerability sparked a series of 
responses that included world-leading innovations, and both poor and exceptional examples of 
water planning and management. 
Supply and demand planning 
In some areas, consideration of ways to reduce demand and diversify water sources was 
relatively mature, and demand management and the use of best practice planning played 
central roles. Initiatives were implemented at the national, state, regional, and individual utility 
scales, ranging from new regulations to new planning tools and processes to realize water 
efficiency opportunities and pilot new programs.  
At the national level, efficiency labeling, originally instigated in Victoria, was taken over by the 
Water Services Association of Australia (WSAA) in 1999. The voluntary labeling scheme was 
expanded in 2001 to cover more products and became mandatory in 2003 under the federal 
government’s Water Efficiency Labeling and Standards scheme (WELS).5 This means that all 
appliances and fixtures covered under the scheme, most domestic water using equipment, must 
carry the label showing their relative efficiency under standardized tests, and in some cases 
must meet minimum standards to be sold. The scheme assisted in providing a consistent 
terminology for water efficiency products, such as showerheads, toilets, taps, washing 
machines, dishwashers, and urinals. Water utilities and government agencies used this 
terminology when communicating with customers and when highlighting the efficiency of the 
products they advocated as part of their demand management programs. Later, Smart 
Approved WaterMark6 provided a consistent labeling and certifying scheme for outdoor water 
efficiency products and other efficiency equipment not covered under WELS. 
At the state level, regulatory instruments, such as the Building Sustainability Index (BASIX)7 
were adopted. The BASIX instrument required new households (and later refurbished 
                                                       
4 https://papundits.wordpress.com/2011/01/20/wivenhoe-dam-levels-background-after-the-1974-flood/  
5 http://www.waterrating.gov.au  
6 http://www.smartwatermark.info/home/inner.asp?pageID=881&snav=3  
7 https://www.basix.nsw.gov.au/basixcms/ (accessed 4 January 2016). 
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households) to reduce their water usage by targets of up to 40% compared to a benchmark 
household usage of 65 gpcd (246 lcd). Targets were also set for energy use. 
At the utility level, some regulators established water demand or efficiency targets, and some 
utilities set them for themselves. In the case of Sydney Water Corporation (SWC) the New 
South Wales State Government set a strong target to reduce total water demand, as a 
condition of a new operating license, which included reducing total water demand by 25% and 
35% by 2001 and 2011 respectively, from the 1991 base level of 133 gpcd (503 lcd) (White et al. 
2001). SWC’s performance against these targets is reported annually as part of its operating 
license requirements.  
To help determine what to implement at the program level to achieve its targets, SWC 
commissioned the first detailed end use model in Australia to assist in understanding how 
water was used at a detailed level, what options might be adopted to save water and achieve 
the required targets, and how such demand-side options compared in terms of costs and 
benefits to supply-side options using an integrated resource planning approach (White and 
Howe 1998; Turner et al. 2010).  
SWC also began piloting demand management programs in 1999, including a residential audit 
program – Every Drop Counts WaterFix. This program was eventually implemented in nearly 
half a million homes in Sydney and has demonstrated significant water savings (Turner et al. 
2005). The success of this initiative inspired other regions to adopt similar programs.  
In other locations, including Perth, a similarly detailed understanding of demand was being 
explored at an end use level (Loh and Coghlan 2003), and Perth committed to significant 
demand management programs from early 2003. The washing machine rebate program, which 
was implemented in Perth between 2003 and 2009 and provided over 80,000 rebates provided 
in the first two years of the program, helped to rapidly transform the market due to the high 
demand for new, more efficient machines. 
The exploration of how water is used and how it could be saved through demand management 
using the principles of integrated resource planning has had a long history in Australia, actually 
commencing in the 1990s in smaller more remote communities (such as Kalgoorlie Boulder 
where over half the households took part in retrofits and rebate programs). The knowledge in 
this case was brought from the US by Australian champions inspired by how demand 
management and integrated resource planning were being implemented in the energy sector in 
the US, leading to the first Australian national Demand Management Guide in the late 1990s 
(White 1998). The Guide was subsequently updated in 2008 and 2010 (Turner et al. 2008; 
Turner et al. 2010). Specific work was also undertaken in Queensland in the late 1990s, which 
set the scene for the successful implementation of demand-side programs during the drought 
(Maddaus et al. 2000). 
This early demand management knowledge gathering and trialing in Australia, the broad-scale 
application of programs in larger cities such as Sydney and Perth, the national efficiency 
labeling, and the state-level regulation of new buildings, were inadvertently creating the 
foundations for a multi-pronged approach to understanding and managing demand. This 
approach utilized multiple instruments (i.e. regulatory, economic and educational) together with 
both technical and behavioral measures, which were all driving in the same direction. These 
foundations provided a springboard for the rapid expansion of planning and demand 
management activities that were to come as the drought intensified it was realized that demand 
management could play a significant and pivotal role in both short- and long-term planning. 
Drought planning 
Across the country, dams reached their lowest levels at different times and thus the urgency to 
deal with the drought varied from place to place at particular times. This allowed different cities 
to observe and replicate approaches as they saw fit. All of the major cities highlighted in this 
report: 
• engaged in some form of strategic planning of their water resources during the late 
1990s and early 2000s when the drought began to take hold, with Perth also 
demonstrating a high level of community engagement  
• moved away from rain-dependent sources, although South East Queensland still 
considered constructing a large dam and Perth considered transferring water from a 
high rainfall area thousands of miles away until these options were ruled out for 
environmental and economic reasons, respectively  
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• implemented water use and reuse targets, although the exact wording around these 
and the level of difficulty to achieve them varied, with Sydney being the first to 
commit to an aggressive target back in 1995  
• used restrictions to help cut demand as dam levels fell, with South East 
Queensland, for example, implementing a complete ban on sprinkler use, while 
Perth avoided such a ban  
• committed to water efficiency in a major way although Sydney and South East 
Queensland made the largest investments to slow the depletion of the dams, and in 
the case of Sydney, with the expectation of water efficiency made a major 
contribution to the future supply–demand gap 
• made significant investments in desalination and water reuse, with only Perth now 
currently using its desalination plants for base supply. 
Below is a brief summary of how planning unfolded in each area, with further details provided in 
each of the individual case studies. 
 
Perth, Western Australia 
While Perth has major groundwater resources and is thus less reliant on dams, it had been 
suffering from significantly reduced inflows during the 1990s, a problem that appeared to be 
worsening during the early 2000s. This led to concerns about the effects of long-term climate 
change becoming a motivation for: investigations into drought planning; the reduction in the 
expected yield of the water supply system; detailed research into water usage; early 
implementation of large-scale demand management programs in 2003; investigations into 
additional groundwater reserves; and consideration of large-scale alternative supplies that 
would alleviate the need for stringent restrictions (seen as a significant political issue). One 
large-scale supply option – the construction of Australia’s first major desalination plant – was 
completed in 2006. 
 
Sydney, New South Wales 
After developing the first end-use model in Australia, SWC piloted its first demand management 
program in the Shoalhaven, south of Sydney, in 1999. The SWC was going through a gradual 
process of testing and rolling out programs to assist in reaching its operating license demand 
management target. By early 2004, investigations were looking at what might need to happen 
for drought response as part of a metro-wide strategy, which later became the Metropolitan 
Water Plan 2004. In 2006, as the drought intensified, the Plan was further revized through 




revenue water) and 
recycled water, as 
required under the SWC 
operating license. It also 
included other emergency 
drought responses (see 
Figure 2.4). The Plan 
included, for the first time, 
a “real options” analysis 
and the inclusion of a 
readiness option, which 
meant that a commitment 
was made to fund 
preparatory work for a 
desalination plant at 
Kurnell in Sydney. The 
decision to actually build 
the plant would be 
delayed until a specified dam trigger level was reached that would allow sufficient time to build 
the plant before the dam reached dead storage, i.e. the level at which the remaining water in the 
dam could not be accessed without the need for additional pumping. 
Figure 2.4 – Sydney water supply and demand measures 
(source: White et al. 2006) 
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Brisbane and South East Queensland 
South East Queensland (SEQ) was in the throes of detailed supply–demand planning in the 
mid-2000s because of the significant and rapid growth in the area, resulting in the development 
of the SEQ Regional Water Supply Strategy. However, between 2004 and 2007 SEQ dam 
levels dropped from over 60% of capacity to less than 20%, and it was recognized that a 
strategy for short-term drought planning was needed. After significant multi-stakeholder 
planning led by the Queensland State Government, the Queensland Water Commission was set 
up in 2006 to oversee the management and implementation of the drought plan across the 
entire SEQ region. The Queensland Water Commission was responsible for managing the 
dwindling supplies, establishing water restrictions, and implementing a broad range of both 
short- and long-term water demand- and supply-side measures. These measures included rapid 
deployment of large-scale water efficiency rebate programs, the likes of which had not been 
seen in Australia, to slow depletion of the dam reserves. The measures also included 
construction of the state’s first desalination plant and a major wastewater recycling system.  
 
Melbourne, Victoria 
In Melbourne, detailed visioning of water planning had taken place at a state level for a number 
of years, culminating in the 2006 Central Regional Sustainable Water Strategy that included 
targets for conservation and reuse and clarity about institutional roles and deployment of 
demand- and supply-side options. However, as the drought progressed further, rapid and 
adaptive decision-making was employed with significant reliance on restrictions for slowing the 
depletion of the falling dam levels as well as water efficiency initiatives. Large-scale supply 
options were also considered, including the largest desalination plant in Australia and the 
controversial North-South pipeline. Both of these schemes were eventually implemented at 




Demand management played a major and critical role during the Millennium Drought in terms of 
providing: 
• significant water savings on a par in scale with new supply-side options, often at a 
fraction of the unit cost 
• solutions that filled both the short- and long-term supply–demand gap, resulting in 
significant reduced demand over the longer term that post-drought has had limited 
bounce back, with most of the initiatives representing “no regrets” options 
• additional time for water planners in various regions, which was invaluable in 
slowing the rate of depletion of the dams sufficiently to provide enough time to plan 
and develop additional supplies if required. 
Figure 2.5 below illustrates how the combination of restrictions, water efficiency measures, and 
curtailed environmental flow releases from a minor storage assisted in buying time and 
preventing the city of Melbourne, with a population of over four million people at that time, from 
running out of water. Running out of water was a serious and real threat that was faced by 
several cities due to the severity of the drought. 
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Figure 2.5 – Historical Melbourne system storage and demand (source: OLV 2013) 
 
Water use restrictions 
Outdoor water use restrictions played a major role in curbing demand in Australia. Many cities 
had not implemented restrictions for decades, if they had ever done so. Nevertheless most 
stages of restrictions were well accepted by the community, even though, unlike water efficiency 
measures, they meant a different level of service, and under some restrictions such as a 
complete sprinkler ban, they placed vegetation and lawns at risk. In Australia restrictions 
predominantly focused on residential outdoor uses, such as watering lawns and gardens, 
washing cars, and filling pools, which in many locations, depending on climate, traditionally 
represented half of household demand. As restrictions became more stringent, non-residential 
customers were also affected. By the end of the drought, overall restrictions had run over a 
longer period, and had been more stringent, than in any previous drought. Further details on 
restrictions are provided in Section 3. 
 
Water efficiency measures 
The extent of demand management used across Australia during the drought is difficult to 
calculate retrospectively, as many of the records are not publicly available, or they are 
incomplete and/or are difficult to compare due to the changing nature of the programs 
implemented. It is also difficult to document the full costs of programs. Often, only a narrow 
government and/or utility perspective is articulated rather than whole-of-society costs and 
benefits, incurred by customers or other stakeholders. In the process of integrated resource 
planning (Turner et al. 2010) assessment of costs and benefits should be undertaken from the 
combined perspectives of the utility, government, customers, and other stakeholders to allow 
rigorous comparison of options. Surprisingly, many of the results of estimation or measurement 
of savings from programs have not been released publicly. Where they have been measured 
and the results released, the savings are often significant and the programs highly cost effective 
(Turner et al. 2014). 
One long-running and well-documented program that illustrates the sheer scale of demand 
management programs implemented in response to the drought is the SWC-managed Every 
Drop Counts suite of programs. As part of its operating license, SWC was required to publicly 
report on the program annually. A breakdown of the individual programs that span the 
residential, non-residential and non-revenue water sectors is provided in the Sydney case study 
in Section 4. Between 1999 and 2011, with high participation and investment during the core 
drought years: 
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• Over USD 195 M (AUD 270 M) was invested in SWC programs focusing on the 
residential and non-residential programs, representing over USD 105 per customer 
connection.  
• Annual reported water savings from these programs were over 32,000 acre-feet (40 
GL)/a by 2011.  
• An estimated USD 90 M (AUD 125 M) was spent on major leakage and pressure 
management programs, saving another 24,000 (30 GL) per year (SWC 2010).  
• The largest participation rate was associated with the household audit and retrofit 
WaterFix program, which was implemented in nearly half a million houses, or 
approximately one-third of all houses supplied by SWC at that time (SWC 2011). 
• The cost of that one program alone was USD 53 M (AUD 73 M) and is reported to 
have saved over 8,225 AF/a (10,100 ML/a) by 2011. 
In contrast, the SEQ example illustrates the rapid investment, design, and deployment of 
demand management over a much shorter period, targeting specific sectors and subsectors 
(discussed in more detail in the SEQ case study in Section 4). SEQ was able to do this because 
they learned from the Sydney experience (Turner et al. 2005). In 2006, the Home WaterWise 
Service was launched over the 21 councils (later merged to 10) and included the successful 
rapid deployment of a retrofit program in which: 
• State government and local councils invested over USD 32 M (AUD 43 M) with over 
225,000 households taking part in two years. The target of 150,000 households 
within 18 months was reached nearly 8 months early (Coates and Bullock, 2008). 
• The program was linked to the statewide Home WaterWise Rebate Scheme that 
provided USD 201 M (AUD 280 M) in subsidies for water-efficient devices ranging 
from showerheads to rainwater tanks. 
SEQ also demonstrated world-leading programs in the form of: 
• the USD 3 M (AUD 4.2 M) Target 140 campaign, introduced during the stringent 
Level 5 restrictions, which encouraged individuals to reduce household water 
demand from 79 gpcd (300 lcd) before the drought to less than 37 gpcd, breaking 
new ground on the extent of behavior change expected of the community (later 
replicated by Melbourne as Target 155) 
• the One to One water savings program, which focused on reducing the demand of 
residential high water users by providing customized residential water savings plans 
based on individual survey questions sent to 80,000 households with an 
extraordinary response rate of over 90%. 
 
Supply-side measures 
While demand management was gaining traction and being used to slow the depletion of water 
in the dams, major investigations were also taking place into a vast array of supply-side 
measures, including large dams, desalination plants, wastewater reuse, groundwater storage, 
storm water capture, aquifer recharge, and inter-catchment transfers. Other more innovative 
drought response options included accessing deep storage in dams and readiness options 
based on the planned ability to implement and build options on a contingency basis. 
Dams 
The proposed Traveston Crossing Dam, 62 miles (100 km) north of Brisbane, was included as a 
drought response strategy for SEQ in 2006, even though the water from the first stage would 
not have been available until well after 2012 and would have relied on rain-dependent sources. 
This highly controversial scheme, with an estimated cost of over USD 1.4 B (AUD 2 B) for stage 
1 alone, was envisaged as a key part of a future proposed “water grid” for SEQ. The dam was 
eventually vetoed by the federal government in 2009, predominantly on environmental grounds 
due to ‘listed threatened species and communities’. Other minor schemes in the form of raising 
dam levels to increase volume were included in drought strategies and successfully 
implemented. Major dam modifications are shown in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 – Large dam projects (source: PC 2011) 
  
Desalination 
Planning for the first large-scale desalination plant in Australia commenced in Perth at the end 
of 1999. It was finally announced in July 2004 that the construction of a 37,000 AF/a (45 GL/a) 
plant at Kwinana would proceed. The plant’s output represented just under 20% of annual 
demand at the time it was completed in 2006. Almost immediately, a two-stage 100 GL/a 
desalination plant at Binningup was investigated due to continuing concerns over reduced 
inflows. The favored Yarragadee aquifer option was also considered, along with other supply-
side options. In 2007 the Yarragadee option was dropped and construction of the Binningup 
plant commenced, with both stages completed by 2012 (Porter 2013). The Kwinana and 
Binningup plants are now capable of supplying 40% of Perth’s current water demand.  
Table 2.2 provides details of the major desalination plants constructed in Australia since 2006. 
A total of over USD 7.2 B (AUD 10 B) has been invested in these plants, which has contributed 
significantly to the recent increases in water prices across the country. The majority of these 
plants are currently in standby mode, representing large stranded assets. 
 
Table 2.2 – Large desalination plants (source: PC 2011) 
 
Wastewater recycling 
Water recycling had been used since the 1970s in many parts of Australia, and Sydney and 
Melbourne have water recycling targets. In combination with significant federal and state 
subsidies, these targets aimed to reduce potable demand, and they helped drive increased 
investment in recycling schemes during the drought. These schemes varied widely in scale and 
application and many took years to come to fruition due to the difficulties in the approvals 
processes. In many cases, the customer base shrank after the drought, and/or the systems 
were considered too expensive to operate compared to potable water (ISF, 2013). In some 
cases, like the iconic Pimpama Coomera residential scheme in Queensland, the recycling 
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plants were turned off after the drought ended.8 Table 2.3 provides details of key large-scale 
recycled water schemes.  
Large-scale water recycling has been implemented in virtually every major city in Australia as a 
result of the Millennium Drought. The largest is the 30,000 AF/a (36 GL/a) Western Corridor 
Recycled Water Scheme in SEQ, which was completed in 2008 at a cost of USD 1.9 B (AUD 
2.6 B). It is linked to the water grid system, enabling water to be directed to power stations (the 
primary users), as well as industry and agriculture, and if necessary to provide an indirect 
potable reuse supply for Wivenhoe Dam, the major water supply dam for the region. In 2013, 
the plant was shut down to reduce long-term costs with start-up arrangements in place should 
the water be needed.9 Like the desalination plants, this represents a large stranded asset.  
There were large-scale subsidies available from state and federal governments during the 
drought, and whilst some of these were not well targeted, overall the support for recycling and 
investment in recycling technologies, and developing associated policies, regulation (including 
of private suppliers) and business cases helped to drive experimentation and innovation at 
various scales (ISF 2013). Decentralized systems grew in popularity during and after the 
drought, and there are now several precinct-scale systems that utilize sewer mining and feature 
water innovations as an iconic element of their development – both for the public, as well as 
private residents and investors. 
 
Table 2.3 – Large water recycling projects (source: PC 2011) 
 
After	  the	  drought	  and	  emerging	  lessons	  
The drought broke at different times in different parts of the country but officially ended in 2012. 
By this time, restrictions had been in place for many years in some locations, and there had 
been significant expenditure on water efficiency initiatives. Regulations improved the efficiency 
of fixtures and fittings in new properties built during the drought, and demand management 
programs brought about structural changes in existing properties. The awareness campaigns 
and water restrictions led to long-term behavioral changes in water use. As a result, there was 
minimal bounce back in water demand after the drought ended, suggesting that many of the 
short-term drought response savings have been locked in over the longer term. 
In all the major cities in Australia, there is now much less reliance on rain-dependent sources 
and a more diverse supply portfolio, which includes improved water efficiency, small-scale 
source substitution through stormwater and rainwater use, large-scale wastewater reuse, 
increased groundwater use and groundwater replenishment, and desalination. However, in 
developing this portfolio several issues have arisen: 
• The construction of large-scale supply-side infrastructure, such as desalination, 
may not have been the best strategy, especially considering the extremes of 
                                                       
8 http://www.goldcoast.qld.gov.au/environment/pimpama-coomera-waterfuture-residents-and-businesses-7904.html  
9 http://www.bom.gov.au/water/nwa/2013/seq/contextual/wateroverview.shtml  
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climate variability now observed and recent large-scale flooding in cities such as 
Brisbane and Sydney, resulting in the dams now being full and the large-scale 
supply-side measures not being required for years. There is now a large and 
diverse water supply system, but most of the desalination plants, in which USD 7.2 
B (AUD 10 B) has been invested, are currently not in use, representing significant 
stranded assets. 
• Similarly, some large-scale wastewater reuse initiatives, such as the SEQ’s 
Western Corridor Recycled Water Scheme, have either been mothballed or are 
suffering from significantly reduced demand (ISF 2013). 
• The overall cost of water services has increased substantially due to the need to 
pay for large capital expenditure during the drought. 
• Many of the capital cities now have a higher energy intensity for delivering water 
than they did before the Millennium Drought because the higher proportion of 
recycled water, desalination plants and associated interconnecting pipe grids within 
the system require additional pumping (Cook et al. 2012). 
Another concern is that while good planning was practiced during the drought, this planning was 
often negated by political decisions resulting in billions of dollars of unnecessary expenditure. 
This is a major concern amongst water planners and managers in Australia. 
While demand management has been highly successful in reducing demand over the longer 
term and has contributed to short- and long-term savings, the investment in research, modeling, 
implementation teams, and the programs themselves, has been significantly curtailed since the 
drought ended. This is a major concern for water planners and managers in Australia because it 
means that potential savings are being eroded due to a lack of ongoing maintenance of 
programs, the absence of messages to customers about the need to keep water usage down, 
and the loss of the industry knowledge. These drought response elements will be essential 
when the next drought hits. 
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3. Measures in detail 
 
In this section, a number of the measures that were implemented during or prior to the drought 




During the Millennium Drought, water use restrictions were in place in most capital cities and 
many regional towns across Australia. In most of these locations, restrictions had not been 
applied for several decades, or at such levels of stringency, if at all.  
Restrictions focused on outdoor water use, particularly garden watering, car washing, cleaning 
of hard surfaces, and swimming pool use. They primarily targeted residential water users, 
although in some locations restrictions were also placed on non-residential outdoor water uses, 
such as irrigation of parks and sport fields, nurseries and market gardens, swimming pools, 
commercial car washes, and building and construction activities. 
Restrictions were implemented as a “first contingency option” early during drought, as water 
storage levels declined. They were initially implemented at low levels – for example, reflecting 
basic and already well-accepted water conservation practices, such as not watering gardens 
during the middle of the day. As the drought intensified, progressively stricter restrictions were 
imposed, up to a total outdoor water ban in some places. Most places had 5 or 6 “levels” or 
“stages” of restrictions, but the rules in place at each of these levels varied between states, 
and for some states, between different water supply areas within that state.  
Residential restrictions 
• Garden watering –	  limits on the	  time of day and/or 
number of days a week; whether sprinkler use 
allowed; whether lawn watering allowed.  
• Swimming pools and spas – filling of new pools 
was either banned or required a permit/ 
exemption with stipulations such as a pool cover; 
existing pools required a pool cover and/or a 
water conservation plan. 
• Vehicle washing – restricted to spot cleaning and 
window cleaning with a bucket not a hose. 
• Exemptions to these rules were in place for 
“seniors”, people with disabilities, or on the basis 
of medical or health requirements. 
Non-residential restrictions 
• Specific rules for non-residential industries or 
water users – e.g. on nursery and market 
gardens, public pools, commercial car washes, 
commercial poultry farms, food transport vehicles, 
sportsgrounds, building and construction, and 
motor vehicle dealers. 
• Same rules applying for residential and non-
residential users, with a scheme to apply for 
exemptions. 
• Specifying rules and requiring development of 
water management plans. 
• No specific rules, but requiring development of 
water management plans.  
• No specific rules (even where residential 
restrictions are in place). 
 
Examples of restrictions on non-
residential water uses 
Melbourne Stage 3a 
• Sportsgrounds and public gardens 
may be watered under restricted 
hours, or under an approved water 
conservation plan. 
• Commercial nurseries, garden 
centres, and market gardens may 
use watering systems up to 3 hours 
per day with approval. Trigger 
hoses, buckets, and cans filled from 
a tap may be used anytime.  
Examples of restrictions on residential 
garden water use during the 
Millennium Drought: 
 
Sydney Level 3 
• No sprinkler use 
• Drip systems and hoses allowed 2 
days/week, 4pm-10am. 
 
Melbourne Stage 3a 
• No lawn watering  
• No sprinkler use 
• Dripper systems and trigger hoses 
allowed 2 days/week in restricted 
hours  
 
Perth Level 4 
• Sprinkler watering allowed 2 
days/week, 6pm-9am 
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Restriction triggers 
In locations predominantly supplied via surface water catchments, including Sydney and 
Melbourne, the “trigger” for introducing restrictions and for progressing to stricter levels of 
restrictions were linked to storage levels in dams. These triggers served as an operational 
guideline and also as an effective way to clearly communicate to the public the introduction of 
progressive stages of restrictions – and after the drought, the lifting of restrictions. In other 
locations, such as Adelaide and Perth, where there is a strong reliance on inter-catchment 
transfers and groundwater respectively, restriction levels were not linked to dam levels, and 
decisions to introduce restrictions were made adaptively over the course of the drought.  
In places such as Melbourne and Sydney, a set of rules and trigger levels was established prior 
to the drought, based on estimates of savings and stochastic modeling (Yurisich and Rhodes 
1999). Amendments were made during the drought, for example due to public, media and/or 
political pressure not to introduce a total outdoor water ban when dam levels fell beyond the 
planned trigger point for these restrictions; or, worsening drought and the need to introduce 
more restrictive rules than had been previously planned.  
Communication and compliance 
Building on and fostering a water conservation ethos: Water savings through restrictions 
were achieved by building upon a latent water conservation ethos in the community –  
stemming from successful campaigns over many decades to encourage water saving attitudes 
and behavior. Nevertheless, while many Australians held strong attitudes in favor of saving 
water, household water use prior to the Millennium Drought was particularly high compared to 
other tropical regions which were not usually subject to drought, and also in particular segments 
of the community. Water use behavior – in terms of social norms, as well as technologies – 
fundamentally shifted as a result of restrictions and other water conservation programs in place 
during the drought. After restrictions were lifted, in many locations demand did not “bounce back” 
to pre-drought levels. 
Compliance through communication and education: Overall, there was strong compliance 
with restrictions rules. At the core of this compliance were comprehensive programs of 
education, awareness-raising, and promotion. Communication strategies included dedicated 
information mail-outs with water bills, websites, public advertizing, and publication of dam levels. 
Restrictions promotions were coordinated with promotion of other demand-side measures – 
such as conveying restrictions as a way to achieve the voluntary water use targets also in place 
during the drought. Although there were provisions for water utilities to issue on-the-spot fines to 
those breaching restrictions, these were rarely issued, with education-based letters more 
commonly issued. Spot-check monitoring of outdoor water use was undertaken by utilities, but 
compliance relied more on social pressure from within the community. Phone-in systems were 
also introduced where the public could for example report on neighbors’ non-compliance. 
Generally, approaches to compliance sought to engender a joint sense of community-wide 
participation in water savings for the collective good, rather than focusing on the punishment of 
offenders.  
Community acceptance 
Numerous community surveys showed people supported restrictions (at levels less strict than a 
total outdoor water ban) and they were mostly perceived as “sensible” water use given the 
drought conditions. Overall most households thought restrictions were relatively “fair” because 
all residents had to comply with the same rules – compared to, for example, the regressive 
impact of a drought pricing measure. As detailed in the next section, however, concerns were 
raised by households, businesses, and municipal authorities about the impacts of restrictions. 
Concerns and costs 
Although there was generally widespread support for restrictions, costs and concerns were also 
raised. 
Households: Restrictions only applied to utility-supplied water, and some people were 
concerned, on the grounds of fairness, that households who accessed groundwater, or could 
afford to install or purchase rainwater or grey water systems, were exempt. There were also 
concerns about the loss of amenity and health benefits due to the reduced quality of gardens, 
and less activity in undertaking gardening, due to restrictions.  
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Businesses: In some locations, non-residential water users who were subject to specific rules, 
thought there had not been enough consultation on the design of restrictions, and questioned 
why only outdoor water-using industries were targeted, e.g. if there were no other requirements 
for improving water management for all industries. The nursery, turf growing, and garden 
industries voiced particular concerns about market impacts from restrictions on residential users 
that discouraged gardening.  
Public open space: Municipal councils recognized the need to conserve water and instituted a 
wide range of water-saving measures but many also raised significant concerns about the 
decline of parks and recreational areas. Impacts included the increased risk of injury (and hence 
liability) from sports fields that were no longer grassed due to restrictions on lawn watering; re-
establishment costs; and the loss of in many places decades- or centuries-old iconic trees from 
parklands. There was also concern about the overall loss of amenity, liveability, and health 
benefits due to the “browning” of public green spaces, particularly where households’ private 
gardens were also affected by restrictions.  
Costs and politics 
As the drought progressed, restrictions became central to policy dialogue and political debates 
about whether various state governments had effectively planned water supply systems for 
drought, what decisions to make during the drought, and how to best make them.  
Cost estimates for proposed infrastructure solutions during drought were in the order of one to 
several billion dollars per city – and at the same time, “cost of restriction” estimates were also 
made of similar magnitude. However, extrapolating costs of restrictions to Australia from limited 
surveys or studies – that fail to take into account differential impacts that depend on the stage of 
restrictions, the climate and the context of water use – is methodologically problematic and 
often produces flawed results. Ultimately, towards the end of the drought some political 
announcements opposed restrictions on the basis that there should not be any limits to how 
consumers choose to use water.  
Water savings from restrictions  
Water savings from restrictions were estimated by comparing actual demand to water use “if 
restrictions had not been in place”. The estimation of this reference case requires modeling to 
separate the impact of restrictions on demand from that of weather and other demand 
management programs. Sydney Water was one of the few utilities which estimated water 
savings for restrictions corrected for climate as well as separated from the impact of other 
programs that reduced demand. As shown in Table 3.1, significant water savings were achieved. 
Several other utilities estimated the combined impact of water restrictions and other water 
conservation programs. 
 
Table 3.1 Water savings due to restrictions: Sydney (note 300 lpd = 80 gpcd) 
















2005-06 341 400 59 
2006-07 328 389 61 
2007-08 306 378 72 
2008-09 309 372 63 
Source: Sydney Water (2011) 
Lessons learned 
Restrictions were instrumental in achieving water savings and critical in buying time, i.e. 
delaying the need for infrastructure construction. They were also one of a suite of measures 
aimed at engendering a sense of the importance of water conservation within the community. 
Water restrictions – despite the name	  –	  were not a punitive mechanism, but rather an 
educational and behavior change tool designed to dramatically reduce water consumption. 
Restrictions on outdoor water use were a key pillar of a public promotion and education 
campaign to shift understanding and actions towards efficient garden and outdoor water use 
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practices and as a result they were highly effective in achieving water savings. Communities 
were generally supportive of restrictions programs during drought – that is, up to a certain level. 
This support eroded if restrictions caused significant long-term damage to trees in either homes 
or public parks, reduced “liveability” and recreational values of parks and sportsgrounds, or 
placed undue obligations on some water-using sectors, but not on others. 
Since the drought, some locations have revised trigger levels, including the removal of trigger 
levels in some cases. On balance, although they provide certainty in terms of defining the level 
at which restrictions will be implemented, they also reduce the ability for water utilities to act 
flexibly to adjust to changing conditions during a drought. 
 
Residential home audits 
The first significant residential water audits were implemented in Australia in the mid-1990s in 
Kalgoorlie in Western Australia. Audits implemented over the years have varied to some extent 
but have typically involved, for a small fee, a qualified plumber going to a participating house 
and installing, where appropriate, a new 3 star (<9 l/s) water efficient showerhead, tap flow 
regulators/aerators on kitchen and bathroom sink taps, and a toilet cistern flush arrestor in 
single flush toilets. Minor leaks were checked and, where feasible, repaired and additional 
showerheads offered for an extra fee. Advice was often provided to customers by the plumber, 
and educational materials were provided. The results of the household audit were sometimes 
collated to assist in subsequent analysis and evaluation of savings. In Sydney, water savings 
from a large sample collected early in the program were found to be 5,500 gallons per 
household per year (21 kl/household/a) (Turner et al. 2005). Significant energy savings from 
such programs have also been measured. Various models have been used for implementation 
ranging from the use of a utility’s own staff for audits and bulk buying of products to reduce 
costs, to tenders with local plumbing service providers, to contracting out the entire service to 
niche contractors.  
Audit programs have been used extensively in Australia. The Sydney Every Drop Counts 
WaterFix program was the largest program implemented, with 80,000 homes participating in 
2006/07 alone and nearly 485,000 households participating between 1999 and 2011 (Sydney 
Water 2011). As part of this program, SWC also partnered with the state government to provide 
audits to low-income households. The SEQ Home WaterWise Service was widely implemented 
during the peak of the drought, with just under 225,000 households visited in two-and-a-half-
year period commencing with a rate of 1,500 households per week initially and rapidly 
increasing to 3,000 per week using a large team of trained plumbers (Coates and Bullock 2008). 
Uptake of such programs was highly dependent on the level of advertizing and the incentives 
offered. In Sydney, the cost to the utility of such a program was around USD 130 (AUD 180) 
with the customer paying only USD 16 (AUD 22). After the drought, several utilities offered little 
or no financial incentives to the household, significantly lowering participation rates.  
 
Do it yourself (DIY) kits 
This initiative focused on providing water savings kits containing regulators and aerators for 
showerheads and taps. Such kits, worth USD 7.20 (AUD 10), were often given out free of 
charge in public places, such as shopping malls. These kits were widely used in Sydney as an 
alternative to the audit program as a means of capturing those customers that did not want a 
plumber to enter their home or were skilled enough to change their own fittings. A drawback of 
the program was that many of the devices were not actually installed, thus lowering the overall 




This program typically involved residential customers exchanging their old inefficient 
showerheads for a free, 3 star (<2.4 gallons per minute, <9 l/m) water efficient model by 
bringing their old showerheads and latest water bill to approved exchange points, such as water 
retailer offices, local government locations, postal outlets, and hardware stores. The exchange 
process, as opposed to just giving showerheads away, helped to increase the number of units 
installed in households. The largest example of this kind of program was in Melbourne, where 
460,000 showerheads were exchanged between 2006/07 and 2010/11 by the three water 
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retailers. Measured savings in Melbourne ranged from 2,240 to 3,260 gallons per household per 
year (8.5 to 12.4 kl/household/a) (Turner et al. 2013). 
 
Toilet replacement programs 
Historically, toilets have represented a large proportion of indoor water usage in Australia. Since 
the 1990s toilet water usage has gradually reduced from a standard single 2.9 gallon (11 litre) 
per flush to the current 1.2/ 0.8 gallon (4/3.5 litre) per flush dual-flush toilet introduced during the 
peak of the drought. While regulations, such as WELS and BASIX, improved the efficiency of 
new and refurbished properties, toilet replacement programs during the drought focused on 
tapping into the water savings from these devices in existing households. Toilet replacement 
programs typically involved a one-stop shop approach, with a resident contacting the local utility 
and arranging for a qualified plumber to visit the house. The plumber would change up to two 
single-flush toilets with new dual-flush toilets with the option of paying for the service through 
their quarterly water bills.10 The programs would typically offer a range of three models starting 
at USD 206 (AUD 300) in total for the new toilet and associated installation, which included a 
USD 72 to 144 (AUD 100 to 200) rebate from the state government. In some locations, seniors 
on fixed incomes were offered a toilet replacement at no cost. Many of the utilities used a 
partnership approach with a major plumbing service and toilet manufacturer. Sydney had one of 
the largest programs, installing over 28,000 toilets between 2008 and 2011 (Sydney Water 
2011), with each toilet replacement saving an estimated 6,000 gallons per household per year 
(Tillman 2012). 
 
Rebate programs  
Rebates for water efficient devices were widely available across the country during the drought, 
with hundreds of thousands of individual rebates provided in each major city for a variety of 
products. The most common and popular indoor rebates were for showerheads, toilets, and 
washing machines (see details following). Common outdoor products included pool covers and 
subsurface irrigation systems to reduce evaporation. Rebates were also available for alternative 
water sources; rebates were extremely popular for rainwater tanks (see details following) and in 
Perth, for private backyard wells using superficial groundwater.  
Some areas also offered rebates on smaller water efficiency products. In Melbourne this was 
provided as a ‘basket of goods’ for USD 22 (AUD 30) on products worth over USD 72 (AUD 
100), including flow control valves, mulch, wetting agents, compost/mulch bins, moisture/rain 
sensors, garden tap timers, trigger nozzles, drip watering systems/weep hoses, temporary grey 
water diverters, shower timers, rainwater diverters, waterless car cleaners, and toilet flush 
interrupters. 
Less popular rebates offered in various parts of the country, that struggled to gain numbers past 
the hundreds, included rebates for grey water systems, aerobic treatment units, and hot water 
re-circulators. 
 
Washing machine rebates 
Rebate programs for efficient washing machines, typically up to USD 110 (AUD 150) a machine, 
were very popular and a cost-effective means of saving water during drought by shifting 
significant inefficient stock within existing homes (only 10% were front loaders pre-drought) from 
top loading 37 gallons (140 litres) per wash to front loading 20 gallons (75 litres) per wash. 
Significant numbers of rebates were provided during the drought years as part of the state 
rebate program administered by the local water utility. In Perth alone, 80,000 rebates for 
washing machines were provided in the first two years of the program, rising to over 200,000 by 
the end of the program in 2011. The rebate programs across the country helped rapidly 
transform the washing machine industry with manufacturers providing more choice in efficient 
front-loading machines due to the new efficiency market developed with efficiency labelling and 
later minimum standards assisting in the transition (Fyfe et al. 2015). Savings varied depending 
on which washing machines were included in the rebate scheme but were typically in the range 
4,700 to 6,000 gallons per household per year (18 to 23 l/household/a) (Turner et al. 2013).  
                                                       
10 In some areas, older less efficient dual flush toilets were eligible for replacement, although this typically reduced water 
savings and thus the cost-effectiveness of these programs. 
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Key points 
• Rebate programs for efficient washing machines were very popular and a cost- 
effective means of saving water during drought by shifting inefficient stock in 
homes. 
• There was significant potential in the early 2000s with only 10% of homes with 
efficient front loaders that used 50% less than standard top loading machines. 
• The rebate programs helped rapidly transform the washing machine market due to 
the sheer scale of the programs implemented (i.e. in Perth 80,000 rebates in two 
years). 
• Efficiency labelling and later minimum standards aided in the transition but still only 
30% of homes have front loading machines, so there are still considerable savings 
available.  
Background 
In the early 2000s only 10% of homes had efficient front loading washing machines, typically 20 
gallons/wash (75 liters/wash). The remaining 90% were top loaders, typically using 37 
gallons/wash (140 L/wash) (Fyfe et al. 2015). Hence the potential to shift washing machine 
stock from top loading to the more efficient front loading machines, that used 50% less water, 
provided significant potential savings for both short- (drought) and long-term savings.  
The introduction of rebates to capture that potential and incentivize the purchase of more 
efficient machines helped transform (along with WELS) the washing machine market in 
Australia in less than a decade. While top loading washing machines can achieve higher 
efficiency ratings than current models do, they typically remain less efficient than front loading 
models. There has been a clear shift towards more efficient machines being available in 
Australia, with over 75% of machines available now being the more efficient front loaders – 
markedly different from the early 2000s. 
Top loader sales are now mainly 3 star (weighted average 25 gallons/wash or 96 liters/wash) 
while front loaders are mainly a higher rating of 4.5 star (weighted average 17 gallons/wash or 
66 L/wash). While the availability of more efficient front loaders has increased, more top loaders 
are still sold per year (375,000 versus 436,000) (Fyfe et al. 2015, p. 48). Over 30% of homes 
now have the more efficient front loaders (ABS 2011) indicating there is still significant potential 
for savings in homes. In 2011 minimum water efficiency standards were introduced whereby 
machines with a capacity of greater than 11 pounds (5 kg) must be at least 3 star and machines 
with a capacity of less than 11 pounds (5 kg) must be at least 2.5 star (Fyfe et al. 2015). 
Description 
Washing machine rebates in Australia aimed to raise the stock of efficient machines from only 
10% observed in the early 2000s. The rebate programs typically involved advertizing by a water 
utility or government agency of a rebate for a washing machine at the point of sale. Retailers 
also advertized the rebates to incentivize customers to upgrade their machines and to increase 
sales. Such rebates were typically around USD 108 (AUD 150). The logic initially was that the 
rebate would provide the cost differential between an efficient and inefficient machine at point of 
sale, although this price differential changed over time. The early rebate programs (pre-2004) 
used the Water Services Association of Australia AAA rating scheme. After 2004 the Water 
Efficient Labelling and Standards (WELS) Scheme star rating scheme was used to assist 
customers to determine which washing machines were eligible for a rebate. 
Examples 
From 2003 to 2009 the Water Corporation of Western Australia (WCWA) provided USD 108 
(AUD 150) rebates on 4A or higher washing machines (a lower efficiency rating than the current 
WELS 4 star rating) as part of the broader Waterwise Rebate Scheme administered by WCWA 
on behalf of the state government. In only two years, over 80,000 washing machine rebates 
were processed. By 2009, the end of the program, over 210,000 rebates had been processed. 
Estimated savings by WCWA were 6,870 gallons (26 kl) /household/a (Turner et al. 2005, p31). 
However, measured savings were found to be 3,960 gallons (15 kl) /household/a. The sheer 
scale of the rebate program in Western Australia assisted in shifting the market towards more 
efficient machines. 
In 2003 Sydney Water Corporation (SWC) ran a washing machine pilot program offering a USD 
72 (AUD 100) rebate on the purchase of a machine with a 4A or 5A rating (i.e. before the 
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current WELS star rating was introduced). The pilot was evaluated using statistical analysis and 
showed savings of 6,075 gallons (23 kl) /household/a. The evaluation showed there was a 
marked difference between the savings achieved by a conversion from a top loader to a front 
loader (7,925 gallons or 30 kl/household/a) and the savings achieved by a conversion from an 
older style front loader to a more efficient front loader (4,490 gallons or 17 kl/household/a) 
(Kidson et al. 2006). Based on this evaluation SWC ran the full program from 2006 to 2010 
offering customers and tenants a USD 108 (AUD 150) rebate for purchasing a 4 star or above 
rated machine. This was upgraded several times eventually to a 5 star machine (SWC 2011. 
p.11). Between 2003 and 2010 SWC spent USD 23 M (AUD 32 M) on the program,  processing 
over 186,634 rebate applications with an estimated saving of 4,755 gallons (18 kl) /household/a 
(SWC 2011. p.11 & p.38). 
Lessons 
• The use of the rating schemes was important to provide clarity for customers, 
utilities and retailers about which washing machines were acceptable under the 
scheme. 
• The rebate schemes were highly successful in helping retire inefficient stock early 
and shifting the market towards higher efficiency machines but care is needed to 
judge when the market has shifted sufficiently to withdraw rebates to avoid free 
riders. 
• The evaluation of the program in Sydney at an early stage indicated how savings 
from the program could be maximized and how retailers work with the rebates (i.e. 
some retailers were influenced by specific manufacturers rather than the savings 
objectives of the rebates programs). 
• For maximum savings to be achieved it might have been better to be more vigilant 
about which machines were replaced (e.g. only less efficient or top loading 
machines) as savings achieved from replacement of front loading machines were 
less and customers with a front loader more likely to buy a front loader anyway (i.e. 
free riders). 
 
Rainwater tank rebates 
Key points 
Rainwater tanks (RWTs) have long been used in Australia in rural areas and where town water 
supply is of a low quality. During the drought there were extensive rebate programs and building 
regulations for rain tanks, with considerable uptake. Actual water savings from rainwater tanks 
were low or mixed, as their effectiveness is dependent on specific rainfall patterns, roof sizes, 
rain tank size, and connected end-uses.  
Background 
Before the Millennium Drought the adoption of rainwater tanks in major cities was relatively low. 
In 2004 it was: 
o 9% in capital cities 
o 31% in the balance of the states/territories 
o 17% Australia wide (ABS 2004). 
In capital cities the adoption typically ranged between 4.8 and 6.4% with Adelaide being an 
exception (37.7%) with a high proportion of small tanks, due to the hard water supply. 
By 2010 this had changed dramatically with tanks in cities more than doubling (ABS 2010) to: 
o 20% in capital cities 
o 37% in the balance of the states/territories 
o 26% Australia wide. 
The most dramatic increases were in Melbourne (rising from 6% to 23%) and Brisbane (5% to 
38%) from 2004 to 2010 respectively (ABS 2004, ABS 2010). This major shift has been as a 
result of a combination of regulations and rebate programs. 
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Regulations 
• Regulations have affected both new and refurbished buildings. For example,  
o The performance-based efficiency certification system in NSW where water 
efficiency targets associated with BASIX11 require up to a 40% decrease in water 
usage (depending on climate zone and property type) compared to a pre-BASIX 
home benchmark of 24,000 gallons per person per year (90 kl/person/a) (65 gpcd 
or 247 lcd). BASIX also requires energy targets. BASIX was initially introduced in 
2004 for new single dwellings in Sydney and subsequently expanded to more areas 
in NSW, other new residential properties and residential properties being 
refurbished (over a particular value). The installation of a RWT has often been 
considered one of the easiest ways to achieve this target thereby inadvertently 
driving RWT installation growth in new and refurbished residential properties in 
NSW. 
o In 2006/07 the Queensland Development Code (part 25) required that all new 
detached and semi-detached houses in Queensland should be fitted with a RWT, 
wastewater reuse system or stormwater reuse system to reduce water demand on 
reticulated town water supply systems. These regulations were modified on several 
occasions including specification of a range of targets for such water demand 
reductions ranging from 2,600 to 18,400 gallons per property per year (10 to 70 
kl/property/a) depending on geographical location.12 As for the BASIX system, 
RWTs were predominantly used to achieve such targets, driving RWT installation 
growth in SEQ, which was undergoing a significant population growth at that time. 
This mandatory requirement was repealed in 201313 by the Qld Commission 
Authority (QCA) after cost benefit analysis. Councils can now opt into the 
requirement. 
o As part of the broader Victorian Star Building Standard a 5 star system was 
introduced in 2005 requiring new homes (class 1 and 2 dwellings) to achieve a 5 
star energy rating for the building fabric, adhere to maximum flow rates for 
showerheads and taps, and have a maximum water pressure of 73 psi (500 kPa). 
In addition, new houses (Class 1 dwellings) must install either at least a 500 gallon 
(2 kl) RWT for toilet flushing serviced by a 540 square feet (50 sqm) roof area or a 
solar hot water system, or be connected to a reticulated recycled water system 
where it is available.14 In 2011 a 6 star rating system including home renovations 
and alterations of a particular size was introduced nationally, which maintains the 
RWT requirements.15,16 
Rebates 
In existing households (with the vast majority being single detached dwellings where space is 
less of an issue but also town houses and semi-detached dwellings) have predominantly been 
affected by rebates provided by various levels of government (federal, state and local) as well 
as individual utilities (often implementing rebates on behalf of state governments). For example, 
o As part of the USD 9.3 billion (AUD 12.9 billion) Water for the Future plan, the 
federal government delivered a USD 180 million (AUD 250 million) National 
Rainwater and Greywater Initiative from March 2009 to May 2011.17 The initiative 
provided rebates of up to USD 360 (AUD 500) for tanks over 1,000 gallons (4 kl) 
(USD 300 for tanks 500–1,000 gallons) connected to toilet and/or laundry end uses 
and could be claimed on top of other state and local rebates within a particular 
period incentivizing actions to connect the tanks to indoor end uses.18 
o The New South Wales Government Home Saver Program in NSW (including the 
installation of over 52,806 tanks from 2007 to 2012). 
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o The Victorian Government Home and Garden Rebates (more than 300,000 rebates 
since 2003 including a significant proportion of RWTs).  
Lessons 
• Typically there is a need to maximize indoor water end use connections such as toilets and 
washing machines to optimize water savings from a RWT system. 
• Careful tank configuration is important (i.e. maximizing end uses, increasing roof area, 
appropriate tank sizing as well as careful consideration of pump sizing). 
• There is a need to consider whether RWTs are appropriate in individual climate zones in 
terms of rainfall quantity and pattern versus tank size, roof area connected and specified 
end uses (rainwater tank simulation models can be useful to ascertain this). 
• Energy use can be significantly affected by poor pump size choice and/or operation with low 
flow and/or intermittent individual end uses such as toilets and taps leading to the pumps 
running inefficiently. Pumps typically need to be designed for low flow rates as high flow 
rates only represent a small proportion of water used. The use of pressure vessels in the 
system can assist in improving and rectifying inefficient pump operation. 
• Rain switches and similar devices that switch to potable water when the tank is empty have 
been reported as an area of concern because tank owners are unaware they are using 
potable water.  
• Poor functionality due to lack of ongoing knowledge/care of system (pumps failing, blocked 
guttering) has been identified as a potential issue of concern for the few locations across 
Australia that have conducted such evaluation. 
• In the few locations that have conducted water savings evaluations the savings being 
achieved are typically below theoretical/modelled estimates due to the design and 
connection issues outlined above (Turner et al. 2014). 
• While RWTs have been proven to save water they are in most cases, when retrofitted to 
existing houses, a relatively expensive option in terms of unit cost, compared to other 
options.  
• A combination of better installation practices and better information for customers about 
ongoing tank maintenance will assist in improving functionality, tank water savings and 
energy usage. 
 
Residential outdoor watering programs 
Climate and associated outdoor water usage varies significantly across Australia but typically 
ranged between a third and half of residential water use in detached houses, which dominate 
the residential sector. As restrictions were imposed during the drought, several jurisdictions 
turned to residential outdoor watering programs to assist residents to use outdoor water more 
efficiently.  
In Perth, the Waterwise Garden Irrigators Program was launched in 2003, the same year as the 
state government rebate scheme administered by the water utility. The program was developed 
in collaboration with the Irrigation Association of Australia. Accredited irrigation contractors 
received training on water efficient design and installation of garden irrigation systems requiring 
at least two years’ experience in the industry including a written exam before becoming 
accredited under the scheme. Under the initial program, accredited irrigators conducted 
assessments for customers at a reduced fee. A large proportion of these customers had work 
undertaken following the assessment. In Western Australia, due to the sheer scale of outdoor 
water use, the water utility worked extensively for many years with industry representative 
groups, local garden centers, and irrigation suppliers and specialists to set up partnerships, 
accreditation schemes and common Waterwise products and services to help customers 
understand how to make their gardens more water efficient.19 These partnerships and 
accreditation schemes are still in place. 
In Sydney the Love Your Garden Program was run between 2007 and 2010, with over 23,000 
participants. The program focused on households with significant outdoor water usage. It 
                                                       
19 http://www.watercorporation.com.au/save-water/in-the-garden 
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involved a qualified horticulturalist visiting a customer’s home, calculating the amount of water 
the garden needed based on the area, plant types, soil chemistry and irrigation methods and 
identifying how water could be saved. Tools, such as tap timers, rain gauges and information 
tags on taps giving advice on water regimes, were provided along with a detailed assessment 
report. The service was valued at USD 130 (AUD 180) but was provided to the customer for 





From 2004 to 2007 SEQ dam levels dropped from over 60% to less than 20%. In 2006 the state 
government set up the Queensland Water Commission to manage and oversee the 
implementation of a drought plan across the SEQ region to manage the dwindling reserves, 
restrictions and implementation of both short- and long-term water demand- and supply-side 
measures. These measures ranged from major water efficiency rebate programs to construction 
of the state’s first major desalination plant and one of the largest water recycling plants in the 
world. A key component of the drought plan was the use of water restrictions. Restrictions were 
tightened to Level 5 in 2007, breaking new ground in terms of the extent of behavior change 
expected of the community. While moving to Level 5, the Target 140 campaign was introduced 
encouraging individuals to reduce household water demand to less than 37 gpcd (140 lcd) from 
pre-drought levels of 79 gpcd (300 lcd). With severe outdoor restrictions already in place, 
voluntary indoor water savings were seen as an opportunity. Other targeted programs such as 
the One to One water savings program were introduced at the same time to specifically curb the 
demand of the top 10% of high water users. 
Program design 
The program focused on voluntary residential indoor water saving practices, behaviors, and 
attitudes and asked residents to reduce their average water consumption to 140 lcd (37 gpcd). 
Overall the program aimed to:  
• reduce SEQ water use by 10% by the end of 2007 
• achieve 37 gpcd (140 lcd) by the end of August 2007 (within 5 months) 
• generate 60% awareness amongst SEQ residents of Target 140 by August 2007  
• achieve 50% recall of campaign key messages by the end of August 2007. 
The program was based on behavior change principles aiming to assist individuals to move 
through the various stages of behavior change leading to action, namely: pre-contemplation, 
contemplation, preparation, action, and maintenance. The program relied heavily on 
understanding where the community was already at in terms of their behaviors and attitudes 
through the use of extensive social research. Issues that came through in the research strongly 
were restrictions fatigue, belief that businesses were major users (when in fact the residential 
sector was responsible for 70% of demand), and there was still a significant group of high water 
users with high socio-economic status that had not changed their behavior. The social research 
drove the design of the campaign, which ultimately focused on: 
• understanding the problem (the water supply in SEQ region is at a critical level) 
• being aware of regional consumption patterns (70% of demand residential) 
• believing that small individual changes in behavior could in combination make a 
significant difference to the crisis. 
The entire population of SEQ (2.3 million people) were targeted in the campaign but an 
additional segment, high water users, was also specifically targeted under the associated One 
to One program. The Target 140 campaign aimed to personalize the problem and individualize 
the solution to facilitate individual behavior change. 
The program 
Various techniques were used in the campaign and resources provided: 
• powerful, pervasive imagery and messaging to highlight the issue, complemented 
with entertaining imagery and messaging to show what individuals can do to save 
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• regular imagery and messaging to let people know how dam levels and overall 
achievement of targets were tracking 
• extensive mass media (TV, radio, newspaper, web) 
• direct mail to 1.1 million households (4-minute shower timers, refrigerator magnets 
and educational booklets) 
• a specific website with resources 
• communication materials (billboards, 
brochures, fact sheets, posters) 
• giveaways (shirts, face washers, 
magnets)  
• media partnerships  
• local stakeholder partnerships (utilities 
and local government) 
• linkage with the rebate programs, One to 
One program and business programs. 
The Target 140 campaign ran for 8 months, cost USD 
3 M (AUD 4.2 M) and reached 2.3 million people (1.1 
million households) at a cost of less than USD 1.4 
(AUD 2) per person. Fifty-four per cent of the budget 
was allocated to advertizing to ensure consistent and 
engaging messaging across multiple channels to gain 
maximum outreach. Forty per cent of the costs went 
into the direct mail-out of shower timers and 
information booklets. The remainder went to market 
research, communication collateral, website and 
consultants. The program was highly successful in 
that in combination with other programs it more than 
doubled its target of a 10% reduction, with demand 
dropping from 47 gpcd (179 lcd) pre-campaign to as 
low as 34 gpcd (129 lcd) by the end of 2007 (mid-
summer). The 37 gpcd (140 lcd) target was achieved 
only four weeks after the launch of the program, 13 
weeks earlier than aimed and the awareness and 
recall of the messaging of the program were similarly 
successful.  
Following the easing of the drought, target messaging was used, such as Target 170, indicating 
that SEQ had come out of the red zone but that individuals still needed to engage in water 
efficiency activities. The messaging of targets was similar to those used to warn of fire danger. 
Due to the success of the program in SEQ, Melbourne used a similar campaign, Target 155. 
Lessons 
• Target 140 was a highly innovative program using multi-media, multi-strategy 
communication approaches to encourage reductions in household water use across 
all uses based on behavior change principles. 
• Target 140 was highly successful in part because it used research into the attitudes 
of the target audience to inform the design and determine how to best take 
individuals along the various behavior change stages to lead to action. 
• The program integrated other initiatives, including restrictions on outdoor water use, 
the One to One residential high water users’ program, non-residential sector water 
efficiency programs and the rebate program thus focusing on behavioral and 
structural changes. 
• A potentially confusing aspect of the program was the subsequent messaging of 
‘Target 170’ and above that encouraged people to use more water. After the 
drought ended water demand has typically ranged between 40 and 53 gpcd (150 
and 200 lcd) between the winter and summer months. 
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• Due to the success of the program, the design was replicated in Melbourne as 
Target 155 during the peak of the Melbourne crisis in 2009. 
 
Non-residential water efficiency management plans 
The non-residential sector was seen as a conservation opportunity by all major cities during the 
drought. As water restrictions mostly targeted residential users (and in some locations, specific 
outdoor water-using business sectors), it was also crucial to garner overall community support 
for water conservation programs by securing participation by the business and industry sectors 
to save water.  
 
Industry water conservation potential was targeted in numerous ways. A common approach was 
the use of mandatory and voluntary Water Efficiency Management Plans (WEMP) for 
businesses. Programs would for example commence by targeting the highest water using 
businesses in the city or state, and supporting them with planning and responses. Rather than 
being framed as constraining production, WEMPs were seen as a way to save water, save 
money, and for some businesses an important component of demonstrating their efforts to save 
water during drought and helping to secure their “social licence to operate”.  These businesses 
may have used their water savings as part of their corporate social responsibility strategy and 
marketing. 
 
In SEQ, for example, the program targeted businesses using >10 ML/a (8 AF/a) and nurseries, 
public swimming pools, buildings with cooling towers, and areas using potable water to irrigate 
areas greater than 5,400 square feet (500 m2). Such businesses were required to develop plans 
to demonstrate 25% reductions in water use or best practice. These measures were introduced 
under restrictions and as part of ongoing Permanent Water Conservation Measures and were 
enforceable under the Water Act 2000. The restrictions were lifted for large businesses in 
2013.20  Similarly, in Western Australia, all businesses and government agencies using over 17 
acre-feet (20 ML/a) of potable water per year needed to develop a WEMP that detailed their 
water-using practices and water saving actions and initiatives and provided regular progress 
reports on savings achieved.  
 
In Melbourne, all business and industrial customers were required to develop and submit to 
their water utility a similar “WaterMap” for each site using more than 8.3 acre-feet per year (10 
ML/a). The program built on and extended the voluntary scheme that had been introduced in 
2003, in which Melbourne’s top 200 non-residential consumers developed water management 
plans in conjunction with their water retailers. During the drought, water retailers contacted, 
approached, and worked with a wide range of businesses across many water-using industries 
to promote water saving and assist users to save water during the drought. Since the end of the 
drought in 2011, water management planning have no longer been mandatory, but the retailers 
continue to offer the program on a voluntary basis.  
 
Waterless woks 
A targeted non-residential end use program initially established in Sydney and later adopted by 
Melbourne involved a program focusing on the installation of waterless woks. Wok burners are 
extensively used in Asian commercial kitchens. These burners generate significant heat and 
water jets, which typically flow continuously while the kitchens are in operation, are used to cool 
each stove top. A typical burner can use around 660 to 925 g/d (2.5 to 3.5 kl/d). The use of such 
burners can represent up to 75% of the water use in an Asian restaurant (Sydney Water 2007, p. 
46). An alternative water efficient system is the waterless wok, which can save up to 90% of the 
water used in traditional wok stoves. 
The program established in Sydney in 2003/04, which identified a payback period of only one 
year, initially had limited uptake until the Saving Water in Asian Restaurants Project, run by the 
Ethnic Communities Council of NSW, began in 2006. With assistance from state government 
funds, participating restaurants could receive up to USD 1,440 (AUD 2,000) towards 
replacement of an existing conventional wok stove or a USD 1,440 (AUD 2,000) grant plus the 
same amount as an interest-free loan (payable after a year). Through the use of a combination 
of the subsidies, qualified multi lingual environmental educators, Chinese and other language 
educational brochures and DVDs were distributed to program participants. Case study 
                                                       
20 https://www.dews.qld.gov.au/policies-initiatives/water-sector-reform/queensland-water-commission 
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examples, and a website were also used. The program became highly successful, often spread 
by word of mouth to new participants. 
Key points 
• The program demonstrates innovation and the effectiveness of considering 
potential savings in the commercial sector using an end use-based approach. 
• Although only a small sector the savings potential for Asian restaurants swapping to 
waterless woks was up to 90% with a payback period of only one year without 
financial subsidies offered under the efficiency program. 
• This program also demonstrates the benefits of collaborating with small ethnic 
community groups that understand how best to communicate with specific 
subsectors. 
Background 
In 2003/04, as part of the Sydney Water Corporation (SWC) Every Drop Counts Business 
Program, research and associated audits of Asian restaurants in Sydney revealed surprisingly 
high water use when compared with other similar food preparation establishments. Following 
further investigations it was discovered that standard water cooled wok stoves typically use a 
high proportion of the water in such premises, up to 75% (SWC 2007, p. 46). This discovery led 
to the development of new technology, the waterless wok stove, and associated demand 
management programs in Sydney and Melbourne. 
Description 
In Sydney in 2003/04 when SWC discovered the significant water usage and potential savings 
available in Asian kitchens they led research into developing the waterless wok stove. At that 
time there were over 2,000 wok stoves in Sydney. It was estimated that if each saved 1,320 g/d 
(5 kl/d) this could represent significant potential savings of 2,920 AF/a (3,600 ML/a).  
A trial was conducted on a 200-seat Yum Cha restaurant with an average of 275 customers a 
day using two water cooled wok stoves, each with two burners and associated taps. One stove 
was replaced at a cost of USD 3,600 (AUD 5,000). The associated water savings were over 
1,585 g/d (6 kl/d). Based on water, sewer and trade waste charges at that time, the savings 
were over USD 3,600  (AUD 5,000) representing a payback period of only one year for the 
customer. 
After a low initial uptake in 2004/05, the Saving Water in Asian Restaurants Project, run by the 
Ethnic Communities Council of NSW, began in 2006 and the program gained traction.  
The program won multiple environmental awards for its innovation and achievements. The 
program was evaluated in 2010 and was found to save 715 g/d (2.7 kl/d) per restaurant. 
Average savings achieved were 0.75 AF/a (929 kl/a) for each restaurant (78% of their water 
use) for the 147 wok stoves replaced (average 1.5 wok burners per establishment). Although 
savings were lower than anticipated the overall savings were 78 AF/a (96,679 kl/a). The 
program went on to be implemented in over 270 restaurants21 in Sydney. Due to the success of 
the program it was replicated in Melbourne.  
Lessons 
• Although only a relatively small sub-sector in some cities the water savings and 
cost-effectiveness of the program provide significant potential savings. 
• Evaluation of the program identified that savings could be increased if it targeted: 
larger restaurants, those with a more Asian-focused cuisine, and those that 
operated for longer hours (e.g. in clubs, pubs, casinos). 
• Contracting the implementation program out to the Ethnic Communities Council that 
focused on providing multilingual education and advisory services in combination 
with significant financial incentives was highly successful. 
 
  
                                                       
21 http://www.ben-global.com/storyview.asp?storyid=9581758&sectionsource=&highlight=took&aspdsc=yes 
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Schools water efficiency programs 
Most regions across Australia have engaged in some form of water efficiency program for 
schools for many years. These have ranged from developing education materials for children, 
assisting schools to find leaks through sub-metering and more recently smart meters, and in 
some cases assisting schools to upgrade inefficient appliances around the school premises and 
irrigation equipment and practices. During audits of schools, significant water losses and 
wastage have been found, providing significant opportunities in this sector. The implementation 
processes used are very broad, differing in each location and over time but typically include the 
utility working closely with government education departments and individual public and private 
schools.  
A highly successful program demonstrating world leading attributes is the Victoria-based 
Schools Water Efficiency Program (SWEP). The program has been conducted in several stages 
after first being conceived in 2005 during the drought. Audits and retrofits were conducted from 
2006 to 2010. After an initial voluntary phase the program became mandatory for public schools, 
leading to 1,739 participants of which over 1,600 were public. In 2012, the program progressed 
to the use of data logging and smart meter usage providing schools with the opportunity to 
access subsidized data loggers, web technology, specialist advice and curriculum materials for 
managing and monitoring water use and leaks with over 500 schools registered under the 
scheme by 2015 (Walker et al. 2014, Walker et al. 2015).22 
 
                                                       
22 http://www.myswep.com.au  
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4. Case studies 
 
This section provides case studies on the experience of four regions of Australia: Sydney; South 
East Queensland, including Brisbane; Perth; and Melbourne. 
 
 
4.1 SYDNEY, NEW SOUTH WALES 
Sydney is the largest city in Australia, with a population of 4.1 million in 2001 and 4.6 million in 
2011. It has a temperate climate with warm, sometimes hot, summers and mild winters and an 
average rainfall of 48 inches (1.2 m).  
The Greater Sydney water supply system, shown in Figure 4.1, consists of over 20 dams with a 
combined capacity of 2 million AF (2,500 Gl)  (Turner et al. 2014). The large Warragamba Dam, 
with an operating capacity of 1.6M AF (2,000 Gl), accounts for 80% of this capacity. 
Bulk water in the Greater Sydney area is managed by the wholesale authority, Bulk Water New 
South Wales (formerly the Sydney Catchment Authority). 
Sydney Water Corporation (SWC), a statutory corporation set up in 1995 and wholly owned by 
the New South Wales (NSW) Government, is Australia’s largest water utility, providing water, 
wastewater and major stormwater services to customers in the Greater Sydney area. The 
Metropolitan Water Directorate, created in 2003/04 due in part to the emerging drought situation, 
leads a whole-of-government approach to water planning for Greater Sydney and the smaller 
lower Hunter service area to the north. 
The Metropolitan Water Plan inter-departmental stakeholder engagement process, led by the 
Metropolitan Water Directorate and instigated due to concerns over drought before Sydney’s 
dams reached a low of 32% in 2007, has driven an innovative and diverse water service 
portfolio approach. Where once Sydney relied predominantly on rain-dependent dams, it now 
has a more diverse portfolio comprising dams, water recycling, comprehensive water efficiency 
programs, and a large desalination plant (albeit, like many others in Australia, currently in 
standby mode). The world-leading demand management and portfolio analysis undertaken in 
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SWC became a state-owned water corporation in 1995 while Sydney was going through a 
relatively short drought in the mid-1990s. The Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal is 
the regulatory body that has oversight of SWC’s license and the pricing of water in Sydney. 
Under its original license, SWC was required to reduce total water demand, including residential, 
non-residential and non-revenue water, by 25% by 2001 and 35% by 2011 from the 1991 base 
level of 133 gpcd (503 lcd) down to 100 gpcd (380 lcd) and 86 gpcd (329 lcd) respectively 
(Howe and White 1999). The license requirement, reviewed every 5 years, was established to 
ensure that customers do not pay for inefficient supply augmentation projects or face overly 
harsh or frequent restrictions, and that the supply–demand balance is managed efficiently. This 
set the scene for water planning in Sydney from the late 1990s.  
In response to the aggressive target and commitment to demand management, SWC 
developed Australia’s first major end-use model in the late 1990s. It was built to assist SWC to 
develop a detailed understanding of how water is used and what options could be implemented 
to achieve the required targets, and to compare the costs and benefits of demand management 
and supply-side options using an integrated resource planning approach (White and Howe 
1998; Turner et al. 2010).  
SWC set up the first demand management pilot in 1999. This pilot was the precursor to the 
Every Drop Counts WaterFix residential audit program that would eventually be rolled out to 
nearly half a million homes in Sydney (a third of households in the Greater Sydney area) and 
provide inspiration for similar programs in other regions. SWC was going through a gradual 
process of piloting programs to evaluate the cost and savings (Turner et al. 2005; Kidson et al. 
2006) to achieve the demand management target when investigations in early 2004 began to 
look at what might be needed to respond to the drought as part of a metro-wide strategy. This 
strategy became the Metropolitan Water Plan in 2004. This was revised in 2006 as the drought 
intensified and the dam levels fell further. These investigations examined predictions of dam 
depletion curves using a monthly time step to determine how rapid deployment of demand-side 
and supply-side options could slow the rate at which the dam water levels were falling (refer to 
Figure 4.1).  
Figure 4.1 – Modeled Sydney dam depletion curves considering various demand- and 
supply-side options 
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Demand management programs were seen as a way of providing more time for large supply-
side options, such as groundwater reserves and desalination, to be considered, designed, and 
potentially implemented before existing major supply systems reached dead storage. Many of 
the demand management measures were also seen as ‘no regrets’ options, as they assisted in 
reducing long-term demand at a relatively low cost. The process of options investigation and 
portfolio analysis was undertaken with significant multi-stakeholder consultation and gave rise to 
significant commitments to water efficiency and recycled water as well as other emergency 
drought responses, including access to deep storage and tapping into ground water reserves. In 
addition, for the first time in Australia, real options analysis was applied in the development of a 
water strategy. A detailed assessment was made of a desalination readiness option. Under this 
approach the desalination plant would only be built when dam levels fell below a trigger level, 
which would allow sufficient time to build the plant before dams reached dead storage (White et 
al. 2006).  
Decision-making 
In Sydney, despite multi-stakeholder discussions and agreements, political intervention took 
over at critical points in the decision-making process. These decisions are well documented and 
provide useful lessons, as discussed later. Figure 4.2 shows the dam levels in Sydney over the 
drought period and the associated key decisions made with respect to the desalination plant. 
Figure 4.2 – Water planning decision-making during the drought (source: modified from 
Giurco et al. 2014) 
 
In 2006, the commitment to build the desalination plant “drought or no drought” was put on hold 
when the government formally adopted the 2006 Metropolitan Water Plan review 
recommendations. These recommendations included the innovative ‘readiness’ strategy (White 
et al. 2006).  
Figure 4.3 provides an overview of the portfolio of demand- and supply-side options adopted in 
the 2006 Metropolitan Water Plan. As shown, there was a significant commitment to water 
efficiency measures. For example savings contributions would come from: water efficiency 
programs (audit, retrofit and rebate programs) in the residential (both indoor and outdoor) and 
non-residential sectors; national appliance efficiency standards and the water efficiency labeling 
scheme (WELS); local regulations on the efficiency of new and refurbished buildings (i.e. the 
building and sustainability index – BASIX); as well as leakage and pressure management in the 
non-revenue water sector. The commitments to water savings through these demand 
management measures amounted to twice the savings that would result from the Plan’s major 
water recycling schemes. The portfolio also included access to deep storage in dams and to 
limited groundwater sources as well as the desalination ‘readiness’ option.  
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Figure 4.3 – Water contributions of various initiatives to the Metropolitan Water Plan 2006  
(source: White et al. 2006) 
 
While the readiness strategy was formally adopted by multiple stakeholders involved in the 
Metropolitan Water Plan process, it was overtaken by political imperatives in 2007 when dam 
levels reached 34% and were dropping by 0.5% per week. Due to concerns that dam levels 
might approach the trigger level of 30% storage during the government’s caretaker period 
(between when the state election was called and the date of the election), a decision was made 
to proceed with the desalination plant.  
Shortly thereafter, it began to rain, and at the time the contract to construct the desalination 
plant was signed, the dam levels were at 55% and rising. By the end of 2008, dam levels were 
above 60% of capacity. By 2012, the desalination plant output was reduced during the testing 
period as rain caused Warragamba Dam to overflow. By the end of the testing period in late 
2012, the USD 1.4 B (AUD 2 B) desalination plant was shut down, raising major concerns about 
the decision-making process and associated political intervention (PC 2011). 
Water demand 
Prior to the drought, total water usage in Sydney was typically over 490,000 AF/a (600,000 
ML/a), or 110 gpcd (420 lcd) with the approximate split in residential, non-residential and non-
revenue water as shown in Figure 4.4.  
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Figure 4.4 – Historical water usage in Sydney by sector (SWC 2011 p. 93) 
 
The license target for 2011 was 87 gpcd (329 lcd). As shown in Figure 4.5 this was achieved 
well ahead of time and the demand has remained below the 2011 target for over 7 years with 
limited bounce back despite restrictions being lifted and investment in demand management 
programs being significantly curtailed after the drought. 
 
Figure 4.5 – Historical total per capita water demand (source: SWC 2014) 
As shown in Figure 4.6, Sydney now uses less water than it did in the early 1990s despite the 
population rising from 3.7 million to 4.6 million. This is due to a combination of factors including:  
• Improved toilet efficiency – Pre-1990s most toilets sold were large 3 gallon (12 liter) 
single flush units. In the early 1990s dual flush toilets became more common until, 
during the mid to late 2000s, the new efficient 1.2/0.8 gallon (4.5/3 liter) dual flush 
toilets, using a fraction of the water, began to dominate the market. 
• Improved fixtures and fittings efficiency due to labelling – Efficiency labelling has 
been in place for decades in Australia but was taken up nationally in 2004 as part of 
the water efficiency labelling and standards scheme (WELS), which now covers the 
efficiency of toilets, showerheads, dishwashers, washing machines, taps, and 
urinals.  
• Regulations and shifts in the market of products sold – Equipment such as toilets 
and washing machines now have minimum efficiency requirements, and due to the 
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high number of washing machine rebates taken up across the country as part of 
demand management programs the market is now dominated by more efficient 
models.  
• New and existing BASIX refurbished housing regulations – From 2004 the building 
and sustainability index (BASIX) in Sydney and then NSW was rolled out requiring 
existing and then later refurbished properties to be up to 40% more water efficient 
than a baseline of 24,000 gallons per person per year or 90 kl/person/a) (reducing 
to a below 39 gpcd or 148 lcd). BASIX continues to apply today. 
• Increased urban density – In 1991, 78% of households were separate, single-family 
houses, but by 2011, this was reduced to 61%, indicating the trend toward 
densification23 and subsequent reductions in water use for turf (lawns) and gardens. 
• Restrictions – Restrictions on outdoor watering and sprinkler use were in place in 
Sydney to varying degrees from 2003 to 2009 and were subsequently replaced with 
permanent water wise rules after the drought ended in 2012. 
• The significant water efficiency programs for existing residential and non-residential 
properties (combining behavioral and structural changes) as discussed below. 
 












The reduction in water demand in Sydney has been significantly influenced by the SWC-led 
Every Drop Counts demand management program that ran for more than a decade (from 1999 
to 2012). The program broke new ground in Australia in terms of its breadth (residential, non-
residential and non-revenue water) and participation rates, with the WaterFix residential retrofit 
program reaching nearly half a million households (a third of households in the Greater Sydney 
area at that time).  
As the drought worsened, restrictions were imposed in 2003 and gradually increased as dam 
levels dropped. Because the demand management program had already gained significant 
traction and was being implemented across various sectors, SWC was well positioned to 
increase the intensity and scale of the existing program as part of the drought response 
program of the Metropolitan Water Plan released in 2006. Table 4.1 provides details of key 
programs within the extensive SWC-run demand management program. The majority of uptake 
occurred during the peak of the drought. 
The total investment by SWC in demand management, was well over USD 195 M (AUD 270 M) 
over the period 1999 to 2011, excluding the leakage and pressure management and recycling 
projects which were under separate parts of the license agreement. Additional smaller demand 
management programs were also implemented during the drought period by other organisations.  
                                                       
23 http://www.censusdata.abs.gov.au/census_services/getproduct/census/2011/quickstat/1GSYD 
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Table 4.1 – SWC key Every Drop Counts demand management initiatives 




Residential   
WaterFix From 1999 to 2011 households were provided with the 
opportunity to have a qualified plumber install a new 3 star 
water efficient showerhead (removing the old showerheads), 
tap flow regulators, and toilet cistern flush arrestor for single 
flush toilets and to repair minor leaks for a small fee of USD 
16 (AUD 22). As at 2011 the service was offered to low-
income households for free. Measured savings were 5,550 
gallons/household/a (21 kl/household/a) (Turner et al. 2005) 
AUD 72.5 M 






From 2004 to 2011 the DIY kits were given free as an 
alternative to the WaterFix program. Customers could install 
simple devices to make existing showerheads and taps 
more efficient.  
Estimated savings were 1,770 gallons/household/a (6.7 
kl/household/a) 
AUD 7.1 M 







From 2006 to 2010 customers were offered a USD 108 
(AUD 150) rebate for buying a water efficient washing 
machine, initially commencing in 2006 with rebates for 4 
star-rated machines, which was subsequently modified to 
4.5 star-rated and eventually in 2010 to 5 star-rated 
machines. Estimated savings were 4,750 
gallons/household/a (18 kl/household/a) 
AUD 32 M 







From 2008 to 2011 the service enabled householders to 
replace existing single flush toilets with a choice of three 
new 4 star-rated dual flush toilets with prices starting from 
USD 240 (AUD 330).  
Estimated savings were 6,070 gallons/household/a (23 
kl/household/a). 
AUD 15.5 M 
USD 11 M 
28,224 
558 ML/a 
450 AF/a  
Rainwater 
Tank Rebate 
From 2002 to 2011 householders were offered a rebate to 
install and connect a new tank to existing homes not 
influenced by BASIX requirements. The size of the rebates 
depended on tank size and whether the tank was connected 
to indoor end uses such as a washing machine or toilet. 
Savings are estimated to be between 9,250 and 15,850 
gallons/household/a (35 to 60 kl/household/a). 
AUD 26.7 M 






From 2003 to 2010 this program targeted households with 
high outdoor water use. It provided them with the chance to 
have a qualified horticulturalist review the water demand of 
their garden. A detailed watering plan was developed for 
each garden’s needs and an array of tools was offered (i.e. 
tap timers, rain gauges and tap tags). The service, valued at 
USD 130 (AUD 180), was provided to householders for only 
USD 24 (AUD 33). 
AUD 12.3 M 










This program ran from 1999 to 2013 and encompassed 
several business programs. Sydney Water supported large 
water-using business customers in the industrial, 
commercial and institutional sectors to achieve water and 
cost savings, by applying industry best practice and efficient 
AUD 84.5 M 
USD 61 M 
Not reported 
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management practices in day-to-day operations. Numerous 
best practice guides were developed as part of the program 
for sectors such as hotels, clubs and commercial laundries. 
22,577 ML/a 
18,300 AF/a 
BizFix From 2009 to 2011 this program assisted business 
customers to retrofit water efficient fittings in bathrooms and 
kitchenettes. 50:50 co-funding was provided. The program 
assisted 327 business sites to identify water savings and by 
2011, 203 businesses had implemented actions to achieve 
water savings estimated at 1.45 AF/site/a (1,800 kl/site/a). 
AUD 1.6 M 




Smart Rinse From 2006 to 2011 this program offered free replacement of 
inefficient pre-rinse spray valves with efficient models. The 
program targeted both commercial kitchens and retail food 
shops. Over 4,700 spray valves were provided to business 
customers. Estimated average savings were 0.2 AF/unit/a 
(253 kl/unit/a). 
AUD 3 M 





Another large and highly effective efficiency program that SWC implemented was a leakage and 
pressure management program in which it invested around USD 90M (AUD 125 M) between 
1999 and 2011 (USD 90 M). During the peak of the drought SWC inspected virtually the entire 
13,050-mile (21,000 km) network each year. This, together with pressure management, 
improved response times for repairing leaks and improved flow metering enabled SWC to meet 
its specific operating license leakage target of 85 +/- 13 AF/d (105 +/- 16 ML/d), which was 
incorporated into its 2005 to 2010 license after assessment of the economic level of leakage 
(SWC 2008, p. 25). 
SWC was also involved in many smaller programs including: the Top 100 Monitoring Program 
looking at the water efficiency of customers using > 26,000 gallons/property/day (100 
kl/property/day); council partnerships to help small and medium water-using businesses save 
water by employing project officers to work across council areas and conduct audits and give 
advice (500 businesses involved); the HiRise Pilot Program looking at the efficiency of high rise 
commercial/retail buildings (30 buildings); the Every Drop Counts program in schools which 
involved using smart meters to identify leaks (126 schools involved); the top 100 schools 
program which changed out inefficient devices with a saving of 192 AF/a (237 ML/a) in only 26 
schools at a low cost of USD 72,000 (AUD 0.1 M); Rainwater Tanks in Schools where tanks 
were fitted and connected to toilets and irrigation systems; and the highly innovative waterless 
woks program (refer to Section 3). 
Although not reported in the SWC suite of programs, SWC was also heavily involved in the 
Irrigation and Landscape Efficiency Project. From 2009 to 2011 the Australian Government, as 
part of its Water for the Future program, funded a Hawkesbury-Nepean River Recovery 
Program to improve the health of the river. SWC worked with the Recovery Program to 
implement the Irrigation and Landscape Efficiency Project, which looked at the open spaces 
(parks and sporting facilities) in the greater Sydney region irrigated with potable water. The 
project aimed to improve water efficiency by improving soil condition, irrigation technology and 
management practices. Sixty sites participated. At the assessment stage government 
participants received an assessment free of charge, while commercial facilities received 50:50 
funding assistance from the government. During the implementation stage, 50:50 funding 
assistance was provided by government.24 The program cost USD 5 M (AUD 7 M) and saved 
885 AF/a (1,090 ML/a). 
 
  
                                                       
24 http://www.environment.gov.au/water/policy-programs/water-smart/projects/nsw27c.html  




On the supply side, a range of options were considered during the drought including: accessing 
deep storage in dams, 32,430 AF/a (40 GL/a); accessing groundwater reserves (considered as 
a readiness option); major water recycling projects, typically for larger industrial users; and the 
innovative desalination readiness option.  
The readiness option required that only the funds needed to gain appropriate approvals and 
prepare designs would be spent, so that if (and only if) dam levels fell below 30%, the additional 
expenditure would be committed. This option allowed sufficient time to build the plant before 
reaching dead storage. Effectively, this option acted like an insurance policy. As indicated 
earlier, however, the readiness option was overturned due to political intervention and the full 
USD 1,360 M (AUD 1,890 M) was invested.  
The major water recycling projects developed were in response to the Metropolitan Water Plan 
2006 commitment to reusing 56,750 AF/a (70 GL/a). Where economically viable to do so, SWC 
implemented wastewater recycling projects to assist in achieving this target. The projects 
included the Rouse Hill residential effluent reuse (third pipe, or dual reticulation) scheme, which 
was initially completed in 2001 and then extended in 2008 (currently supplying 19,000 homes), 
the Wollongong Recycled Water Scheme for industry and irrigation end users, and the Rosehill-
Camellia Recycled Water Scheme in Western Sydney, also for industry and irrigation. Many 
smaller recycling schemes were also implemented across Sydney during this time by multiple 
public and private organisations in response to available government funding. 
The costs of key supply options implemented are summarized in Table 4.2. 



















Wollongong water recycling 
plant 





Rouse Hill Water Recycling 
Scheme (extension) 













New trigger levels specified in the 2010 Metropolitan Water Plan identify the trigger level at 
which the desalination plant should be switched on, how long it should run, and when the 
second stage 72,960 AF/a (90 GL/a) desalination plant capacity might be needed in relation to 
other demand- and supply-side options (SKM 2011 p.10). These trigger levels, shown in Figure 
4.7, are under review in the 2015/16 Metropolitan Water Plan.  
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With the rains and subsequent severe flooding in Sydney in 2012, the drought officially ended. 
Since then, and due to major investment in a broad portfolio of demand- and supply-side 
options, the activity in water planning and management has reduced significantly and the focus 
has changed. 
Currently (2015/16) the Metropolitan Water Plan is being reviewed with a new focus on both 
potential flood risk to communities in the flood plain below Warragamba Dam, and revised 
drought triggers. This is in response to the risk of more frequent weather extremes, both 
droughts and floods, in Sydney and Australia more broadly. 
In 2015 the SWC operating license was reviewed for the first time since the 2011 demand 
management target was achieved. The existing prescriptive demand management target has 
been retained in the new operating license, but a less prescriptive path has been identified for 
SWC, which will now be required to develop a methodology to determine the economic level of 
water conservation. 
Since the end of the drought, government departments, which had previously focused on water 
demand management, have turned their attention to energy efficiency programs. This has been 
triggered by an attempt to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to reduce the cost burden that 
customers are facing due to increasing energy prices associated with major investments in 
electricity supply infrastructure. Many of these programs have used the replacement of 
showerheads as part of a suite of measures designed to reduce energy use due to the well 
documented energy–water nexus savings that can be attained from reducing hot water use. 
Meanwhile, water demand management teams have been downscaled, from over 80 staff in the 
prime of the program in SWC to a handful, with staff being absorbed into other parts of the 
business or laid off. Water demand management programs have come to an end or they have 
been scaled back to a minimum, with participant rates now often in the hundreds as opposed to 
the tens of thousands during the drought. Many of the programs in place now utilize cost 
recovery mechanisms. For example, the customer pays the full cost of a program and SWC 
acts more like a reliable ‘go to’ plumber service, whereas during the drought generous 
incentives were provided for rebates and audits to encourage customers to participate. 
The price of water has increased significantly due to major schemes such as the desalination 
plant and relatively expensive reuse initiatives, some of which have had to reduce their 
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operations because customers no longer see the benefit of using recycled water, in part 
because restrictions have been lifted, or they have ceased business operations (ISF 2013). 
Due to the burden of the cost of the unused desalination plant, the government has sought to 
refinance the plant in a sale to private investors25, for USD 1.7 B (AUD 2.3 B) on a 50-year 
lease. In shutdown mode, it costs SWC customers over USD 0.36 M/day (AUD 0.5 M/day) in 
‘availability charges’.26 The investors are guaranteed an inflation-linked payment of about USD 
7.2 B (AUD 10 B) from SWC whether the water is used or not. Additional fees are payable to 
investors when the plant is switched on (Turner et al. 2013). 
Lessons 
Crisis and opportunity 
In Sydney, the drought presented the opportunity and the need to rapidly expand demand 
management programs to achieve water savings. This was achieved by a combination of 
factors including: the policy and regulatory impetus created by the water efficiency target in the 
operating license; SWC’s approach to detailed end use analysis to identify potential savings; the 
piloting of programs and subsequent evaluation which provided information about how much 
water programs could save; and integrated resource planning analysis to identify the relative 
cost-effectiveness of options. 
The government also adopted some aspects of the best practice ‘readiness strategy’ for drought 
response, in terms of scheduling and staging options according to dam trigger levels. However, 
politicized ‘crisis-mode’ decision-making meant that the readiness strategy was not enacted – in 
particular, the desalination plant (which was subsequently not used) was built before agreed 
readiness trigger points were reached.  
During the drought, reuse targets were established, and these targets drove investments in 
recycling. Restrictions on potable water uses – both experienced, and anticipated for future 
droughts – also spurred government, industry and local government interest in recycling. 
However, reuse had a different ‘value’ when the drought eased, resulting in some customers 
deciding to revert to potable water when able to do so after restrictions were lifted. 
Working together  
Transparency of decision-making is crucial during drought to engender trust by community and 
stakeholders. SWC’s use of annual reporting of demand management programs provided a 
clear and transparent system to assess the impact of demand management compared to other 
water portfolio options. SWC’s approach to evaluating programs to ascertain savings post-
implementation, and its inclusion of these evaluations in the reporting processes, provided 
evidence that led other jurisdictions to adopt similar programs. 
Getting the rules right 
The use of ‘no regrets’ demand management programs in combination with national (WELS) 
and state (BASIX) regulations assisted in locking in savings and minimizing bounce back after 
restrictions were lifted. The experience of Sydney showed that BASIX-style regulations are 
particularly effective in contexts where demand is being driven by population growth.  
As outlined above, water efficiency targets in SWC’s operating license provided the regulatory 
impetus for successful investment in cost-effective demand management. However, following 
the drought, it was argued that prescribing the ‘level’ of water efficiency does not per se result in 
economically efficient outcomes, and that much water efficiency has already been achieved. 
Consequently, this specific target is in future likely to be replaced with the requirement to 
determine the economic level of conservation. While many water efficiency initiatives achieve 
long-term savings through one-off structural changes, others rely on ongoing efforts to reinforce 
behavior change or maintain savings through management practices. The removal of the target, 
combined with cutting demand management programs and staff, runs the risk of undermining 
millions of dollars of investment in demand management knowledge and savings which are 
required as part of the Metropolitan Water Plan portfolio. 
  
                                                       
25 http://sydneydesal.com.au/about-sdp/ownership-structure 
26 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-09-27/nsw-desalination-plant-deal-costing-customers-10-billion/4985168 
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Picking the low hanging fruit 
Investment in water efficiency programs in Sydney illustrates the magnitude of water savings 
that can be achieved at relatively low cost – the ‘no regrets’ options. The supply-side story 
illustrates the potential for best-practice decision-making, where real options analysis and 
‘readiness’ strategies are considered in drought management together with careful 
consideration of hold and review points for major infrastructure, to limit unnecessary pre-
emptive expenditure. However, as indicated above, this potential was not realized. It has been 
acknowledged that if the call to tender for the design, construction and operation of the 
desalination plant had been split with hold and review points, the ‘readiness’ strategy could 
have been preserved without the full cost of the pre-emptive build. In addition, not signing the 
full contract for the construction of the plant when the dam levels were at 57% would have 
avoided over-commitment (PC 2011; Giurco et al. 2014). Care is also required when refinancing 
desalination plants as this will cost customers even more in the long run and could cause delays 
in using them as part of a drought response strategy. 
  




4.2 BRISBANE AND SOUTH EAST QUEENSLAND 
Queensland is the second-largest state in Australia, covering an area of 71,500 square miles 
(1,852,642 km2). It has diverse climates ranging from tropical in the north to subtropical in the 
south east and desert in the south west. The rapidly growing population, which increased from 
3.7 million27 in 2001 to 4.3 million28 in 2011, predominantly resides in Brisbane, the capital city, 
and the surrounding 8,300 square-mile (21,544 km2) South East Queensland (SEQ) region. In 
2001 the SEQ population was 2.49 million. By 2011 it had grown to 3.18 million.29 The region of 
South East Queensland includes the cosmopolitan city of Brisbane with an industrial center, the 
high-rise beachfront hotels of the Gold Coast and larger more rural style properties found to the 
west. These regions have vastly different water demands. SEQ was originally a collection of 
over 17 local councils, however these were consolidated to eleven in 2008 as part of the 
process of simplifying governance arrangements.  
Prior to the drought, SEQ was heavily reliant on large dams, including the largest dam, 
Wivenhoe (944,500 AF or 1,165 GL) and several smaller dams including Somerset, North Pine, 
and Hinze, providing a further 612,900 AF (756 GL), with only limited interconnections between 
systems. Indeed, SEQ has the largest dam capacity to usage ratio of the main capital cities in 
Australia, reported as 6 times annual usage (ATSE 2012; PC 2011, p.19). Nevertheless, by the 
mid-2000s SEQ faced the prospect of severe water shortages due to the worst drought on 
record. 
The Millennium Drought, which officially commenced in SEQ in 2001 and ended in 2009, 
dramatically altered the governance structures for supplying water, the supply system itself, 
attitudes towards water usage, and the demand for water. 
 
Water planning 
In 2003, in response to rapid growth in the region, the Queensland Government began to 
assess long-term water supply needs for SEQ over a 50-year period (Turner et al. 2007). As 
part of this process, numerous investigations were conducted over a number of years. These 
included studies into water demand, water demand forecasting, dam yields, and options to fill 
the anticipated future water supply–demand gap. As the drought intensified, the bulk, or 
wholesale, water authority (Seqwater) and local councils worked together to develop a short-
term drought response strategy that included water restrictions, communication campaigns, and 
non-residential programs, incorporating audits, plans and retrofits.  
In 2006, emergency legislation was passed (the Water Amendment Regulation No.6) to 
introduce a number of the drought response measures contained within the drought strategy. 
That same year, the Queensland Water Commission was established as an independent 
statutory authority responsible for achieving safe, secure, and sustainable water supplies for the 
SEQ region. The role of the Commission was to work with government departments, agencies, 
and local government water authorities to develop long-term water supply strategies, establish a 
water grid, manage demand, partly by implementing restrictions, and provide advice to 
government on water industry reform.30 The Commission used a combination of demand-side 
measures and large-scale supply-side measures (such as new dams, a water grid, the Western 




Prior to the drought and despite relatively good rainfall (mean 45 inches or 1,135 mm)31, SEQ 
residential demand was typically high, at around 80 gpcd (300 lcd). While climate plays a role in 
above-average demand due to high temperatures in the region, there was also a contribution 
from Queensland’s slow uptake of water pricing reform relative to other states.  
                                                       
 
28 http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/3311.3  
29 http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/censushome.nsf/home/qld-36?opendocument&navpos=620  
30 http://web.archive.org/web/20110110051732/http://www.qwc.qld.gov.au/about/index.html  
31 http://hardenup.org/umbraco/customContent/media/339_regionsummary-seq.pdf  
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As the drought wore on and short-term and long-term planning strategies were developed, it 
was recognized that consistent systems and processes were needed. Once defined, these were 
rolled out across SEQ to measure and forecast demand and assess options using more 
consistent end use- and sector-based methods.  
This, in combination with implementing demand-side measures, including increasingly stringent 
restrictions and improved water efficiency based on a combination of instruments (regulatory, 
economic, and educative) across multiple sectors helped to dramatically reduce water demand. 
Figure 4.8 shows the residential, non-residential, and non-revenue water use between 2001 and 
2010 in liters/capita/day (1 liter = 0.26 gallons). Figure 4.9 shows the demand for the residential 
sector against average rainfall in Brisbane for the period 2001 to 2014 and the levels of 
restrictions imposed. As can be seen, there has been limited bounce back in consumption after 
the drought ended in 2008, even after the severe floods of 2010/2011. Current residential 
demand is less than 45 gpcd (170 lcd). 
 
Figure 4.8 – Historical water use by sector (note 300 lcd = 80 gpcd) (QWC 2010 p. 62)  
 
 








In 2006/07 SEQ received record low rainfall (4% of annual average inflows) and faced the threat 
that dams could fall to less than 10% of their capacity before planned new water infrastructure 
identified in the drought strategy was completed. Hence, a comprehensive and innovative 
demand management program was used as a critical measure to slow the depletion of water 
levels in the dams, in much the same way as was done in Sydney, to buy time for decision-
making and construction of new supplies. The main difference between SEQ and Sydney was 
that while Queensland had been active in water efficiency for many years with the WaterWise 
programs (first introduced in the mid-1990s), these programs were primarily focused on 
communication and therefore had a more limited impact on structural water efficiency. 
The SEQ demand management program during the Millennium Drought used a combination of 
restrictions and innovative water efficiency programs which employed world leading approaches 
to marketing and communication. SEQ accomplished a highly successful large-scale rapid 
deployment of its demand management program. The program halved average residential 
demand in less than three years, with little subsequent bounce back. It did so with a 
combination of long-term structural and behavioral changes in a broad spectrum of sectors and 
by using advanced behavior change methods. The comprehensive program set a new standard 
in terms of speed and size of implementation and it employed a mix of initiatives.  
The highly successful programs that were introduced at this time included the Home WaterWise 
Service, the High Water Users program and the One to One program. The Home WaterWise 
Service, introduced in 2006, was based on the Sydney WaterFix residential retrofit program. In 
SEQ a plumber fitted efficient showerheads and tap aerators, fixed minor leaks, and provided 
efficiency advice to householders. The advice included how they could access rebates for water 
efficient equipment under the USD 171 M (AUD 238 M) Home WaterWise Rebate Scheme 
introduced at the same time. A quarter of SEQ homes took part in the service in only two years. 
The High Water Users and One to One programs were introduced as more severe Level 5 
restrictions were implemented. These highly innovative programs were linked to the Target 140 
Campaign, which encouraged householders to limit their use to 37 gpcd (140 lcd) by changing 
water use behavior and taking up rebate offers. These programs focused on the top 10% of 
residential high water users – those using over 211 gallons (800 liters) per household per day. 
Over 80,000 households were contacted and after they responded to a survey they were given 
personalized plans to help them save water, again linked to the Home WaterWise Rebate 
Scheme to encourage both behavioral and structural changes within the home. Over 70,000 
Water Savings Plans were delivered to customers. Table 4.3 provides summary details of some 
of the key initiatives. 
Table 4.3 – Summary of key demand management initiatives  




Restrictions As dam levels fell from 40% to 20%, restrictions 
were gradually tightened from Level 1 in May 
2005 generally restricting residential outdoor 
watering times, to Level 5 in April 2007, 
significantly restricting residential outdoor water 
use including buckets only, vehicle spot cleaning, 
restrictions on pool filling/top-up and the 
introduction of Target 140 and the High Water 
Users program (see below). The non-residential 
sector was also subject to restrictions, including 
the introduction of Water Efficiency Management 
Plans, see below. Non-residential use was further 
tightened as part of Level 6* restrictions.  
Restrictions across SEQ were lifted after the 
drought ended in 2009. Permanent water 
conservation measures were then in place until 
the Queensland Water Commission was 
abolished in 2013.32 
 
                                                       
32 https://www.dews.qld.gov.au/policies-initiatives/water-sector-reform/queensland-water-commission  
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This statewide program was introduced in mid-
2006 and provided rebates for showerheads, 
dual-flush toilets, washing machines, garden 
products, pool covers/rollers, greywater systems 
and rainwater tanks. The vast majority of rebates 
were for washing machines and rainwater tanks 
(by mid-2008 >188,000 washing machines and 
>239,000 rainwater tanks).  
The program ended in late 2008. 
Statewide  
>AUD 280 M 






This program was introduced in 2006 in 21 SEQ 
councils (in 2008 consolidated to 11 councils) and 
was designed and implemented by Local 
Government Infrastructure Services. Under this 
program, a licensed plumber visited the home, 
provided advice, installed efficient showerheads 
and tap aerators, and fixed minor leaks. The 
program, which was linked to the rebate scheme, 
was implemented on 228,500 households35 in two 
years, around a quarter of homes, greatly 
exceeding the target of 150,000 households within 
18 months (Coates and Bullock, 2008). 
AUD 43 M 
USD 31 M 
228,500 
households 
Target 140* This was a massive communication campaign 
introduced with Level 5 restrictions in April 2007 
that was based on behavior change principles. It 
was linked to other components of the demand 
management program and sought to reduce SEQ 
water use by 10% by the end of 2007, and 
encourage residents to use 37 gpcd (140 
liters/capita/day) by August 2007. The highly 
inclusive and motivating campaign used: 
extensive media coverage with strong messaging, 
imagery and celebrities; a direct mailout of 4-
minute shower timers, refrigerator magnets and 
information booklets; a website; fact sheets and 
posters; and stakeholder partnerships, with local 
councils and celebrities. 
AUD 4.2 M 
USD 3 M 
High Water 
Users and One 
to One water 
saving program 
(Turner et al. 
2010) 
These programs were initiated in combination with 
Level 5 restrictions and the Target 140 
(liters/capita/day) campaign. They involved 
identifying high water-using households (>210 
gallons/household/day or 800 
liters/household/day), and providing a survey form 
of >50 questions to 80,000 households to find out 
why these households were using so much water. 
The survey received a 92% response rate. It 
subsequently provided a follow-up personalized 
Water Savings Plan to those households using 
>37 gpcd (140 liters/capita/day) to advise on how 
to save water (linked to the rebate scheme). The 
High Water Users Program was a water restriction 
70,000 
households 





  MANAGING DROUGHT: LESSONS FROM AUSTRALIA 67 
C
ase studies 




requirement that could result in an infringement or 
installation of a flow restriction device if the 
occupier could not advise why the consumption 
was at that level (e.g. number of people, home 
business, medical condition). The One to One 




Water at Work 
campaign 
This program encouraged and supported SEQ 
residents to take water saving behavior to their 
places of work by, for example, turning off taps 
when not in use, running dishwashers full, taking 
4-minute showers, and reporting leaks. It also 






Businesses using >0.8 AF/a (1 ML/a), in a 
combination of enforcement and rebates, were 
required to have water efficient devices, such as 
water efficient taps, showerheads and trigger 
sprays. The rebate program operated in 
conjunction with the restriction requirements. A 
selection of businesses received a rebate, 
including support for development of WEMPs (see 
below) and major process changes to deliver 
significant water savings. 
AUD 3 M 






The program targeted businesses using > 8 AF/a 
(10 ML/a) and nurseries, public swimming pools, 
buildings with cooling towers, and areas using 
potable water to irrigate areas > 5,400 square feet  
(> 500 m2) were required to develop plans to 







This campaign focused on helping particular 
sectors, such as sporting bodies responsible for 
large grassed sports playing fields, mobile 
commercial washers (i.e. dog washing operators), 
and visitor accommodation providers with tips, 
fact sheets, and education materials. Stakeholder 
groups were formed and enforceable guidelines 
were developed. These became part of the water 
restrictions program. Training programs were 
developed including compliance for car wash 
facilities (mobile and fixed), dog wash facilities 
(mobile and fixed – e.g. vets), house washers, 
and managers of active recreation areas (sporting 
fields). 
 




State government regulation involving 18 councils. AUD 90 M 




                                                       
36 http://www.qldwater.com.au/WEMPs  
37 https://www.dews.qld.gov.au/policies-initiatives/water-sector-reform/queensland-water-commission 
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In addition to the demand management program, regulations played a significant role during the 
7-year drought in SEQ, due in part to the significant growth in the region. Regulations such as 
the national level Water Efficiency Labeling Scheme and local building regulations38 introduced 
in 2006/07 required every new detached and semi-detached house in Queensland to be fitted 
with a rainwater tank, a wastewater reuse system or stormwater reuse system to reduce water 
demand on reticulated town water supply systems, in addition to water saving fixtures such as 
water efficient taps and shower heads. These regulations were modified on several occasions, 
including specifying a range of targets for water demand reductions ranging from 2,650 to 
18,500 gallons/property/a (10 to 70 kl/property/a) depending on geographical location.39 
Rainwater tanks were predominantly used to achieve such targets, driving rainwater tank 
installation growth in SEQ. This mandatory requirement was repealed in 201340 by the 
Queensland Commission Authority due mainly to concerns over the economic viability of 
rainwater tanks as a water source. 
Supply side 
In addition to demand-side measures, there were significant changes made to the water 
infrastructure system. These changes included: new water supply sources, linkages through a 
water grid system, construction of the first major desalination plant in SEQ, and the construction 
of the Western Corridor Recycled Water Scheme, one of the largest recycled water schemes in 
the world. These schemes, listed below in Table 4.4, cost more than USD 4,320 M (AUD 6,000 
M). The large proposed Traveston Crossing Dam, over 100 km (62 miles) north of Brisbane, 
was at one point included within the drought strategy investigations (>USD 1800 or AUD 2,500 
M for stage 1 including delivery network, based on 2006 costs) until the development of the dam 
was eventually refused by the federal government on the grounds of listed threatened species 
and community opposition. 
 
Table 4.4 – Summary of key supply initiatives 
















AUD 970 M 
 














AUD 1200 M 
 







PRW pipelines AUD 1149 M 
  
USD 825 M    
Northern 
Pipeline  
AUD 829 M 
 
USD 595 M    
Southern 
Pipeline 
AUD 855 M  
 
USD 615 M    
Eastern 
Pipeline 
AUD 39 M  
 




AUD 454M  
 





                                                       










AUD 379M  
 
USD 275 M Full volume 
102,883 Ml 
 






AUD 73M  
 
USD 55 M Full volume  
7,338 Ml 









The dams reached their lowest levels (17%) in 2007 before the drought officially broke in 2008. 
At that time further major reform included the reconfiguration of the water supply industry. Also 
in 2010 the Queensland Water Corporation released the SEQ Water Strategy to lay out a water 
security plan for the SEQ region for the next 40 years. This plan was linked to various other 
regional plans, all of which are reviewed every 5 years or as circumstances change. The 
reviews consider, for example, water availability, water demand, service levels, potential effects 
of climate change, triggers for drought response, and potential options available to fill the 
supply–demand gap (QWC 2010). 
Soon after the release of these plans, severe flooding occurred in the SEQ region at the end of 
2010–early 2011 with loss of life and billions of dollars of damage. This illustrates the extremes 
of climate including severe drought and severe flooding. Due to the major floods, subsequent 
rains and reductions in water demand, water levels of the combined regional dams have 
remained in excess of 80% since 2010.41 As a result, some of the major new supplies that were 
developed during the drought are not being used or have limited use. The Western Corridor 
Recycled Water Scheme has been shut down until water shortage issues return. The Tugun 
desalination plant has not been used for base supply, but has been used for back-up when 
other supplies are offline for maintenance or due to contamination. 
Another iconic scheme, Pimpama Coomera, which uses recycled water for toilet flushing and 
outdoor uses, is scheduled for closure due to its high operating costs.42 In addition, the 
mandatory requirement for alternative sources in new houses to reduce demand was repealed 
in 201343 after cost-benefit analysis found that these systems were not cost effective. However, 
councils can opt into the requirement if they choose to do so. After two years of operation, the 
functions of one of the water distribution and retailing entities passed back to the three separate 
local councils and after six years the Queensland Water Commission ceased operation. Policy 
and regulatory functions moved to the Queensland Department of Energy and Water Supply 
and water security functions became the responsibility of Seqwater (the bulk supply authority).  
 
Key lessons 
Crisis and opportunity 
The establishment of the Queensland Water Commission was a good example of rapid 
institutional water reform during drought. Establishing an agency with overarching policy, 
planning, and regulatory functions enabled coordination of water use information, strategy 
development and implementation across formerly fragmented water supply services managed 
by individual councils. A key advantage of this was consistency of both the message and the 
rules associated with water restrictions across a number of council water authorities. For the 
community, having one voice to listen to meant that the message was much easier to hear and 
absorb. 
Working together 
SEQ’s successful, and especially rapid implementation of water efficiency programs during the 
drought was in part facilitated by drawing on lessons and building on the water efficiency 
                                                       
41 http://www.Seqwater.com.au/water-supply/dam-levels  
42 http://www.goldcoast.qld.gov.au/environment/pimpama-coomera-waterfuture-residents-and-businesses-7904.html  
43 http://www.hpw.qld.gov.au/SiteCollectionDocuments/BuildingAndPlumbingNewsflash513.pdf 
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program experiences of other cities, including Sydney and Melbourne, which were also 
experiencing serious drought at the time. In other cases, the experience of SEQ was extremely 
useful for supporting other cities to implement programs. This illustrates the value for those 
organisations that are charged with implementing water efficiency programs of working together 
to learn from and build on practice and implementation expertise from elsewhere in the water 
industry.  
The Target 140 and One to One programs were highly innovative and successful, with the 
Target 140 programing later adopted by Melbourne as Target 155. This further demonstrated 
the sharing of ideas and approaches between water utilities and agencies across the country. 
This was often facilitated through national industry bodies such as the Water Services 
Association of Australia, Australian Water Association, and National Water Commission 
networks, conferences and workshops. 
The other feature was stakeholder engagement. The responsible agency did significant market 
research, as well as extensive discussions with industry associations to increase the success of 
the programs. 
Speaking and listening 
A water efficiency strategy comprises many different elements, and the success of the multi-
faceted program in SEQ illustrated the importance of integrating the different elements – 
communication, promotion, and behavior change as well as programs that provided long term 
efficiency gains by changing fixture and appliances. This enabled programmatic as well as 
cross-promotional links, such as linking the ‘educative’ elements of the high water users’ 
program to the ‘structural’ element of retrofits.  
Getting the rules right 
In SEQ, regulations were introduced to require new developments to incorporate water efficient 
equipment and reduce demand through rainwater tank use and recycled water. However, some 
aspects of these requirements within development regulations were later repealed as a means 
of ‘reducing red tape’, illustrating the difficulty of maintaining consistency between long-term 
supply–demand planning and drought response planning.  
Picking the low hanging fruit  
SEQ applied a broad portfolio approach to identifying potential options that assisted in moving 
away from rain-dependent sources and subsequently implemented significant demand-side and 
supply-side initiatives. In terms of water efficiency, residential programs such as Target 140 and 
the high water users’ program were highly successful. Similarly, the Western Corridor Recycling 
project was a good example of a contingency option, which was established in a way that could 








4.3 PERTH, WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
Perth and the water supply system 
The city of Perth, with a current population of nearly 2 million, is the capital of the state of 
Western Australia (WA), which covers the entire western third of Australia, an area of 1 million 
square miles (2.6 million km2). Three-quarters of the state’s population resides in Perth.  
In 2001, when the population was 1.4 million, Perth witnessed a step change, a sudden and 
significant decrease in inflows to dams. By 2011, the population had risen to 1.7 million and 
there was another downward step change in inflows. By this time the drought had broken in 
other parts of the country.44  
Perth has a Mediterranean climate, similar to much of California, characterized by hot dry 
summers and cool wet winters. The current average rainfall is 33 inches (840 mm). Rainfall has 
been steadily declining over the last century, with a decline of over 30% since the early 1900s 
observed in the southern Jarrahdale dam catchment area.45  
Reduced rainfall has had a significant impact on stream flows, as well as surface and 
groundwater reserves. A 12% decline in rainfall since 1990 has resulted in a dramatic 50% 
reduction in stream flows into Perth’s dams (WCWA 2013, p.3). The significant decline in 
inflows over the last 40 years, commencing in the mid-1970s, is shown in Figure 4.10.  
 
Figure 4.10 – Annual inflows to Perth dams (ATSE 2012)  
Note: 1 megaliter = 0.8 acre-feet 
 
Perth is linked to a complex water system, covering a large area which includes agricultural 
regions. This system is managed by the Water Corporation of Western Australia (WCWA), a 
publicly-owned water utility established in 1996, which provides 97% of water and wastewater 
services in WA (ERA 2004, p.15).  
Perth has access to water from both dams and groundwater reserves, unlike other major 
Australian cities. Over time, groundwater has been used to provide a significant proportion of 
annual water supply. Groundwater is also used directly by farmers, industry, and households; 
indeed, the amount of groundwater used by these private water uses exceeds that extracted for 
public water use supplied by the WCWA (for residential, business as well as the Goldfields and 
Agricultural regions). In 2001, public water use was drawn predominantly from groundwater 
sources as surface water sources were becoming less reliable (WCWA 2009, p.16).  
                                                       
44 http://blog.id.com.au/2012/population/australian-population/perths-population-a-story-of-economic-boom/  
45 http://www.watercorporation.com.au/water-supply-and-services/rainfall-and-dams/rainfall  
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Perth’s surface water supplies experienced major reductions in inflows. As a result, there was a 
strong need to further explore water efficiency and sources which were not rain-dependent, 
including additional groundwater sources, desalination, and recycling. Due to the potential 
environmental and social impacts of these sources, assessing the feasibility, costs, and impacts 
required extensive investigations. Hence, decision-makers in Perth and WA as a whole have a 
long history of water planning in consultation with the community.  
 
Water planning 
Over the last decade, WA has undertaken numerous water planning exercises with multiple 
stakeholders. In 2001, the WA Government held a water symposium to develop the Securing 
Our Water Future: A State Water Strategy involving both the government and community. 
Public forums were held regionally, and these assisted in the formulation of numerous 
recommendations, from water efficiency targets to new supplies to be delivered by multiple 
agencies. The WCWA targets and responsibilities included reducing water use to 40,000 
gallons per person per annum (155 kl/person/a) for total water use by the metropolitan water 
users and achieving a 20% reuse target by 2012 (Government of WA 2003). This strategy was 
eventually finalized in 2003 (Government of WA 2003). Within the strategy, integrated resource 
planning principles were specifically articulated (refer to box). 
The Strategy and associated water efficiency 
targets gave rise to the launch of the multi-
million dollar statewide Waterwise Rebate 
Scheme in early 2003 (described below). In 
2005, a committee was established to guide 
water reform in WA. As part of the State Water 
Plan released in 2007 a priority action was for 
the WCWA to engage with the community 
about water source options for the city and 
surrounds. In 2009, the Options for Our Water 
Future Paper considered options ranging from 
water efficiency measures, individual to 
community-scale alternative supplies, recycling 
(including groundwater replenishment), 
desalination, surface water, and groundwater. 
Also in 2009, the WCWA produced Water 
Forever: Towards Climate Resilience, a 50-
year plan to secure water supplies. This plan aims to reduce demand to 125 kl/person/a by 
2030 (90 gpcd or 342 lcd) comprising 61 gpcd (85 kl/person/a) residential and 29 gpcd (40 
kl/person/a) average for all business, industry and services. 
By 2060 the plan aims to reduce demand to 110 kl/person/a (80 gpcd or 301 lcd) comprising 
19,800 gallons per person per year (75 kl/person/a) residential and 9,240 gallons/ person/year 
(35 kl/person/a) business, industry and services (WCWA, 2009). In 2012 and 2013 the WCWA 
released additional plans to work towards the 50-year target, including further details on water 
recycling and water efficiency (WCWA 2013). 
 
Water demand 
Among the major cities in Australia, Perth has historically been one of the highest water users 
on a per capita basis (WCWA 2009, p. 35). Volume-based water pricing and water restrictions 
were introduced in the late 1970s, resulting in a dramatic drop in total water demand from a high 
of over 166 gpcd (630 lcd) to 90 gpcd (342 lcd) in the late 1970s (Turner et al. 2005). The water 
restrictions at that time caused significant concern in a community that, until that point, had 
used nearly three-quarters of the city’s water on suburban gardens during the summer months. 
The backlash from the community about water restrictions meant that the state government was 
subsequently averse to using stringent restrictions. This was apparent in 2005 when the 
government renewed its commitment to reducing the likelihood of a total ban on water sprinklers 
to just one year in two hundred – a very conservative approach to restrictions compared to 
those adopted in other cities in Australia at that time (Morgan 2015). 
From the early 1980s total water demand per person steadily rose again to an average of 
around 127 gpcd (479 lcd), until two-day-a-week sprinkler restrictions were introduced in 
 
‘Integrated resource planning ensures 
that options that reduce demand on 
valuable water supplies are compared on 
an equal basis with options that increase 
supply. This is achieved by viewing water 
saved through water conservation as a 
resource, in exactly the same way water 
stored in a dam is regarded as a 
resource. Comparisons include the total 
costs and benefits to water service 
providers and the community, ensuring 
that the water planning options 
implemented are those with the lowest 
cost to the community.’ (Government of 
WA 2003).  
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September 2001, which resulted in a decline in water use back to 110 gpcd (416 lcd) in 2001/02. 
By 2011/12 demand was 100 gpcd (135 kl/person/a) due to a combination of water restrictions 
and other demand-side measures. From 2001 demand generally remained below the 112 gpcd 
(155 kl/person/a) target. Refer to Figure 4.11. 
 
Figure 4.11- Historical total and per person total water usage (source: WCWA 2013, p. 12). 
Note: 200 kiloliters per year = 53,000 gallons per year; 200 billion litres per year = 167,000 
acre-feet per year. 
 
Even with water demand falling in recent years, Perth consumers remain the highest water 
users per capita among the major cities in Australia (WCWA 2009, p.34). This is in part due to 
its Mediterranean climate, as well as its sandy soils, and the value residents put on living with 
large areas of turf. Actual water use is higher because a third of households are connected to a 
private household well (WCWA 2009, p. 9) for outdoor watering, which means this water 
demand is not reflected in reported potable water figures. These wells tap into the relatively 
shallow aquifers typically less than 160 feet (50m) deep. This indicates that even though 
significant demand-side measures discussed below have been implemented, there is still the 
potential for increased water efficiency for various indoor and outdoor end uses, as explored in 
the Perth Residential Water Use Study (WCWA 2009). The WCWA was the first major utility to 
undertake an end use study, measuring the disaggregated customer uses of water by appliance 
and fixture (Loh and Coghlan 2003), pioneering the use of evidence-based demand analysis. 
The study was conducted between 1998 and 2001, and has been replicated by other cities in 
Australia. These studies are used to understand household water demand and are useful for 
demand forecasting and options analysis using the principles of integrated resource planning.  
 
Demand side 
In 2001 when Perth faced a step change in inflows to dams, restrictions beyond Level 1 were 
implemented for the first time in over 20 years. Following the release of the 2003 State Water 
Strategy, a large-scale residential demand management program (the Waterwise Rebate 
Scheme) was launched to reduce the risk that Perth would need a total outdoor water use ban. 
Within just two years of the program’s launch, 80,000 washing machine rebates were 
administered through the program, and by the end of the program in 2009, over 200,000 
rebates were processed. This program helped to transform the washing machine market in 
Australia and to greatly increase the availability of efficient, predominantly front loading, 
washing machines (Turner et al. 2005; WCWA 2009, p. 37). The WCWA also led the way in 
developing strong industry linkages, training, and certification arrangements with plumbers, 
garden centers, and irrigation specialists. This was subsequently replicated by other utilities. 
Table 4.5 summarizes some of the key programs implemented. 
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Table 4.5- Summary of initiatives 
Initiatives Summary details Estimated 
costs, uptake 
and savings 
Restrictions Prior to 1994, restrictions were implemented in Perth in 
the late 1970s. Since 1994, there had been Stage 1 
restrictions (a ban on sprinklers between 9 am and 6 pm) 
with high community support (WCWA 2009, pdf p.25). 
In 2001, due to the significantly reduced storage volumes 
and the intent to save 36,480 AF/a (45,000 ML/a) to 
prevent more severe restrictions (i.e. total sprinkler ban), 
Stage 4 restrictions were put in place (limiting sprinklers 
to two days/week) (Turner et al. 2005). 
Additional winter sprinkler restrictions and a temporary 
one-day-per-week watering roster were implemented in 







In early 2003 the state government released the program 
in response to the targets identified in the State Water 
Strategy. The Water Corporation administered the 
program on behalf of the state government from 2003 to 
2009. The numbers in parentheses show the numbers of 
rebates provided: 
# indoor products – showerheads (22,944) and 
washing machines (210,826), flow regulators 
(207)  
# outdoor products – pool covers (29,476), garden 
irrigation systems (392), subsurface irrigation 
systems (8,263), rain sensors (813), tap timers 
(2,495), soil wetting agents (68,579)  
# alternative systems – garden bores (23,541), 
rainwater tanks (15,648), greywater systems 
(245), aerobic treatment units (112) as well as 














As part of the Waterwise Rebate Scheme, an extensive 
multifaceted advertizing and awareness/communication 
campaign was implemented. 
In addition, due to significant outdoor water use, the 
WCWA initiated strong industry linkages and training and 
certification arrangements with plumbers, garden centers, 




The program ran from 2011 to 2013. Participants could 
exchange up to two showerheads for free efficient 
models. The customer’s most recent water bill was 
required. Showerheads could be exchanged at local 
hardware stores. Rental properties were also eligible to 




Toilets to go The WCWA partnered with the private sector to provide 
households and businesses with the chance to swap 
single-flush toilets for 4 star dual-flush toilets at a 
reduced cost. Participants had a choice of 3 toilets.  
 
  










The program commenced in 2007 and required all 
businesses and government agencies in WA using > 16 
AF/a (20 ML/a) to conduct a water management 
assessment and submit annual water efficiency 
management plans to the WCWA on progress in 






According to published data the overall breakdown of savings from the program is as shown in 
Figure 4.12 with the vast majority of savings being attributed to water restrictions, namely the 
two days per week watering roster. 
 




Several options were proposed to augment water supplies in the region, including: 
• Recycling – The Kwinana Water Reclamation Plant supplies approximately 4,000 
AF/a (5 Gl/a) non-potable water, equal to about 2% of Perth’s current annual water 
use, predominantly to large industrial users near the wastewater recycling facility. 
Indirect potable reuse via groundwater replenishment46, or aquifer recharge, has 
now also been shown to be a highly viable option to boost drinking water supplies in 
Western Australia, and is expected to provide an additional 12,000 AF/a (14 Gl/a) of 
water from 2016.  
• Desalination – The first major desalination plant in Australia, the 36,500 AF/a 
(45,000 Ml/a) Kwinana desalination plant, was completed in 2006 and provided 
about 20% of total supply at that time. By 2012, another plant had been constructed 
to the south of Perth at Binningup, providing a total of 81,000 AF/a (100 GL/a) and 
bringing the total desalination supply in Perth up to 40%. Both plants remain 
operational. 
• Transfers – Transferring water from the Kimberley47, a wet region over 2,175 miles 
(3,500 km) north of Perth, via pipeline, canal or ocean transport. After lengthy 
analysis, these options were finally ruled out in 2005 because they were considered 
too costly. 
                                                       
46 http://www.watercorporation.com.au/water-supply-and-services/ongoing-works/groundwater-replenishment-scheme 
47 https://www.water.wa.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/4966/64772.pdf  
(Outdoor	  watering)	  




The cost, capacity and completion dates of recent large-scale supply-side initiatives are 
summarized in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6 – Large supply-side initiatives (PC 2011)  














AUD 28M USD 20 6,000 ML/a 
 
4,865 AF/a  2004 
Desalination 
(Kwinana) 







stage 1 and 
2 







* Costs incurred at that time 
Aftermath 
In Perth, it has been widely assumed that what has been experienced is not a drought but 
rather a long-term shift in climate, a shift that may continue. As part of the Water Forever: 
Towards Climate Resilience 50-year plan released in 2009, a portfolio approach has been 
adopted. In 2001, the Perth system relied exclusively on groundwater and surface water 
supplies. Today, nearly 122,000 AF/a (150 Gl/a), representing 41% of demand, is supplied by 
desalinated seawater from the Kwinana and Binningup plants. An additional 42% comes from 
groundwater reserves and less than 17% from surface water dams. As Perth enters the summer 
of 2015/16 dam storages are below 30%, even though water has been transferred into the dam 
system from the desalination plants as part of a policy to “bank” desalinated water in the winter 
when demand is lower. 
Over the next 50 years, water demand in Perth is expected to decline by 25% due to denser 
urban developments, which use less water, and the continuation of many of the existing water 
efficiency programs. In addition, there is a major focus on increasing water recycling, largely 
through groundwater replenishment, or aquifer recharge. Significant work has been done on 
trialing and transferring groundwater sources from higher aquifers within the complex 
groundwater system to deeper more reliable groundwater sources. There have also been 
investigations into increasing desalination to further offset declining inflows to dams (WCWA 
2013). Figure 4.13 shows the community’s views on the ranking of these options (WCWA 2009) 
and the alignment of these views with sustainability indicators. Water efficiency and large-scale 
water recycling have the greatest support, while desalination and especially surface water have 
much less support. 
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Figure 4.13- Community views on future water sources compared to sustainability 
indicators (source: WCWA 2009)
 
Lessons 
Crisis and opportunity 
Perth’s water supply system was confronted with the decline in inflows earlier than those in the 
east of Australia. This decline in inflows captured public attention, and, combined with strong 
community engagement by the state government and the WCWA, increased awareness within 
the community about water issues. The community engagement on the State Water Strategy 
indicated strong support for investment in water efficiency and recycling in WA as a means of 
meeting water needs. 
As conditions worsened, policy-makers sought to “drought-proof” the system through the 
construction of desalination plants. This was also seen as a means of avoiding a complete ban 
on outdoor water use. More recently, there have been large-scale investments in recycled water 
to replenish groundwater. There is a real risk that the high level of capital expenditure for 
increasing water supply reduces efforts to pursue cost-effective water efficiency measures. It is 
important to ensure that investment in these options is not curtailed due to the reallocation of 
priorities once the sense of urgency has passed. There are profound cost implications for 
customers, and equity implications for low water users of a path of prioritizing higher unit cost 
supply options over lower unit cost water efficiency improvements. 
Working together 
The WCWA and the WA Government showed great leadership in establishing partnerships with 
industry on water saving initiatives. This is demonstrated by the long running outdoor water 
programs with the irrigation and garden industries. 
The water industry in WA was also an early adopter of an evidence-based approach to 
understanding water usage, through its pioneering residential end-use study. Perth was one of 
the first major cities where this research, including household surveys, was undertaken. These 
studies have been replicated in other cities to inform the development of water demand 
forecasting models and associated options assessment models, allowing more accurate 
predictions of the role that water efficiency could play in both short- and long-term water 
planning and management. 
Speaking and listening 
Western Australia has a long history of comprehensive, high quality engagement processes 
involving the community in water planning. The WCWA and the WA Government have 
conducted numerous community consultation processes over the last decade. The outcomes of 
these processes, in particular the 2003 community engagement, indicated a strong preference 
for water efficiency, and a lower preference for desalination. There has been a very strong 
historical commitment to water saving measures in WA, and in particular the implementation of 
a permanent two day per week garden watering roster and associated behavior change 
measures have had a major impact on demand. However, the levels of investment in structural 
water efficiency measures have not reflected the potential savings available, the need for action, 
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or the high marginal cost of water. On a per capita basis, the investment levels in efficiency are 
well below those of Sydney and South East Queensland. 
Getting the rules right 
The WCWA was the first utility in Australia to implement a comprehensive, community-wide 
water efficiency program, based on the principles of integrated resource planning. This was the 
Kalgoorlie-Boulder Water Efficiency Program, implemented in 1995 at a cost of USD 100 (AUD 
138) per person. Further to this, the 2003 State Water Conservation Strategy explicitly referred 
to the need for integrated resource planning. 
Following a period of significant caution regarding the use of recycled water and non-potable 
sources, the Western Australian regulatory agencies have facilitated the largest trial of indirect 
potable reuse in the country, in the form of aquifer recharge from recycled wastewater. This is 
important for the Perth regional water supply and for reducing the strain on groundwater 
systems and for reducing the high operating and capital cost of desalination. It also provides an 
example for other Australian cities. 
It is not clear, however, whether the current economic regulatory arrangements administered by 
the Economic Regulation Authority recognize the importance of investing in the lowest cost 
options, in particular, optimum levels of investment in water conservation measures, consistent 
with the high operating and capital costs of new supply. For example, the estimated long-run 
marginal cost of water supply is USD 5.60 to 11.40 per hundred cubic feet (AUD 1.49 to 3.11 
per kiloliter in 2015/16) (ERA 2013). This is much higher than the unit cost of many water 
efficiency options. 
Picking the low hanging fruit 
Perth’s planning is an example of how to use broad portfolio thinking to consider supply- and 
demand-side options. Much has been achieved through investment on the demand side, such 
as the large-scale washing machine rebate program that helped transform the washing machine 
market. It is recognized that there is still significant scope for further water savings, and that 
there is potential to tap into further opportunities for using recycled water, two key options 




  MANAGING DROUGHT: LESSONS FROM AUSTRALIA 79 
C
ase studies 
4.4 MELBOURNE, VICTORIA 
Melbourne and the water supply system 
Melbourne is the capital city of the state of Victoria with a population of about 4.5 million (3.5 
million in 2001 and 4.2 million by 2011) (ABS 2003, ABS 2012). The city’s water comes almost 
entirely from surface water catchments that feed into a complex series of dams and networked 
storages, with a large storage capacity, relative to inflow, of about 1,470,000 AF (1,812 Gl) 
(ATSE 2012). The storage capacity is in the order of four times current annual consumption. 
Development is restricted in the catchments, which contain large areas of protected forest. 
Water quality is relatively high. The system is gravity-fed and hence water supply from this rain-
fed system is relatively inexpensive. 
Melbourne has a temperate climate with warm to hot summers and cool winters, with rainfall on 
average spread reasonably evenly across the year and dam inflows higher in winter and spring. 
Inter-annual climate variability is influenced by El Niño and La Niña events, resulting in periodic 
droughts.  
Historically, Melbourne has had a reliable water supply, including through previous dry periods. 
However, the period from 1997 to 2009 (known as the Millennium Drought) was the longest and 
driest period that Melbourne had experienced since records began in the 1910s. Inflows were 
39% lower than long-term averages during this period (Figure 4.14). Storage volumes began to 
drop in late 1996, with a period in 2005 when the drought appeared to ease, before inflows fell 
again the following year and the total system storage of the dams hit a low of 25.6% in June 
2009 (Low et al. 2015).  
 
Figure 4.14 – Historical inflows to Melbourne’s dam system (source: Melbourne Water 
2016). Note: 600 Gl = 500,000 acre-feet. 
 
Melbourne is located near Port Phillip Bay, which receives storm water and treated wastewater 
from the metropolitan area. The Bay is a low mixing environment and concerns about water 
quality (especially due to the effect of nutrients) provide another incentive, in addition to 
concerns about water security, for focusing on storm water and wastewater management, and 
for a focus on the health of rivers and waterways draining the catchments.  
Throughout the Millennium Drought, the Victorian Government, wholesale supplier Melbourne 
Water, three geographically-separate retailers (City West Water, South East Water and Yarra 
Valley Water), and regional water authorities connected to the Melbourne system embarked on 
a number of wide-ranging demand- and supply-side strategies to ensure water security for the 
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Water policy and planning 
The coordinated response of the Victorian Government and the water utilities to the Millennium 
Drought built on existing joint policy and strategy development to plan for and manage 
Melbourne’s water supply system. 
In 2004, a Victorian Government policy white paper (Victorian Government, 2004) set targets of 
a 15% reduction in potable water use and 20% reuse of effluent from Melbourne Water’s 
Western Treatment Plant by 2010. Water authorities were also required to assess the future 
water supply and demand balance and identify new supply options and demand management 
strategies based on environmental, social, and economic considerations.  
This work informed the 2006 Central Regional Sustainable Water Strategy (CRSWS) (Victorian 
Government, 2006), which addressed supply needs for Melbourne and other cities and towns in 
the central region of Victoria. This key strategy document, developed in the early stages of the 
Millennium Drought, emphasized the need for a longer-term vision and approach to ensuring 
water security, highlighted the importance and value of water conservation as a response to 
drought, and identified actions for local recycling for non-potable uses and large-scale supply 
augmentation. The government set a more stringent target of a 25% reduction in total water use 
from the 1990s average use by 2015, i.e. from 112 to 84 gpcd (423 to 317 lcd) (Victorian 
Government, 2005). A water supply-demand strategy was developed by the water companies in 
2002 and updated in 2006 to support the development of the CRSWS. In Melbourne, water 
companies have legislated obligations to prepare these strategies and review drought response 
plans every 5 years. 
The policy, strategy and plan development prior to the drought laid the foundation for clarity of 
institutional roles, and for the identification and deployment of supply and demand strategies 
during the drought. Despite these efforts, the severity and length of the drought meant that 
conditions during the Millennium Drought were more extreme than scenarios considered in the 
supply–demand plan. Thus, while Melbourne’s response to the Millennium Drought built on the 
foundation of prior preparation, it was also characterized by further rapid and adaptive decision-
making about both supply and demand measures.  
Water demand 
Demand in Melbourne has historically been around 60% residential, 30% non-residential and 
10% non-revenue water. Average total water demand in the 1990s was 112 gpcd (423 lcd). In 
the residential sector, less than 20% of demand has been for outdoor purposes (Parliament of 
Victoria 2009). Water use dropped 
significantly during the Millennium Drought 
due to restrictions and other demand 
management measures, with restrictions 
implemented from the end of 2002. 
 
Figures 4.15 to 4.17 (Melbourne Water et al. 
2015) show how the total water demand, total 
water demand per person and residential 
demand per person changed during and after 
the drought, which officially ended in 2010 
when Melbourne experienced its highest 
catchment rainfall and inflows since 1996. The 
lowest demand was in 2010/11 just after the 
drought and during a period of relatively high 
rainfall. Since restrictions were finally lifted at 
the end of 2012, demand has increased 
slightly but remains much lower than pre-
drought levels.  
Fig 4.15 – Melbourne’s total water demand. 
Note 400 gigalitres = 333,000 acre-feet. 
 
Fig 4.16 – Melbourne’s total water 
demand per person. Note 300 lpd = 80 
gpcd. 




Drought response plans are the key 
framework instrument for managing 
drought in the state, and Victoria has a long 
history of structured requirements from 
drought response planning. Since the 1990s, 
the Victorian Government has required each 
urban water authority to prepare a plan 
which outlines roles and responsibilities, a 
staged approach to managing demand 
through restrictions, and in the case of 
Melbourne, protocols for coordination 
between utilities. 
In line with the drought response plan requirements, a Drought Response Coordination 
Committee was established to coordinate the drought responses of utilities and the Victorian 
Government (Rhodes 2009). Water restrictions and efficiency programs were implemented by 
the city’s three retail companies and Melbourne Water through a Joint Water Conservation Plan. 
The retailers managed efficiency programs in the residential, non-residential, and non-revenue 
water sectors, including the Target 155 (155 lpcd) program that was introduced towards the end 
of the drought in 2008 (Fitzgerald, 2009). Melbourne’s total system storage of the dams reached 
their lowest levels in 2009. These programs were implemented in combination with a suite of 
residential rebates available statewide from the Victorian Government’s Living Victoria Rebate 
Program from 2003 to 2015 (DSE, pers. comm. 2015). The “155” target was selected based on 
modeling of residential consumption expected under stage 4 restrictions (Fitzgerald, 2009). 
Restrictions played a central role in drought management in Victoria. Melbourne’s drought 
response plans contained permanent water savings measures (applicable at all times) and four 
stages of restrictions of increasing stringency, progressively introduced as the drought 
deepened and predetermined dam level trigger points were reached, consistent with Ministerial 
Guidelines for preparing DRPs (Victorian Government, 1998). Unlike other states, Victoria 
applied the same restrictions rules by stage in all cities and towns (although different locations 
were under different levels of restrictions, depending on local water levels).  
Stage 1 restrictions were imposed in Melbourne in 2002 for the first time in 20 years. They 
progressed to Stage 2 in 2003 and were pulled back to permanent water savings rules in early 
2005 when there appeared to be a lull in the drought. Around late 2006, the restrictions were 
significantly modified and then gradually ramped up to the highest level implemented during the 
drought, Stage 3a, by 2007, and they remained in effect for 3 years (various sources, see 
Chong et al. 2009). For residential users the Stage 3a restrictions included: a ban on watering 
lawns and turf; garden watering limited to two periods of two hours per week (using hand held 
hoses with trigger nozzles and/or efficient dripper irrigation systems); a ban on car washing at 
home (with exceptions for windows and mirrors); and a limit on commercial car washing 
services to a maximum of 18.5 gallons/vehicle (70 L/vehicle).  
These stringent restrictions were combined with Target 155 in late 2008 to provide motivation to 
save more water. The design of the program took on board many of the characteristics of the 
highly successful Target 140 campaign used in SEQ in 2007. The Target 155 program was a 
voluntary “call to action” introduced as a concerted campaign to encourage residential water 
users to reduce their consumption to less than 41 gpcd (155 lcd). With Stage 3a restrictions in 
place since April 2007, residential water use in 2007-08 had already dropped to 44 gpcd (166 
liters/capita/day) (Melbourne Water et al. 2015). The campaign, introduced at the end of 2008, 
was built on recognizing customers’ efforts to date, informing them about the role of Target 155, 
and assisting them with knowledge about and access to practical solutions. The approach 
employed: 
• mass marketing – a direct mail pack to all households with information and a 4-
minute shower timer; advice via print, radio, television, websites, and water 
conservation kiosks in major shopping centers, plus showerhead exchanges at the 
conservation kiosks 
• personalized marketing –  information in quarterly bills to enable customers to 
compare their usage to the target 
• media engagement – media releases about progress against target (Fitzgerald 
2009). 
Fig 4.17 – Melbourne’s residential water 
demand per person. Note 200 lpd = 53 gpcd. 
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Target 155 focused on households but was accompanied by a voluntary Support 155 program 
for non-residential water users. Support 155 focused on encouraging and providing resources 
for small and medium-sized businesses (including those using less than 10 million litres of water 
a year) to assess water use and improve their water use efficiency (Yarra Valley Water 2009).  
The communication, promotion and outreach elements of the water conservation campaign 
were pivotal to its success, and to engendering and maintaining strong community support for 
water restrictions and other conservation measures in Melbourne. Storage levels and 
consumption information were highlighted on websites, television news broadcasts, and other 
media. Information about water conservation and recycling was similarly distributed in bills, on 
websites, via schools, and through the media. Some of the key programs used in Melbourne 
during the drought are summarized in Table 4.7. 
 
Table 4.7 – Summary of key demand initiatives 













The program ran from 2003 to 2015 and provided 
rebates on a range of water efficient products in 
Melbourne and across the state 
Residential rebates included (with the number of 
rebates shown in parentheses):brackets) 48:  
• indoor – showerheads (9,882), toilets (27,629), 
dishwashers (4,516), washing machines 
(19,214), hot water re-circulators (180)  
• outdoor – pool covers (1,863), high pressure 
cleaning systems (46,015)  
• alternative supplies – grey water systems when 
connected to subsurface irrigation (2,367), tank 
connection systems (1,968), a range of rainwater 
tank rebates dependent on size from 1 kl to 10 kl 
and connection to indoor end uses such as toilet, 
laundry (30,393)  
• water conservation audits (11,967)  
• a ‘basket of goods offer’ of a USD 22 (AUD30) 
rebate on products worth over USD 72.40 
(AUD100), including flow control valves, mulch, 
wetting agents, compost/mulch bins, moisture/ 
rain sensors, garden tap timers, trigger nozzles, 
drip watering systems/weep hoses, temporary 
grey water diverters, shower timers, rainwater 













The exchange program, which started in 2006/07 
and finished in 2010/11, was run by the 3 water 
retailers. Residential customers exchanged their old 
showerheads for a free, 3 star water efficient model 
by bringing in their old showerheads and latest water 
bill into approved exchange points such as water 
retailer offices, local government locations, post 
outlets, hardware stores, and water conservation 
kiosks in major shopping centers. Some retailers 
later included free installation of showerheads with 




savings of  





                                                       
48 Data provided by Department of Sustainability and Environment, pers. comm. 2015. 
49 Data provided by Department of Sustainability and Environment, pers. comm. 2015. 







The rebate program run by all 3 retailers 
(including a Living Victoria Water Rebate) 
included removal and recycling of old units and 
standard installation of a new 4 or 5 star toilet by 





Target 155  Target 155 was introduced as a campaign to 
encourage residential water users to reduce their 
consumption to less than 41 gpcd (155 lcd). The 
campaign, introduced at the end of 2008. It was built 
on recognizing customers’ efforts to date, informing 
them about the role of Target 155, and assisting 
them with knowledge about and access to practical 












In 2006, the Victorian Government launched the 
statewide SWEP. This innovative and highly 
successful multi-faceted program used a 
combination of smart meters, a website portal, 
education and ongoing liaison to help schools to 
identify leaks, assess their water usage, and 
promote water efficiency. By 2009, 1,737 schools 








During the drought, all business and industrial 
customers were required to develop and submit to 
their water utility a “WaterMap” for each site using 
more than 264,000 gallons/a (10 ML/a). This 
Victorian Government program built on and 
extended the voluntary scheme that had been 
introduced in 2003, in which Melbourne’s top 200 
non-residential consumers developed water 
management plans in conjunction with their water 
utility. 
 
The program required and provided support to non-
residential water customers to:  
• assess their current water use 
• identify inefficiencies and opportunities for water 
savings 
• prepare an action plan to implement water 
conservation activities 
• report annually on implementation of those 
activities (Barron and Liubinas, 2009). 
During the drought, water retailers contacted, 
approached, and worked with a wide range of 
businesses across many water-using industries to 
promote water saving and assist users to save 
water. Since the Millennium Drought ended in 2011 
and with storage recovery following the 2010-11 and 
2011-12 La Niña (see BoM)50, stringent demand 
management initiatives such as restrictions have no 
longer been mandatory, but the retailers continue to 
offer the program on a voluntary basis.  
 
 
                                                       
50	  BoM:  Record-breaking La Niña events – An analysis of the La Niña life cycle and the impacts and significance of the 
2010–11 and 2011–12 La Niña events in Australia. http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/enso/history/ln-2010-12.	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In addition to the restrictions and water efficiency programs, regulations were also in place to 
encourage water efficiency in buildings. As part of the broader Victorian Star Building Standard 
(Australian Building Codes Board 2005), a system was introduced in July 2005 requiring new 
homes to: achieve a 5 star energy rating for the building fabric structure, adhere to maximum 
flow rates for showerheads and taps, and have a maximum water pressure of 73 psi (500kPa). 
In addition, new houses must install either (1) a rainwater tank with a capacity of at least 528 
gallons (2 kl) for toilet flushing serviced by a 540 square foot (50 sq. meter) roof area, (2) a solar 
hot water system, or (3) be connected to a reticulated recycled water system where it is 
available (Australian Building Codes Board 2005). The combination of rebates and regulations 
on rainwater tanks increased their penetration in Melbourne from 6% in 2004 to 23% in 2010 
(ABS 2004, ABS 2010).  
It is well documented that Melbourne relied heavily on restrictions in its response to the drought, 
and that without the combination of various measures such as restrictions, efficiency measures 
and environmental flow reductions, the city could have come close to running out of water in 
2009 as depicted in Figure 4.18. 
 
Fig 4.18 – Historical Melbourne system storage and demand (source: OLV 2013) 
 
Supply side 
In 2007, supply and demand options for Melbourne were outlined in the Victorian Government’s 
Our Water Our Future, The Next Stage of the Government’s Water Plan (Victorian Government, 
2007). Two major supply-side projects were: 
• the Wonthaggi desalination plant, to supply Melbourne, Geelong, and other towns – 
120,000 AF/a (150 GL/a) capacity – the largest desalination plant in Australia 
• the 43-mile (70 km) “North-South” Sugarloaf pipeline, to enable water to be 
transferred from the Goulburn River, in northern Victoria, to the Sugarloaf Reservoir 
near Melbourne. This was accompanied by the Northern Victoria Irrigation Renewal 
Project, which aimed to modernize, and reduce losses from, delivery infrastructure 
and irrigation management, with the savings to be shared between Melbourne, 
irrigators and the environment.  
Both infrastructure schemes were opposed by various stakeholders, including community and 
irrigation organizations. The Victorian Auditor-General (2008) acknowledged the emergency 
water security context and the tight timelines required to finalize the 2007 Water Plan, but noted 
that it was finalized with “minimal stakeholder consultation [and] inadequate levels of rigor 
applied to estimate the costs, benefits and risks of some of the key component projects.”  
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The Victorian Government’s intention in Our Water Our Future (Victorian Government 2007) 
was to “enable Melbourne to move off restrictions to the more secure level of service they 
historically received.” The Victorian Desalination Project was not the most cost-effective option, 
and was not implemented in a staged way, but nevertheless it was a rainfall-independent 
source capable of supplying up to 150 billion litres a year, around one-third of Melbourne's 
annual water consumption. Now constructed, the desalination plant provides insurance against 
future dry conditions by supplementing Melbourne's existing catchment supplies.51  
In 2002 the Victorian Government had set a statewide target of reusing 20% of all wastewater 
inflows to treatment plants by 2010 (Victorian Government 2002). Driven by the joint goals of 
water security during drought and reducing the nitrogen loading to Port Phillip Bay, this target 
was exceeded at a statewide level, including in Melbourne where 22.8% of wastewater was 
recycled in 2009/2010 (Marsden Jacob Associates 2012). 
Two Class A recycled water schemes were established in 2005 to supply recycled water from 
treatment plants to the Werribee and Eastern Irrigation schemes. Melbourne also saw growth in 
the allocation of recycled water to urban uses, including residential and industrial uses, although 
the total volumes were substantially less than those used by irrigation schemes. 
One example of a residential water recycling scheme that was developed during the drought is 
the Aurora Water Reuse Scheme, developed by Yarra Valley Water. Aurora’s water reuse 
scheme is part of a large-scale greenfield residential development in Melbourne’s northern 
urban fringe. The overall residential development was launched in 2006 and is due for 
completion around 2025–2030. The scheme was designed to serve 8,500 homes with recycled 
water for toilet flushing, laundry and garden watering, and public open space irrigation. It took 
around 8 years to progress from the earliest feasibility discussions to commissioning the 
recycled water treatment plant in 2009 (ISF 2013). Various operational difficulties constrained 
the volume of recycled water provided in the early years of its operation, and the costs of the 
scheme ended up being higher than expected, due mainly to institutional and regulatory 
changes. Nevertheless, Aurora was valuable because it pioneered a recycling scheme in 
metropolitan Melbourne and enabled the industry to learn how to identify and deal with 
operational, institutional, and regulatory risks. Although its overall contribution to recycling 
volumes is small (about 3% of the overall target), it provided an opportunity for learning within 
the industry and the utility (ISF 2013).  
 
Table 4.8 – Supply measures implemented during the Melbourne drought (ATSE 2012, PC 
2011) 
Infrastructure Capital 
































USD 540M See below. 








The Millennium Drought officially ended in 2010 with the highest catchment rainfall and inflows 
since 1996 (Melbourne Water 2016). By the end of 2011, Melbourne’s dam levels had 
recovered to around 65% and remained between 65% and 80%.52 With a total dam storage 
                                                       
51 DELWP (2016) Victorian Desalination Project. http://www.depi.vic.gov.au/water/urban-water/desalination-project 
52 http://www.melbournewater.com.au/waterdata/waterstorages/Pages/Storages-over-the-years.aspx  
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capacity that is large compared to mean annual inflow, the inter-annual carryover of Thomson is 
a key factor underpinning drought security.  
 
Due to the availability of surface water since the drought was broken, the 120,000 AF/a (150 
Gl/a) Melbourne desalination plant (the largest in Australia) has not been used because 
Melbourne’s dams did not fall to levels that require supply to be ordered from the plant. This is 
similar to events which have occurred in other jurisdictions.  
 
 Also, due to the availability of low-cost surface water from Melbourne’s dams, the North-South 
pipeline has seen limited use. The North-South pipeline was completed in early 2010 and 
operated for only 6 months that year, following a change of government in Victoria in late 2010. 
A pre-election commitment by the new government resulted in the North-South pipeline being 
used in times of ‘critical human need’. This means the pipeline will only be used when the 
combined volume of Melbourne’s dams goes below 30% of full capacity on 30 November in any 
year, or when there is a need to use the pipeline’s off takes for fire-fighting purposes 
(Melbourne Water 2012). This has resulted in very limited use since 2010.  
In addition, water restrictions were lifted in late 2012 (while permanent water savings rules 
remain applicable at all times), and the long-established state government water efficiency 
rebates finally closed in 2015. As a result of the rebates closing, most of the water retailer 
programs have also closed. Since the drought, water utilities in Melbourne continue to work on 
more holistic integrated water management approaches to delivering Melbourne’s urban water 
services. This includes making use of alternative water sources – like recycled water and 
stormwater – to reduce pressure on our drinking water supplies while improving the livability of 
our communities.53  
 
Key lessons 
Managing crisis and opportunity 
Water management strategies implemented as drought response strategies (as well as long-
term strategies) highlighted how water shortages can drive both innovations, with long-term 
benefits, and crisis-driven, politicized decision-making. The utilities and the state government 
embarked on a range of water conservation initiatives and the drought represented an 
opportunity to target a wide range of users, and to commence exploration, research and testing 
of innovative new approaches to restrictions (although these were not ultimately implemented). 
Water efficiency programs that achieved structural changes had a longer-term impact on water 
savings, ongoing water security during drought, and deferral of need for augmentations. Also, 
as the drought worsened, large-scale supply-side infrastructure investments that had previously 
not been considered as part of planning processes were rapidly put forward. Several of these 
large-scale, supply-side schemes were implemented and may be viewed by some as politically 
unpopular and financially costly compared to other more cost-effective options to save or supply 
water and didn’t incorporate staging that could have saved billions of dollars of unnecessary 
investment. However, now constructed, the Victorian Desalination Project (VDP) is a rainfall-




Melbourne’s Drought Response Coordination Committee – which included representatives of 
the state government policy and program agencies, the bulk or wholesale supplier, and three 
retailers – demonstrated the importance and value of institutional coordination to enable 
implementation of a cohesive, effective water savings program during drought. The water 
utilities and government also collaborated significantly on investing in critical research, and in 
monitoring, evaluating, and modeling to support effective water efficiency programming. This 
collaboration ranged from end use assessment and modeling, to investigating new and 
innovative approaches to responding to drought. 
Melbourne’s three metropolitan retailers have drawn on lessons from the drought to revise the 
Drought Response Plans to incorporate a more adaptive water management approach for 
Melbourne’s water security and drought response (Tan et al. 2015). A key element is 
                                                       
53 http://www.melbournewater.com.au/whatwedo/Liveability-and-
environment/Integrated_Water_Management/Pages/Integrated-water-management.aspx  
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collaboration between Melbourne Water and the three retailers to produce an annual “Water 
Outlook for Melbourne” (Melbourne Water et al. 2016) that includes information on water 
storages, use, system performance, and water security action plans (including both supply and 
demand options) corresponding to three “zones” of water security, “high”, “medium” and “low”.  
Speaking and listening 
In Melbourne, regular customer surveys indicated strong support for restrictions throughout 
most of the drought, and the water conservation, efficiency, and restriction programs introduced 
by the Victorian Government, Melbourne Water and the three retailers sought to include and 
communicate to a wide range of users across sectors. This promoted the “all in it together” 
sentiment crucial for public support and action on water conservation. However, at higher levels 
of restrictions, which resulted in ongoing impacts on public and private gardens, support for 
restrictions waned. 
The planning processes leading up to the drought, including for the CRSWS, included strong 
community engagement. There was significant community engagement during the drought 
period to understand preferences and needs, for example around restrictions. However, during 
the drought, community engagement to inform major supply decisions was not as strong. 
Picking the low hanging fruit 
As in other jurisdictions, analysis was undertaken on the potential for accelerated water 
efficiency options to “flatten the depletion curve” of water storages, in order to defer the capital 
investment for large-scale supply options to come on line. In Melbourne, integration of short-
term and long-term impacts – through the inclusion of drought response measures within a 
long-term water supply and demand strategy that incorporates the impact of population growth 
and climate change – was key to water system planning undertaken prior to the drought. 
However, the large-scale supply investments implemented were contentious in terms of impacts, 
costs (relative to other options) and concerns about taking water from water-stressed rural 
areas, while others considered these augmentations as insurance policies against drought and 
climate change.  
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